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SUMMARY 
 
Fiscal stress is an important and recurring problem that states face. Research to date on 
state fiscal stress involves, predominantly, cross-sectional and case study analyses and 
does not address the effectiveness of state responses. Many of these studies use different 
definitions and measures of fiscal stress compounding the difficulty of comparing fiscal 
stress findings. The present research effort adds to the fiscal stress literature by (1) 
clarifying the meaning of fiscal stress in the state context, (2) developing a measure of 
fiscal stress that operationalizes this meaning and is comparable across units, and 3) using 
this measure analyzes patterns in and the effectiveness of state responses. Fiscal stress is 
measured using four indexes: budget, cash, long-run, service-level. Eleven financial 
indicators, calculated using data from state Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
(CAFRs), are used to create these indexes for all fifty states for the years 2002-2009. 
Descriptive analysis compares state fiscal stress levels (grouped into low, moderate, and 
high fiscal stress by cluster analysis) to state economic growth rates, state responses, and 
institutional factors yielding several findings. First, states do not use an incremental or 
punctuated equilibrium strategy in responding to fiscal stress; nor do their responses 
follow the pattern predicted by Cutback Management theory. Second, institutional factors 
affect both the levels of fiscal stress and state responses to fiscal stress. Regression 
analysis supports and extends these findings. First, short-term responses of expenditure 
cuts, tax increases, and rainy day fund use do not affect state fiscal stress levels. Second, 
these responses have long-term effects on fiscal stress levels. A major implication of this 
research is that there is very little states can do in the short-term to reduce fiscal stress. 
However, by balancing expenditures and revenues states can set themselves up to 
weather the next economic downturn with lower levels of fiscal stress. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Every few years, newspapers are filled with bad news about U.S. state 
government finances, billion dollar budget deficits, dramatic cuts to programs and 
services, and sometimes government furloughs and layoffs. During the national recession 
that began in December 2007, many but not all states followed this well-worn pattern. 
Similar to business cycles, public budgeting and finance literature periodically focuses on 
the issues of fiscal stress, budget deficits, and budgeting with constrained resources. Over 
the past 30 years, research on state experiences of fiscal stress has clustered around 
national recessions, including those in 1982, 1990-91, and 2001. The 50 states provide an 
ideal laboratory for studying responses to and consequences of dramatic economic shifts 
and particularly, economic decline. States differ in their budget structures, protocols and 
processes, political and socioeconomic cultures, and demographics.  On the other hand, 
most states are bound by balanced budget requirements that necessitate action to close 
budget gaps arising during economic downturns (Hou and Smith 2006; NCSL 2010).  
 A focus on governmental fiscal stress in the United States, initially at the 
municipal level, began with the near default of New York City in 1975 and subsequent 
problems in other cities (Levine 1978). As cities’ problems continued, often due to the 
ebb and flow of the business cycle and demographic changes, the problems faced by 
states also gained recognition (Bahl 1984; Gold 1992; Ross and Greenfield 1980). State 
fiscal stress is a recurring problem, therefore the need to know the best short-term and 
long-term responses, is perennial. The current difficulties in state fiscal situations adds 
urgency to the problem, though understanding the best way to manage stress will be no 
less important once states’ budgets balance.  
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 The fiscal stress literature is largely silent on effective strategies for dealing with 
its occurrence (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). Part of this is likely due to the cyclical 
nature of fiscal stress; eventually as the economy improves so do state fiscal situations. 
However, lengthy periods of economic stagnation or decline in some regions of the U.S. 
point to the need for practical advice on the best way to minimize fiscal stress. Though 
states’ options for responding to fiscal stress are relatively limited – reduce expenditures, 
increase revenues, tap rainy day funds or reserves, and implement efficiency measures – 
a well-designed strategy for dealing with fiscal stress can minimize the short and long-
term negative effects (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). 
To address some of the gaps in current literature, this research proposes 
development of a new measure of state fiscal stress and then, using this measure, 
examines state responses to economic decline. In this analysis the following questions are 
addressed: (1) How is state fiscal stress defined and measured in the existing literature? 
(2) Is there a better measure of fiscal stress? And, if so, why is such a measure more 
reliable and valid? (3) Do state characteristics affect their experience of fiscal stress (as 
measured here) and/or influence their choice of responses? (4) Are some states able to 
navigate better through periods of fiscal stress than other states, and if so, why? (5) Are 
certain state responses more effective at reducing or alleviating fiscal stress? and, (6) 
Does the type of response a state uses in one period of fiscal stress affect its stress levels 
in subsequent periods of fiscal stress? 
1.1 Motivation for Study 
 Effects from the recent “Great Recession” resulted in large budget deficits in 
many states over the last three years (2008 to 2011). With a slow and uneven economic 
recovery, budget deficits are expected to continue into fiscal years 2012 and 2013 
(McNichol et al 2011). Indeed, the state budget repercussions of this economic downturn 
have extended several years longer than the length (December 2007 – June 2009) of the 
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national recession (McNichol et al 2011). In fiscal year 2009, 45 states faced a total 
budget deficit of $109.9 billion. The budget deficits continued into fiscal year 2010 with 
48 states facing total budget deficits of around $196 billion or 29 percent of state budgets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Total State General Fund Revenues, Fiscal Years 2002 - 2011 
 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the State (Fall Edition)  
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As shown in the figures above, neither revenue collections nor total state 
expenditures have returned to their pre-recession levels. This situation has direct 
repercussions not just for state budgets but also for state residents. Fiscal stress 
experienced by state governments generates interest, in part, due to the direct impact that 
revenue increases and expenditure cuts have on the public.  For example, since the most 
recent recession began, California has issued IOUs instead of paying creditors, teachers 
in Hawaii were furloughed for seventeen days in one year, Florida increased tuition at all 
of its public universities by 15 percent, and the State of Washington intends to increase 
premiums on health plans for low-income residents by 70 percent (Johnson et al 2010; 
Knutson 2010). Not surprisingly, states are closing their budget deficits by reducing aid 
Figure 1.2: Total State General Fund Expenditures, Fiscal Years 2002 -2011 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (Fall Edition) 
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to cities, effectively passing budget problems from states to cities (Cooper 2011). Use of 
this balancing technique has grown as federal stimulus dollars have dried up. Cuts in aid 
to cities – unlike cuts in some state services – are likely to result in visible and stark 
reductions in direct services to the public (e.g., closed libraries, unfilled potholes, fewer 
police and firefighters) (Cooper 2011). While state responses to fiscal stress differ, the 
effects on citizens are profound.   
 Besides the practical ramifications of fiscal stress, the non-theoretical and at times 
confusing nature of the academic discussion on fiscal stress also motivated this study. 
Apart from the work of Levine (1978, 1979, 1980) and Levine et al (1981a) in 
developing the “cutback management” literature, no budget theory explicitly considers 
how governments budget under constrained resources, how they will respond to fiscal 
stress, and why some responses may work better than others.  
1.2 Contributions to Literature 
Research to date on state fiscal stress involves, predominantly, cross-sectional and 
case study analyses. Research tends to concentrate on the causes of fiscal stress and state 
responses, but not on the effectiveness of state responses (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). 
Many of these studies use different definitions and measures of fiscal stress that 
compound the difficulty in identifying the effects of state responses to fiscal stress. The 
present research effort adds to the fiscal stress literature by (1) clarifying the meaning of 
fiscal stress in the state context and (2) proposing a new measure of fiscal stress that 
operationalizes this clarified meaning and is comparable across states and years. This 
measure takes advantage of improved cross-state financial reporting.  
Building on previous work conducted at the municipal level (Lewis 1984; Downs 
and Rocke 1984; Bartle 1996) and state level (Dougherty and Klase 2009), this research 
delves into how state responses to fiscal stress vary by the severity of fiscal stress through 
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explicitly comparing three budget frameworks: incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, 
and cutback management theory. 
 Case study and cross-sectional analyses provide only limited insight into which 
responses, if any, help advance a state out of fiscal stress. Even less is known about how 
state responses to one period of economic decline impact the fiscal stress experienced in a 
subsequent period. To better understand the effects of state budget and fiscal 
management on fiscal stress, this study uses an eight-year panel data set. This section 
adds to the literature by (1) deepening our understanding of the effectiveness of responses 
to fiscal stress, (2) using the state Coincident Index developed by the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve to capture the effect of state economic conditions on responses to fiscal 
stress and (3) assessing the longer-term impacts of responses to fiscal stress. Results from 
this research may inform state policy makers, budget and finance officers and managers 
of effective short-term and long-term solutions to fiscal stress. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this dissertation is to construct a valid and comparable 50-state fiscal 
stress measure following the methodology of Wang et al (2007); and to then use this 
measure to test the effectiveness of state responses. State comprehensive annual financial 
reports (CAFRs) from 2002 to 2009 will be used to create four indices, each measuring a 
dimension of fiscal stress: budget solvency, cash solvency, long-term solvency, and 
service-level solvency. Next, cluster analysis will be used to group states into low, 
medium, and high categories of fiscal stress. Descriptive analysis will be used to assess 
patterns in fiscal stress responses, assess the validity of theoretical propositions on state 
responses at different levels of fiscal stress severity as well as the relationship between 
state demographic and institutional characteristics and fiscal stress levels. Regression 
analysis will be used to analyze the effectiveness of fiscal stress responses in lowering 
fiscal stress levels.  
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 This analysis is limited by several factors. The period of study, eight years, is due 
to the availability of government-wide state data that began to be collected in fiscal year 
2002. For the purposes of this study, the range of economic conditions both at the state 
and national level minimize the effects of the limited time frame.  
1.4 Organization  
 The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the 
theoretical and empirical framework for understanding how states respond to fiscal stress 
as well as the responses available to them. Chapter 3 covers the range of meanings 
assigned to fiscal stress in the literature and synthesizes a meaning that will be used 
throughout this research. In addition, this chapter covers the range of fiscal stress 
measures and the strengths and weaknesses of the most common state fiscal stress 
measures. In Chapter 4, the fiscal stress measure to be used in this analysis is constructed 
and tested against existing measures and coincident economic trends. Chapter 5 contains 
a descriptive analysis of state responses in light of fiscal stress severity, assesses the 
usefulness of the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chapter 2, and also looks for 
relationships between state institutional characteristics and the severity of fiscal stress. In 
this chapter states are divided into three categories of fiscal stress severity using cluster 
analysis. Chapter 6 details the data and methodology used to analyze the effectiveness of 
fiscal stress measures both within the short term and long-term. Chapter 7 discusses 
analytical findings, offers policy implications from this work and presents considerations 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
BUDGETARY RESPONSES TO FISCAL STRESS 
 
 No single theory explains the intricacies of the public budgeting process, the 
influence of political institutions and socioeconomic conditions on management choices, 
and the pattern of choices public organizations will make in an environment of 
constrained resources (Rubin 1990; Bartle 2001). While several theories provide a 
context for the decisions of budget actors, empirical work on the influence of budget and 
political institutions on state decision-making is also important to set the context and 
describe the environment that state budget and policy makers face. This analysis 
considers the decisions state budget actors make in conditions of fiscal stress. For this, 
budget theory provides a context and some guidance but not unequivocal certainty of 
how decisions are made under fiscal stress, why these decisions are made or the results 
expected from such decisions.  
Three theories offer guidance on how states will react to stress – two primarily 
focus on periods of growth (though subsequent research has considered resource 
constrained environments), and the third theory was developed and specifically 
formulated to consider how local governments react to fiscal stress. In this chapter, these 
budget theories – incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, and cutback management – are 
described with particular emphasis on their application to fiscal stress conditions. 
Research findings about the role of budget and political institutions in shaping 
government responses to fiscal stress are also considered and used to deepen our 
contextual understanding of decision-making under fiscal stress. 
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Maryland’s recent budget woes illustrate the extent to which the budget process 
and fiscal stress are inextricably linked. In fiscal year 2012, Maryland – for the third 
straight year – faces an imbalance between expected revenues and planned expenditures1, 
one manifestation of fiscal stress (McNichol et al 2011). Because of this imbalance, the 
focus of the governor, state legislature and interest groups is on the possibilities for 
implementing cost-saving measures (Wagner 2010).  Some options open to the governor, 
who must submit a balanced budget to the legislature, include across-the-board cuts to 
local education aid, reducing payments to mental health providers, shifting responsibility 
for teacher pension costs to counties and increasing hospital contributions to the state’s 
insurance program for the poor (Wagner 2010). In this case, the immediate need to 
address fiscal stress directly impacts the focus of budget decision-makers on specific 
balancing options, the political viability of programmatic changes, and the size of budget 
increases or decreases. The imperative, often constitutional, to balance budgets is the 
major driver of state responses to fiscal stress. As will be explained in the next chapter, 
budget deficits are not the only manifestation of state fiscal stress, however; they receive 
the majority of the attention.   
Questions central to this analysis include those regarding state characteristics that 
may influence the level of their fiscal stress, the timing and responses to fiscal stress, 
differences in balancing strategies depending on the severity of fiscal stress, and the 
effectiveness of these responses. The answers to these questions depend on a number of 
factors that comprise public budgeting theory, including: the nature of relationships 
between and among budgeting stakeholders and decision-makers, the role of institutional 
and socioeconomic factors in budgetary decision-making, the pace of budgetary decision-
making and the guidance decision-makers use to shape budget policy (Rubin 2005).  
                                                
 
 
1 Despite ending fiscal year 2011 with a budget surplus, Maryland’s governor estimates the state will still 
face a budget deficit of $700 million in fiscal year 2012 (Linksey 2011). 
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2.1 State Responses to Fiscal Stress 
 States have four2 common responses to fiscal stress: reduce spending, increase 
revenue, implement efficiency gains that provide the same level of services for less 
money, or transfer funds between accounts (such as tapping into rainy day funds) (Gold 
1995; Druker and Robinson 1993; Grizzle and Trogen 1994; Willoughby and Lauth 
2003; Sobel and Holcombe 1996a; Douglas and Gaddie 2002; Hou 2003; Hou 2004). 
Current research on state government fiscal stress focuses on how states respond to stress 
and, in some cases, why they respond to stress in certain ways (Gold 1995; Druker and 
Robinson 1993; Grizzle and Trogen 1994; and Willoughby and Lauth 2003). Many of the 
effects of fiscal stress felt by state citizens are a direct result of how these governments 
respond to stress. Understanding why states respond in certain ways and how 
organizational characteristics shape their responses provides a more nuanced view of 
state responses to fiscal stress. Besides the type of response, the sequence of responses 
have important effects on how fiscal stress is experienced within the states. 
2.1.1 Types of Responses 
 Reducing expenditures is a timely response to fiscal stress and can take 
many forms, from across-the-board to targeted cuts. Most budgetary responses to fiscal 
stress undertaken in the current fiscal year are done through spending and not tax changes 
(Fisher 1988). Poterba (1994) also finds that expenditure and tax changes are the largest 
(in terms of dollar amounts) responses to fiscal stress. As seen in state responses to the 
NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States3 strategies to eliminate budget deficits, also take the 
                                                
 
 
2 Even though borrowing specifically to alleviate budget gaps is prohibited in most states (Dougherty and 
Klase 2009), states occasionally engage in borrowing funds to relieve fiscal stress (Gold 1995). 
3 The Fiscal Survey of the States is published twice a year in the fall and spring by the National Association 
of State Budget Officers’ (NASBO) and the National Governors Association. Publication of this series 
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form of employee furloughs, layoffs, hiring freezes, salary reductions and reducing aid to 
local governments (NASBO 2010). Table 2.1 provides a sample of budget balancing 
strategies states used in FY 2010. Local aid includes revenue sharing programs that 
provide general funds to local governments or earmarked funds for street repair, local 
schools, libraries, and local jails. Since the 2001 recession, expenditure cuts, especially 
across-the-board and targeted cuts, are the most common measure taken by states during 
economic downturns (NASBO 2009).  
 
Table 2.1: Examples of FY 2010 Budget Balancing Strategies 
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When faced with fiscal stress, states may try to minimize declining revenue by 
raising taxes or user fees. In many states, fiscal stress occurs because an economic 
downturn exposes an ongoing structural deficit or results in a temporary, but significant, 
cyclical deficit (Gold 1995; Hackbart and Ramsey 2004). Unlike expenditure cuts, many 
states are limited in the amount and frequency with which they can raise taxes (Braun et 
al 1993). In addition, the political costs of promoting tax increases during an economic 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
began in 1979. The results are based on field surveys completed by Governors’ state budget officers in each 
of the 50 states. The Fiscal Survey includes information on states’ general fund revenues, expenditures, and 
balances as well as actions states reported taking to balance budget shortfalls. The fall edition of the Fiscal 
Survey reports on enacted state budgets, while the spring edition reports on governor’s proposed budgets.  
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downturn are well understood by politicians (Braun et al 1993). Tax increases are also 
more likely to go into affect the fiscal year following a budget shortfall, although they 
can occur within the same fiscal year (Poterba 1994). Despite these limitations, there 
does appear to be a relationship between severity of fiscal stress and the use of tax 
increases. In response to the 1990-1991 recession, states with the most severe levels of 
fiscal stress enacted the largest increases in taxes; with most increases going into effect as 
the period of fiscal stress ended (Gold 1995; Poterba 1994; Kalambokidis and 
Reschovsky 2005). In contrast, in response to the 2001 recession, states were much less 
likely to use tax increases to deal with budget problems (Kalambokidis and Reschovsky 
2005; Maag and Merriman 2007). States are also more likely to enact tax increases after 
gubernatorial elections (Gold 1995). Tax increases have tended to result in a more 
balanced distribution of tax revenue. For instance, states with more reliance on income 
taxes tended to increase sales taxes or vice versa (Gold 1995). In terms of relieving fiscal 
stress in one year, tax increases tend to have delayed effects, since a tax increase in one 
year will not be felt until the next fiscal year. If a period of fiscal stress extends over 
several years, then increases in taxes or user fees may then provide needed relief. In 
addition, if the tax changes broaden the tax base or adjust previously inefficient tax 
systems, this may contribute to a more elastic tax system that then can protect the state 
against future periods of fiscal stress or reduce the severity of stress at a future period 
(Gold 1995). States increase taxes to raise revenues in times of fiscal stress using 
increases to sales taxes, personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, cigarette and 
tobacco taxes, motor fuel taxes and alcohol taxes. In the last decade, fee increases are the 
single most popular method of increasing revenues (NASBO 2010). Fee increases include 
user fees, university fees, transportation/motor vehicle fees, and business related fees.  
State efforts to produce the same level of programs or services at lower cost are 
characterized as efficiency measures. Examples of these activities include reorganizing 
agencies and privatization of public activities. These measures typically take place at the 
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agency or program level and so are hard to measure and assess quantitatively, especially 
across states. In response to cutbacks in Georgia during the 1990-1991 recession, 
agencies consolidated programs with similar or identical activities, outsourced some 
human resource functions and reduced middle management positions (Willoughby and 
Lauth 2003).  In a multiple state study, however, Druker and Robinson (1993) found the 
opposite trend in middle management reduction, with few states attempting to flatten 
organizational structures and preserve service-providing positions. 
 State rainy day funds have proliferated since the 1980’s with 48 states currently 
using some form of budget stabilization fund (Hou 2004; NASBO 2010). These funds, 
called budget reserve funds, revenue-shortfall accounts, cash-flow accounts, budget 
stabilization funds, or rainy day funds, are intended to stabilize the ups and downs of 
revenue collection with overspending in prosperous years curtailed by putting surpluses 
in the reserve fund and cutbacks in less prosperous years minimized by making transfers 
out of the reserve fund (Hou 2004; NASBO 2010). Indeed this is one area of state 
response to fiscal stress that has been studied extensively using quantitative methods as 
well as cross-sectional and panel data. Important characteristics of rainy day funds 
include whether states are legally required to fund to them, the size of fund balances, caps 
on a maximum balance, as well as limits on when and how reserve funds can be accessed 
(Sobel and Holcombe 1996a; Douglas and Gaddie 2002; Hou 2004; Hou 2006).  
 The structure of rainy day funds plays a role in easing or worsening state fiscal 
stress.  Specifically concerning the 1990-1991 recession, the mere presence of a rainy day 
fund did not necessarily relieve the fiscal stress experienced by a state (Sobel and 
Holcombe 1996a). A panel analysis using state data from 1979-1999 confirms this 
conclusion (Hou 2003). However states with a legal requirement to fund rainy day funds 
experienced lower levels of fiscal stress (Sobel and Holcombe 1996a; Douglas and 
Gaddie 2002). An interesting relationship found by Douglas and Gaddie (2002) is that 
states with higher rainy day fund balances are more likely to experience fiscal stress – the 
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authors explain this seemingly counterintuitive finding as states that expect more 
volatility in their revenues fund their rainy day funds at higher levels. Such results point 
to the difficulty in determining the causality between rainy day fund existence, use and 
fiscal stress. Hou (2003) found a negative relationship between higher reserve fund 
balance and fiscal stress. This expected relationship may reflect the larger sample size (48 
states over 21 years) as well as the use of a different measure of fiscal stress. Douglas and 
Gaddie (2002) use the sum of tax increases and expenditure shortfall as a percentage of 
general fund expenditures in one year as their measures of fiscal stress; in contrast, Hou 
(2003) uses general fund expenditure gaps as the dependent variable. Another factor, 
demonstrated in the economic downturn in 2001, is that many states experienced budget 
shortfalls so large that rainy day funds were not able to make up the difference 
(Kalambokidis and Reschovsky 2005). These studies suggest that rainy day funds serve a 
countercyclical function and that their structures determine to their relative effectiveness.  
 These responses, especially spending cuts, tax increases, and rainy day fund use, 
do not operate in isolation. Use of rainy day funds may reduce the need to cut 
expenditures and cutting expenditures may reduce the need for tax or user fee increases. 
In a review of state responses to the 2001 recession and its aftermath, Maag and 
Merriman (2007) find that states with higher savings (rainy day fund balances) were able 
to weather the recession without tax increases or substantial spending cuts. These 
findings suggest that states can engage in a trade-off among responses to successfully 
battle fiscal stress. 
2.1.2 Effect of Budgetary Institutions and Politics on State Responses 
A large body of research looks at how the interplay of politics and institutions 
(e.g. tax and expenditure limitations, balanced budget rules, etc.) affect state responses to 
fiscal stress. This research highlights the additional constraints that state decision-makers 
face when dealing with fiscal stress – they must work within their own institutional 
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framework. Ignoring these institutions risks means glossing over major factors that 
influence why states act as they do. This section focuses on the branch of research that is 
pertinent to U.S. states. 
The general consensus among researchers investigating the role of budget 
institutions is that they do affect policy actions (Poterba 1996; Bohn and Inman 1996; 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995; Fatas and Mihov 2006; Hou and Smith 2010). Research 
on balanced budget rules – these apply to 49 of 50 states – concerns the extent to which 
different balanced budget rules affect the occurrence of budget deficits and how they 
influence state responses to these deficits. Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) found that states 
with stricter balanced budget rules are less likely to run budget deficits and in the event 
that they do, the deficits tend to be smaller than in states with less stringent rules. Most 
research focuses on how the budget rules affect the size and speed of state responses to 
deficits. Findings indicate that states with stricter budget rules are more responsive to 
deficits and tend to address the problem faster than do states with weaker rules (Poterba 
1994; Bohn and Inman 1996; Alesina and Bayoumi 1996). Poterba (1994), specifically 
looking at state responses during fiscal stress, found that states with weak anti-deficit 
rules (also called balanced budget rules) adjust spending less than those with stronger 
anti-deficit rules. Anti-deficit rules did not appear to affect state tax response to fiscal 
stress.  
The effect of balanced budget rules on state responsiveness to business cycles 
addresses the trade-off between fiscal discipline and the flexibility to spend more to 
support the state economy. While Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) found balanced budget 
rules limit a state’s budget flexibility, they found no economic costs to this. In contrast, 
Levinson (1998) notes, especially in larger states, that balanced budget rules may 
aggravate the effects of business cycle fluctuations.  
Research on tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) concerns both their effect on 
state responses to fiscal stress and the broader effect these rules have on state ability to 
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respond to the business cycle. Poterba (1994) shows that states with TELs are less likely 
than states without them to use a tax change in response to deficits. Others have found 
that TELs limit state ability to respond to budget deficits and business cycles (Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen 1995; Fatas and Mihov 2006). As with the balanced budget rules, the 
effect of these limitations depends upon one’s interpretation. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1995) suggest state inability to alter spending and tax levels due to economic pressures 
may produce budget deficits or restrict ability to spend more on programs needed during 
economic downturns. Fatas and Mihov (2006) suggest that while states with TELs have 
less discretion to respond to economic shocks, since their fiscal policy will be less 
volatile, they may be less likely to experience volatile business cycles in the first place. 
The effect of politics, specifically the cooperation between the legislative and executive 
branches held by different political parties, have also been found to influence the speed 
and type of response to budget deficits. States with governors from one party and 
legislative houses in control of the other party are more likely to run budget deficits (Alt 
and Lowry 1994) and less likely to respond aggressively to budget deficits with either 
spending cuts or tax increases (Poterba 1994). 
Taken together this research provides strong evidence that in analyzing states’ 
actions, and more importantly, the effect of different actions on states’ experience of 
fiscal stress – the institutional framework must be taken into account. Although the exact 
relationship between the institutional framework, a state’s response, and their broader 
experience of fiscal stress is not entirely clear, it is evident that these factors have an 
impact.  
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2.2 Incrementalism 
2.2.1 Background and Description of Theory 
The predominant theory of public budgeting is incrementalism (Swain and 
Hartley 2001; Tucker 1982). Application of incrementalism to public budgeting was first 
introduced by Aaron Wildavsky in The Politics of the Budgetary Process (1964), was 
clarified and tested by Wildavsky and two coauthors, M.A.H. Dempster and Otto A. 
Davis in the 1960’s and 1970’s and then refined further by Wildavsky in the early 1980’s 
and 1990’s.  This theory was largely in response to the reform orientation previously 
predominant in the field (Swain and Hartley 2001). The theory builds on the work of 
David Baybrooke and Charles Lindblom (1963) as well as that of Herbert Simon (1957) 
by applying concepts of incremental policy change and bounded rationality to the budget 
process and describes an organizational model for change (Swain and Hartley 2001; 
Dempster and Wildavsky 1979; Davis et al 1966). Incremental budget theory’s central 
tenet is that due to the large amount of information facing budget decision-makers and 
the complexity of the decisions they need to make, budget decision-makers use an 
incremental method to calculate the budget amounts each year. Using this method, they 
do not consider the entire range of programs or the entire range of alternatives to these 
programs. Instead, they use last year’s amount as the starting place and only consider a 
narrow range of increases or decreases (Dempster and Wildavsky 1979; Davis et al 1966; 
Wildavsky 1964). As a result, the budget process is not technically rational (i.e., it is not 
a comprehensive review of all the components and their alternatives). As clarified by 
Dempster and Wildavsky (1979) a budget process is incremental if based on two criteria: 
1) the decisions focus around the existing base and 2) the number of alternatives to 
existing programs considered are small. Another aspect of incrementalism is that of a fair 
share; that changes in expenditures (increases or decreases) will be communal and each 
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agency’s share of the budget will remain approximately the same (Swain and Hartley 
2001).  
These budgetary outcomes are the result of the roles budget actors play while 
applying incremental methods (Davis et al 1966). The roles are assigned specifically to 
actors in the federal budget process, but it is possible to generalize them to allow for their 
application to other levels of government. Agencies (federal agencies) advocate for 
increased expenditures, the executive budget office (Office of Management and Budget) 
has a bias towards reducing expenditures, the lower legislative house body with budget 
responsibility (House Appropriations Committee) wants to ensure constituents are served 
within the lowest possible expenditure, the upper legislative house body with budget 
responsibility (Senate Appropriations Committee) is the forum for agencies to appeal the 
lower house’s actions and the executive (President) proposes the budget that then must be 
approved by the legislative body. Agencies are expected to ask for more funds for their 
programs and the executive budget office knows that their role is to fit agency requests 
within the limits of the budget. The results of this budget process as defined by 
incremental budget theory are a negotiated discussion of percentages, not absolute 
numbers, and are relatively stable over time.  
The incremental method is not immune from or deaf to outside political, social or 
economic factors (Davis et al 1974; Dempster and Wildavsky 1979; Wildavsky 1986; 
Dezhbakhsh et al 2003), although it is often presented this way (Ryu 2009).  As 
described, the incremental method of budgeting occurs within a political process (Davis 
et al 1966). Any factors that affect the political process and how budget actors interact 
with one another will potentially change the outcomes of the budget process (Davis et al 
1966; Davis et al 1974; Swain and Hartley 2001). Political factors, such as which party is 
in control of the legislative houses and whether the legislative and executive branches are 
controlled by different parties; economic factors such as the predicted size of the budget 
deficit and whether the economy is in recession; and social factors, such as whether the 
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country is in a state of war and the ratio of the adult to youth populations, are examined 
to determine their effect on budget outcomes (Davis et al 1974). Dezhbakhsh et al (2003) 
find that factors that lead to political vulnerabilities such as presidential elections, 
persistent and large deficits as well as Democratic party control over the political process 
and changes in the party in control of the executive or legislative branches lead to 
changes in the regularity of budget changes and the closeness of these changes to current 
base levels of the budget. 
As mentioned, this theory and the description of the relationships between budget 
actors are based on the federal budget process in the U.S. (Wildavsky 1964; Davis et al 
1966; Dempster and Wildavsky 1979 and Davis et al 1974). Much of the empirical work 
that followed also focused on the U.S. federal budget process (Wanat 1974; Tucker 1982; 
Padgett 1980; Gist 1982; and Dezhbakhsh et al 2003), although not exclusively. In 
applying the incremental theory of budgeting to sub national units of analysis, scholars 
have taken the core elements of the theory and contextualized them to sub national 
budget actors and budget processes, and tested for indications of the incremental method 
(Lewis 1984; Lewis 1988; Downs and Rocke 1984; Rickards 1984; Hackbart and 
Ramsey 2004).  
2.2.2 Application of Theory to Situations of Fiscal Stress  
Incrementalism offers several insights into how states facing fiscal stress will 
react. In early and subsequent research, Davis et al (1966) and Dempster and Wildavsky 
(1979) used the terms increment and decrement to describe changes to the budget base. 
Researchers concerned with budgeting in periods of fiscal stress adapted the term 
decrement to decrementalism (Lewis 1984; Bartle 1996). The term signifies an 
incremental budget process – with examination of the base, concern for stakeholder 
harmony, and limited consideration of alternatives – only instead of increases to the 
budget base there are decreases to the budget base.  
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Taking the broad tenets of incrementalism, we expect states to retain the 
regularity of their budget processes, for the roles of budget actors to be preserved, and for 
the base to be the focus of conversation. Using these ideas, several researchers have 
sought to pinpoint the use of the incremental method within the tactics of local 
governments facing fiscal stress as well (Rickards 1984; Lewis 1984; Downs and Rocke 
1984). Their findings are not unanimous, but through their operationalization of 
incrementalism at different levels of government the types of hypotheses and tests needed 
to determine the use of incremental methods is illustrated. They also provide a framework 
for testing the effectiveness of incremental responses to fiscal stress. 
 At the municipal level, researchers applying incremental budget theory have 
found indications of incremental budgeting – operationalized as across-the-board and 
opportunistic cuts. Rickards (1984), in an analysis of 105 West German cities over nine 
years, finds incrementalism more likely in certain fiscal conditions. More populous cities 
are more likely to follow incremental budgeting patterns. The author speculates this is 
due to the larger size of the budget and the increased demands by interest groups that 
result in decision-makers relying more on “fair-share” rules. In contrast, a larger tax base 
is more likely to result in bigger changes to budgets because there is more revenue to start 
new programs. This suggests that cities with fewer revenues are more likely to 
demonstrate incremental budgeting.  
Looking at U.S. cities with the strongest and weakest economies between 1964 
and 1979, Lewis (1984) found evidence of incremental budgeting or in the case of 
economically depressed cities, decremental budgeting. Incremental budgeting was 
operationalized as similar budget cuts for different city departments, regardless of their 
importance to the provision of core city services. The results of this analysis support the 
incidence of decremental budgeting by cities experiencing revenue declines, with no 
obvious strategy or administrative focus on preserving one department’s budget over 
another’s. A caveat on the application of this study to fiscal stress is that the cities in the 
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sample did not suffer sustained periods of decline.  Therefore, Lewis (1984) suggests that 
decremental budgeting may not persist after multiple years of serious revenue declines. 
 In another study of U.S. cities, Downs and Rocke (1984) operationalize three 
incremental theories of budgetary decision-making: bureaucratic process theory (changes 
are incremental due to bounded rationality and inflexible organizational responses to 
change), interest group politics theory (changes are incremental to avoid upsetting 
interest groups), and managerial theory (overall budget increases are incremental due to 
mandatory spending requirements). While all three theories result in similar incremental 
outcomes during times of fiscal growth, they result in divergent outcomes in times of 
fiscal stress. This study tests how incrementalism in a fiscally stressed setting operates. 
Downs and Rocke (1984) find budgeting is essentially incremental (relatively small 
changes year to year) and that the fair share principle applies with no consistent 
departmental winners or losers – although this is not operationalized as across-the-board 
cuts. Furthermore, they find that in response to fiscal stress, budget cutting tends to take 
the path of least resistance (e.g. hiring freezes, deferred maintenance). The findings by 
Downs and Rocke (1984) mostly concur with those of Lewis (1984). 
 Wildavsky (1986) examined budgeting at the state level and found varying 
applications of incremental budgeting. The presence of various structural (or in another 
parlance, institutional) factors such as spending formulas, mandatory spending, 
earmarked tax revenues and federal grants for specific purposes constrain the choices 
available to state budgeters. In this analysis, it is not just bounded rationality that prevents 
decision-makers from considering all possible options. Rather, the structure of the budget 
and the budget process restrict comprehensive analysis. Wildavsky (1986) concludes that 
the most important factor for state budget decision-makers is revenue adequacy. A 
typology of budgeting divides states (or nations) into poor or wealthy with predictable or 
unpredictable revenues. Regardless of a state’s wealth, if revenues are unpredictable, a 
pattern of repetitive budgeting – in which the budget is made and remade throughout the 
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fiscal year – dominates. However, with predictable revenue – even if it is low – 
incremental budgeting will be the norm.  
2.2.3 Theoretical Implications for State Responses to Fiscal Stress  
 As discussed in the previous section, researchers have identified several practices 
associated with the incremental method of budgeting, specifically in times of fiscal stress. 
Across-the-board cuts, or at the very least not using targeted cuts, are described as 
indicative of the incremental method. In addition, the use of opportunistic reductions in 
expenditures and the lack of a discernable strategy or method in dealing with fiscal stress 
are also described as elements of a decremental strategy. The use of rainy day funds are 
not mentioned in relation to incrementalism, although this is more likely due to a research 
focus on municipal units of analysis than on anything else. Aggregate data on localities 
does not differentiate between funds for annual expenditures and rainy day funds 
(Wolkoff 1999), making it difficult to determine which municipalities use rainy day 
funds and their balances. Based on my review of incremental budgeting theory, rainy day 
fund use neither confirms nor contradicts incremental budgeting. Also using a rainy day 
fund can be categorized as opportunistic and allowing the continued avoidance of 
upsetting particular interest groups or agency heads. Also, to avoid upsetting budget 
stakeholders and avoid a comprehensive look at budget allocations, incrementalism 
suggests budget cutters will look to the easiest areas to trim. Opportunistic cuts include 
hiring freezes and slashing non-mandatory expenditures (Wildavsky 1986). A nuisance of 
incremental budgeting, particularly in times of fiscal stress, is that when state decision-
makers cannot confidently or accurately predict their revenue flow within a fiscal year 
the budget then must be made and remade. The practice of repetitive budgeting involves 
adjustments to budgeted expenditures throughout budget execution, as revenue repeatedly 
misses targeted amounts. 
 
 
23 
2.2.4 Criticisms and Limitations of Theory 
Since incrementalism has been the dominant theory of public budgeting for nearly 
50 years, criticism of it is abundant and varied. Much of the criticism focuses on the 
empirical work that uses the theory as a framework for understanding practical 
application – critics question the methodology used by Davis et al (1966), the unit of 
analysis, and the definition of an increment (Swain and Hartley 2001; Natchez and Bupp 
1973; Gist 1982; Berry 1990). Other criticism concerns the analytical and descriptive 
aspects of the theory. That is, some researchers equate incrementalism to a historical 
period of steady, across-the-board increases and not representative of current budgeting 
practice. Others question incrementalism’s usefulness in periods of revenue decline in 
addition to its adherence to a strictly non-rational orientation of budgeting (Rubin 1990; 
Schick 1983; Bozeman and Straussman 1982; LeLoup 1978; Premchand 1983). Of 
particular interest for the present study are criticisms concerning incrementalism’s 
description of the budget process. 
A persistent criticism of incrementalism centers on its portrayal of the budget 
process, as legislatively dominant, comprised of political trade-offs among multiple 
budget actors with only marginal adjustments made to the budget year after year. 
Scholars offer several different conceptions of how the budget process functions. For 
instance, the budget process is described as both top-down and bottom-up by Bozeman 
and Straussman (1982) in their critique of the theory. In their view, budgeting, at least 
since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (which created a federal executive budget 
process, a central budget office – now the Office of Management and Budget – the 
General Accounting Office – now the Government Accountability Office) has had both 
top-down and bottom-up elements. The authors argue that as chief executives face 
constrained revenues, top-down management will undermine the incremental nature of 
budgeting. The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act; that created budget 
committees, the Congressional Budget Office, and changed the fiscal year, among other 
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actions, is also credited with fundamentally changing the U.S. budget process and moved 
the process further away from incremental budgeting (LeLoup 1988).  
Although the terminology differs (LeLoup and Schick refer to micro- and macro- 
budgeting as opposed to top-down and bottom-up budgeting), the result is the same – 
chief executives, those in the legislative branch, program managers and other budget 
decision-makers are increasingly using non-incremental budget strategies. That is, 
throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, as economic and political environments changed, 
budget practices diverged from the predominant theory (Rubin 1990).  According to 
scholars critical of incrementalism, the theory may have been an accurate description of 
budgeting for a limited, historical time period but starting in the 1970’s certain factors 
including the growth in mandatory spending, entitlements, and reduced revenues reduced 
its accuracy (Rubin 1990; Schick 1983; Bozeman and Straussman 1982). 
In line with Schick’s discussion of macro budgetary adaptations, Premchand (1983) 
suggests that the tasks performed by the government and the decision-making approaches 
they undertake are too complex to be described as simply incremental and non-analytical. 
While warning against overly rationalist, comprehensive descriptions of budgeting, 
Premchand (1983) explains that budgetary decision-making may include goals, strategies, 
and an overarching framework without being unrealistic or even exceedingly rational. 
Some of the macro budgeting adaptations highlighted by Schick (1986) underscore this 
point: countries (such as Australia, Sweden, Finland and Britain) have adopted fiscal 
rules, targets and expanded multiyear budgeting. 
Closely related to critiques of incrementalism as only useful for limited historical 
periods are those that claim the theory does not accurately describe budgeting in periods 
of revenue decline (Schick 1983; Bozeman and Straussman 1982; Rubin 1990). These 
criticisms share a common interpretation of incrementalism; that it assumes growth will 
create a positive increment. Schick (1983) also points to the instability of ‘decremental’ 
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budgeting – when revenue decline is substantial, decision-makers may have to consider 
or reconsider significant budget changes in order to reach balance. 
Although these criticisms have merit, using a slightly more flexible definition of 
incrementalism, as Wildavsky (1986) does, allows for a broader application of the theory 
and, perhaps, a more complete picture of the public budgeting process and outcomes. As 
mentioned, several scholars have used incremental theory to investigate budgeting in 
periods of both revenue growth and decline (Downs and Rocke 1984; Rickards 1984; 
Lewis 1984) while others define strategies in periods of revenue decline as both 
incremental and non-incremental (Hackbart and Ramsey 2004). As noted by Swain and 
Hartley (2001) incrementalism still provides a better description of budgeting than other 
theories and perhaps more importantly, describes the characteristics of budgeting – 
political process, limited human capacity for review, and agencies’ desire for increased 
funding– such that most subsequent descriptions of the budget process build on 
incremental theory.  
2.3 Punctuated Equilibrium 
2.3.1 Background and Description of Theory 
Punctuated equilibrium is a theory of policy change developed in response to 
incremental theories of policy change and budgetary decision-making (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993). In short, punctuated equilibrium theory integrates incremental and non-
incremental policy change into a single theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The theory 
has been applied to agenda setting, policy change and budgetary policy. Its application to 
budgetary policy, in particular, has resulted in an expanding body of research on 
budgeting at the federal, state and local levels. The budget is often, although not 
exclusively, presented as the outcome of decision-making between multiple layers of 
government. The theory builds on incrementalism and does not overtly reject it; however, 
punctuated equilibrium theory offers a different explanation for why large changes can 
occur within the policy system (Jones et al 1998; Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
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Punctuated equilibrium makes several claims about the nature of policymaking 
and by extension the nature of budgetary decision-making. The theory further develops 
the concept of ‘shift points’ mentioned in early research on incrementalism (Jones et al 
1998). The policy arena is broken into policy subsystems that alternate between periods 
of stasis and change (Jones et al 1998; Jones et al 2003). Within these subsystems several 
characteristics are found: bounded rationality on the part of individuals and organizations, 
limited attention to any one issue, and multiple layers of decision-making and 
responsibility. The limited attention to issues on the policy agenda is drawn from 
Kingdon’s (1995) exposition of agenda setting. An issue may come to the forefront of 
attention for a number of reasons, but it is unlikely to maintain a high level of attention 
for a long period of time. In this setting an institution is defined as a set of individuals 
acting according to common rules resulting in collective outcomes (Jones et al 2003). 
Four major costs are found in this institutional setting: transaction costs, information 
costs, decision costs, and cognitive costs. Higher costs, termed friction, result in a slower 
organizational response to external stimuli. Multiple layers of organizational and 
individual decision-making and the resulting institutional frictions result in slow 
adjustment to changing external environments (Jones et al 2003). When applied to 
budgeting, these characteristics conspire to prevent government budgets from being 
quickly and easily adjusted to economic changes (or social and political changes) (Jones 
et al 1998). As a result, changes year after year will be small (incremental) until the 
system is forced, due to overwhelming urgency or an abundance of tension, to produce a 
dramatic change, a punctuation in the language of punctuated equilibrium advocates 
(Jones et al 2003; Breuing and Koski 2006).  
 As a result, scholars using the punctuated equilibrium theory as their framework 
focus on the following: (1) do budgets follow the expected pattern of stasis coupled with 
volatility? and (2) what institutional factors account for greater friction and more costly 
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collective decision-making and therefore cause a greater frequency or size of 
punctuations? 
2.3.2 Application of Theory to Situations of Fiscal Stress  
Punctuated equilibrium theory offers guidance on how states will respond to fiscal 
stress, although relatively little research focuses on this question directly. Scholars report 
a good deal of success in comparing actual budgeting patterns using national, state, local 
and international units of analysis to those predicted by the punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Jones et al 2009; Jones et al 2003; Jones et al 1998; Andersen and Mortensen 2009; 
Breuing and Koski 2006; Ryu 2009; Jordan 2003; Robinson et al 2007). According to 
Jones et al (2009), budgets experience periods of both stasis and volatility.  
Punctuated equilibrium theory generates several expectations about how states 
respond to fiscal stress. Institutional friction and bounded rationality, found at all levels 
of government, will likely result in slow responses to environmental changes, such as a 
recession. The slow response time may be exacerbated by institutional characteristics that 
make decisions, transactions, or information costs higher. In other words, a dramatic 
response to fiscal stress may not be observed in the year that the stress first manifests, 
instead appearing in subsequent years. The inability to respond to fiscal stress quickly 
may result in further fiscal problems for a government. Subsequent retrenchment 
responses therefore are more likely to be dramatic and to affect non-priority functions. 
 Regarding the effect of institutional and other environmental factors on budgeting 
patterns, the literature is far from clear. Particularly at the state and local levels of 
government, research on the role of institutional and economic factors, such as fiscal 
stress, a governor’s budgetary powers, and/or balanced budget requirements, are 
suggestive of the nature of relationships but not conclusive. The more control a governor 
has over the budget process, the higher information and transaction costs are and, as a 
result, punctuations occur with greater frequency (Breuing and Koski 2009). Institutional 
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friction also fosters increased punctuation. New York, with consistently late budget 
approval and a notoriously combative budget process, has more punctuations than any 
other state included in a study covering a 20-year period (Breuing and Koski 2006). On 
the other hand, divided government and type of balanced budget requirement were not 
found to influence the frequency of budget punctuations (Breuing and Koski 2006). 
 The frequency and size of punctuations across basic and developmental budget 
functions differ, at least in large, metropolitan cities (Jordan 2003). In this study, basic 
expenditures are defined as those for police, fire, and sanitation – essentially the core 
services of a municipality. Developmental expenditures are defined as those for parks, 
highways, and public buildings. Examining 38 cities over 27 years, Jordan (2003) finds 
that large punctuations are usually negative and that expenditures for developmental 
functions are more likely to experience large, negative punctuations in periods of 
economic decline. This suggests that in periods of fiscal stress, the brunt of expenditure 
cuts will be borne by developmental functions. In contrast to predictions by researchers 
using the incremental theory, punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that targeted cuts 
are to be expected in periods of fiscal stress. 
The effect of structural deficits may also play a role in the frequency of 
punctuated policy actions. Structural deficits are the result of an on-going gap between a 
state’s expenditures and revenues. As described by Hackbart and Ramsey (2004), 
structural deficits are the result of policy decisions to either expand state provided 
services without also expanding revenue sources or to cut taxes without a complementary 
reduction in state programs or services.  As the cause of structural deficits is policy-
driven, so too is the solution. However, Hackbart and Ramsey (2004) suggest that states 
tend to delay the revenue or expenditure decisions needed to correct a structural 
imbalance. As a result, the size of the policy change needed to correct a structural 
imbalance may increase – and as such, will result in more punctuated policy actions. 
Especially during periods of economic downturns, structural deficits that may have been 
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hidden by higher than expected revenue collections are likely to emerge and become 
more difficult to sustain. 
2.3.3 Theoretical Implications for State Responses to Fiscal Stress 
 Several practices and organizational factors are associated with punctuated policy 
actions in response to fiscal stress. Targeted cuts are the most often cited example of a 
punctuated policy action in response to fiscal stress (Hackbart and Ramsey 2004; Jordan 
2003). An advantage of operationalizing punctuated changes as targeted cuts is that it 
allows researchers to avoid the question of how big a change must be to qualify as a 
punctuated, not an incremental, change. Hackbart and Ramsey (2004) classify rainy day 
fund use as an incremental response because it allows states to avoid making difficult 
decisions and essentially to defer programmatic action. Organizational characteristics 
such as the presence of structural deficits and the extent of a governor’s control over the 
budget process are highlighted as causes of punctuated actions (Hackbart and Ramsey 
2004; Breunig and Koski 2009). Another implication of punctuated equilibrium theory on 
state budgetary responses is that responses may occur one or more fiscal years after stress 
initially appears. Incremental changes may persist despite the need for more substantive 
action as budget actors try to figure out the correct course of action and navigate the 
multiple layers of government decision-making. This has ramifications for the timing of 
responses and the connection between responses within one fiscal year to the level of 
fiscal stress that occurred a year or more past. 
2.3.4 Criticism and Limitation of Theory 
 Criticism of punctuated equilibrium theory centers on the lack of causal 
explanations, poor predictability, and the methods used to measure punctuations (Givel 
2006; Givel 2010; Robinson et al 2007). Robinson et al (2007), despite finding support 
for the stasis and punctuation model in school district budgets, questions the theory’s 
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ability to explain why punctuations occur. The authors note that success in describing the 
nature of policy change – stasis combined with punctuation – does not substitute for 
explaining why the change occurs.  As noted above, efforts to link institutional factors to 
the prevalence of punctuations exists, but it is still in its infancy. The inability of 
punctuated equilibrium to predict punctuations or to explain the conditions that lead to 
punctuations are major limitations of the theory. Furthermore, Givel (2010) points to 
cases in U.S. forestry policy, tobacco policy, and auto efficiency policy in which 
punctuations would be expected to occur due to rapid and major changes in their external 
environments, but in which no major policy outputs changed. Much of the criticism 
focuses on how to measure policy outputs via changes in statutes and regulations or in 
tone.  All of this points to the difficulty in using punctuated equilibrium to form and 
support predictive hypotheses. 
2.4 Cutback Management Theory 
2.4.1 Background and Description of Theory 
Cutback management theory explains the actions governments take in the face of 
fiscal stress. This theory grew out of observations of fiscal stress in U.S. localities in the 
1970’s and early 1980’s (Levine 1978 and 1979; Levine et al 1981a). Scholars examined 
how state and local governments operate when there is no longer growth in revenues and 
fiscal stress sets in (Caiden 1980; Bahl 1984). At the time, Levine (1978) noted that most 
management theories available to public managers assumed a growth environment and 
available resources. Cutback management explains the political context and causes of 
fiscal stress as well as considers strategies and decision rules that public organizations 
can use to manage toward balance in periods of economic decline (Levine 1978; Levine 
et al 1981a). The theory draws from organizational change theory and relates it to the 
context of and actions taken in a resource-constrained environment (Levine 1978; Jick 
and Murray 1982).  
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Cutback management is defined as “managing organizational change toward 
lower levels of resource consumption and organizational activity” (Levine 1978, XX).  
Levine (1978, 317) explains that “so great is our enthusiasm for growth that even when 
organizational decline seems inevitable and irreversible, it is nearly impossible to get 
elected officials, public managers, citizens, or management theorists to confront cutback 
and decremental planning situations as anything more than temporary slowdowns.” The 
fundamental question cutback management theory attempts to answer is how to manage 
public organizations given flat or reduced appropriations (Levine 1978)? The difficulty 
with answering this question is that public organizations have to “be smaller, do less, 
consume fewer resources, but still do something and do it well” (Behn 1980, 614). More 
recently, cutback management theory has also been applied to budgeting in the U.S. 
states. 
Several typologies to explain the causes of fiscal stress have been put forward by 
researchers using cutback management theory. Levine (1978) categorized the causes of 
fiscal stress as internal and external, political and economic. Savage (1992) refined this 
typology by differentiating between structural and cyclical causes of fiscal stress. Grizzle 
and Trogen (1994) divide causes of fiscal stress into cyclical and structural and within 
state control and outside of state control. These typologies demonstrate that most all 
states will face fiscal stress at some point—either from forces outside of their control 
such as federal mandates or recessions or from forces within their control such as setting 
appropriate spending and taxation levels. 
Cutback management theory also describes the paradoxes and unintended 
consequences that result from fiscal stress and cutbacks (Levine 1978; Levine et al 
1981a). These paradoxes of organizational decline include the need for the development 
of planning and information systems as well as policy analysis to determine how to 
reduce spending; but while funds for these systems are available in times of growth they 
are rarely available in times of constrained resources. Without slack resources, it is 
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difficult for public managers to smooth resistance to change and as such organizations 
will struggle to innovate or maintain flexibility. Fiscal stress also creates human capital 
problems due to the inability to reward or promote employees for being more efficient 
and not being able to attract younger workers with new ideas and lower salaries (Levine 
1978).  In addition, decision-makers may take short-term perspectives under conditions 
of fiscal stress (Levine et al 1981a). As a result, unintended and counterproductive 
consequences may result, making it even more difficult to get out of fiscal stress or avoid 
it in the future. Examples of these consequences are deferred maintenance resulting in 
deterioration of public buildings, bridges or roadways; reduced or deteriorating services 
that make investment in the community less likely, and personnel actions that may result 
in the best qualified and motivated employees leaving pubic service. Across-the-board 
cuts also tend to punish the most efficient departments and actually reward those 
departments with inefficiencies. As Berne and Stiefel (1993) found reallocations of funds 
hastened by fiscal stress can become permanent. In terms of the most effective response 
to fiscal stress—the one that will reduce the level of fiscal stress—cutback management 
theory does not offer one best way (Levine 1980), although a comprehensive strategy is 
preferred to one with piecemeal solutions. Instead, the optimal strategy will depend on 
several factors including the severity of fiscal stress, the size and power of the 
government unit, the power and alignment of interest groups, the power and 
professionalism of public employees, and the informal and formal power of political 
leaders (Levine 1980). 
2.4.2 Application of Theory to Situations of Fiscal Stress 
Most research applying cutback management theory to the states attempts to find 
meaning in the order and types of responses used. Regarding responses to fiscal stress, 
the framework devised by Levine (1978; 1979) and Levine et al (1981a) has been used to 
test the relationship between fiscal stress, organizational characteristics and 
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administrative responses (Bartle 1996; Pammer 1990). Levine (1978; 1979) lists the most 
common types of responses and categorizes them as efficiency or equity tradeoffs. In this 
context, equity means how cuts are distributed across the organization and efficiency 
means the extent to which cuts minimize the disruption to the organization (Levine 
1978). Across-the-board cuts are equity based since they attempt to share the cuts across 
an organization with no single department or stakeholder group singled out. Targeted cuts 
are considered efficiency cuts because they involve determining the value of each 
employee and department and determining who is worth more to the government’s 
operation.   
Levine  et al (1981a) presents a general model of local government responses to 
fiscal stress by using the experience of New York City as a guide.  He tests resulting 
hypotheses on four localities, including: Baltimore, Cincinnati, Oakland, and Prince 
George’s County in Maryland. In this model, changes in resource levels are an 
independent variable whose impact is affected by two political variables – formal 
authority structure and interest group structures. The dependent variable is the 
administrative responses of local governments. The model also considers short and long 
term effects of administrative responses. These effects may be felt at the micro level such 
as allocational effects (who benefits and loses), as well as at the macro level (effects felt 
by the whole community such as increased crime levels). The formal authority variable 
includes measures of the constraints placed on local governments such as borrowing, 
revenue raising and spending limitations. An interest group variable concerns the 
presence or absence of interest groups. This variable considers the activity level of 
interest groups both during growth and economic decline as well as their ability to form 
coalitions. Three strategies dealing with fiscal stress are outlined: (1) denial and delay 
strategies, (2) stretching and resisting strategies, and (3) cutting and smoothing strategies. 
 The model posits several hypotheses about the relationship between 
organizational structure, fiscal stress, and administrative response – five of which are 
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relevant to our analysis. The model predicts that administrative responses will vary (1) 
depending on the level of fiscal stress, (2) that responses to fiscal stress will follow a 
predictable pattern, (2a) lower levels of fiscal stress will be associated with denial of the 
problem and a delayed response, (2b) moderate fiscal stress will result in responses that 
affect all parties equally such as across the board cuts and adoption of hiring and 
purchasing freezes, and (2c) severe fiscal stress will result in cuts aimed at preserving 
efficient programs and eliminating lower performing programs or those outside the core 
mission through targeted cuts, reorganization of departments and reduction in force 
measures, and the reduction in employee benefits or pensions.  
 After testing these hypotheses against the experiences of four localities, Levine et 
al (1981a) found that responses do vary depending on the severity of fiscal stress but that 
responses happen over time. In other words, the response to fiscal stress may occur one 
or more years after the experience of severe fiscal stress. The findings also suggest that 
localities prefer responses that are perceived as more easily reversed (e.g., attrition rather 
than layoffs, reducing service levels rather than terminating programs). These scholars 
did not observe local governments adopting tactics in a systematic pattern. They found 
that localities use many tactics in response to fiscal stress and may even use all tactics at 
once.  Localities did not overtly deny or delay responses to fiscal stress; moderate fiscal 
stress fostered equity cuts with a bias toward across-the-board cuts. The final hypothesis 
concerning severe fiscal stress was not tested, as the four case studies did not experience 
this level of stress in the study. 
Much of the research on cutback management focuses on the question of “how do 
governments react when faced with fiscal stress?” Bartle (1996) summarizes the extant 
literature as: (1) governments practice incrementalism in reverse, decrementalism – in 
which the focus is on incremental changes to the budget, not the budget base (Lewis 
1984; Schick 1983), (2) governments’ responses are systematic and depend on resource 
levels and administrative shifts in budgetary priorities (Levine et al 1981a; Rickards 
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1984; Behn 1985; Berne and Stiefel 1993; Dougherty and Klase 2009) and (3) 
government responses are mostly unstructured due to ambiguous goals and ill-defined 
preferences (Pammer 1990; Downs and Rocke 1984; Bartle 1996). Based on the 
predictions of how localities react in periods of fiscal stress and given various 
organizational characteristics, Bartle (1996) tests these frameworks against practices in 
cities in New York. His findings support an unstructured framework, finding that 
government responses to fiscal stress are varied and dependent upon government-specific 
factors. 
 Research applying cutback management theory to the state level supports cutback 
management theory, but is relatively sparse. In examinations of Florida and Georgia, 
researchers found tactics to resist and delay (mainly in Florida) and to smooth changes 
(mainly in Georgia) with relatively few instances of major programmatic shifts or 
eliminations (Willoughby and Lauth 2003; Grizzle and Trogen 1994). Other research 
focusing on personnel actions point to many of the unintended consequences of hiring, 
pay and promotion freezes (Druker and Robinson 1993; Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980). 
In an effort to apply the cutback management model to states, Dougherty and Klase 
(2009) assessed the responses of eight states to budget deficits between 2002 and 2005.  
They found that the pattern of responses largely followed that predicted by Levine et al 
(1981a). States initially used across-the-board cuts and hiring freezes; however, as 
deficits increased or fiscal stress persisted they tended to use targeted cuts. In a few cases, 
as a response to severe and prolonged budget deficits, states laid off employees and 
eliminated programs.  
2.4.3 Theoretical Implications for State Responses to Fiscal Stress 
Cutback management theory provides a relatively comprehensive description of 
how states will act under fiscal stress. The type of responses—across-the-board cuts, 
hiring freezes, targeted cuts, tax increases, or layoffs—will differ depending on the 
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severity of fiscal stress as well as the persistence of fiscal stress. Cutback management 
theory is also helpful in determining the temporal order of administrative responses to 
fiscal stress. The theory posits that fiscal stress, in the form of revenue declines, 
determines the extent of the administrative response. Since the measure of fiscal stress 
developed in this paper encompasses long-term and service level solvency along with the 
more directly relevant to cutback management theory budgetary and cash solvency, we 
expect to see different relationships between responses and these types of solvencies. It 
also suggests that we should not expect to see an effect on fiscal stress levels by 
administrative responses within the same fiscal year. Rather it is more likely that 
administrative responses in the previous fiscal year have an impact on the current year’s 
fiscal stress level. The theory also offers reasons why certain responses – layoffs, for 
instance – may be less effective at improving the fiscal situation than anticipated by 
decision-makers.  
2.4.4 Criticism and Limitations of Theory 
Cutback management theory applies organizational change to resource-
constrained environments, directly relevant to our current investigation. An element that 
is missing from the theory is direct application of theories of budgetary decision-making 
to explain why decision- makers use specific tactics. Perhaps the limitation most relevant 
to this analysis is the lack of discussion or empirical testing of the effectiveness of 
strategies in alleviating and preventing fiscal stress (Levine 1979; Scorsone and 
Plerhoples 2010).  
 Another criticism of the theory, although not unique to this theory, is that several 
researchers have not found the pattern of predicted responses or a difference in responses 
based on the severity of fiscal stress, as mentioned (Pammer 1990; Bartle 1996).  Indeed, 
relatively little research attempts to apply the cutback management framework to a cross 
section of governments, at the state or local levels. While this is a limitation of the theory, 
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it is also a reason to explore the theory further and see where its merits and weaknesses 
lie. 
 
2.5 Assessing Effectiveness 
While theoretical and empirical literature tends to focus on predicting and 
discussing the types of responses states use to address fiscal stress (Dougherty and Klase 
2009; Grizzle and Trogen 1994; Gold 1995; Finegold et al 2003), largely missing is an 
examination of the effectiveness of different responses – for example, a comparison of 
the effect of rainy day fund use, reductions in expenditures, and/or increases in taxes and 
other revenues on fiscal stress levels. With the exception of research on the effectiveness 
of using budget stabilization/rainy day funds to reduce gaps between expected and actual 
expenditures, the effects of state responses to fiscal stress are unexplored (Sobel and 
Holcombe 1996a; Douglas and Gaddie 2002; Hou 2003; Hou 2004). This leaves 
questions such as – will a certain response yield a quicker recovery or protection from 
fiscal stress in a subsequent period? – unanswered. The relative effectiveness of the range 
of possible responses – expenditure reductions, revenue increases, drawing on cash 
reserves – is not assessed, individually or as a group. In 1979, Levine called for more 
research on the effectiveness of responses to fiscal stress; more recently, a retrospective 
article identified effectiveness as a gap in state fiscal stress research (Scorsone and 
Plerhoples 2010). A review of the fiscal stress focused research provides some guidance 
as to the independent effects of different responses.  
2.5.1 Rainy Day Funds 
Studies on rainy day funds hint at the relationship between the existence of a rainy 
day fund, the size (as a percent of total expenditures) of the rainy day fund balance, the 
rules governing rainy day fund deposits and use, and fiscal stress levels (Hou 2003; Hou 
2004; Douglas and Gaddie 2002; Sobel and Holcombe 1996a). The rules governing the 
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funds were found to play a more important role in reducing fiscal stress levels than the 
presence of a rainy day fund or its funding level (Douglas and Gaddie 2002; Sobel and 
Holcombe 1996a). Indeed, Douglas and Gaddie (2002) found that having more than one 
fund designated as a rainy day fund reduced states’ fiscal stress levels significantly.  
Using general fund expenditure gaps as the dependent variable, Hou (2003)’s 
findings are not directly applicable to fiscal stress levels. This research does suggest that 
higher rainy day fund balances reduce reliance on expenditure cuts by states during 
economic downturns. Other studies of rainy day funds focus on the appropriate size of 
the rainy day fund balance, not on the use of rainy day funds to address fiscal stress and 
budget shortfalls (Navin and Navin 1997; Joyce 2001). Confounding this analysis is these 
studies use different measures of fiscal stress – an issue discussed in the next chapter.  
The long-term effect of rainy day fund use on fiscal stress has not received significant 
empirical or theoretical attention. However, certain case study analyses suggest that the 
use of rainy day funds allows states to defer making crucial adjustments to spending 
and/or tax levels (Hackbart and Ramsey 2004; Gold 1995; Conant 2003).  The finding 
that rainy day funds allow states to reduce expenditure cuts during economic downturns 
supports this analysis (Hou 2003). Therefore, choosing to use rainy day funds instead of 
cutting expenditures or increasing taxes and fees, may lead a state to perpetuate structural 
imbalance and make it more vulnerable to future fiscal stress.  
2.5.2 Expenditure Cuts 
Research on expenditure cuts during periods of fiscal stress focus on changes in 
patterns of spending and identifying which functional areas tend to receive the largest 
cuts (Finegold et al 2003; Dougherty and Klase 2009; Hackbart and Ramsey 2004). Case 
study research shows that not calibrating spending levels to revenue collections leads to 
extreme vulnerability to economic downturns (Gold 1995; Conant 2003; Finegold et al 
2003). A general theme in this research is that fiscal stress arises in states that misjudged 
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or willfully ignored the need to match spending levels with volatile tax collections in the 
years prior to fiscal stress (Gold 1995; Conant 2010). As such, to reduce fiscal stress in 
the future, balancing spending levels and tax levels is the recommended course of action 
for states. 
Research on the long-term effects of fiscal stress induced changes in expenditures 
tends to concentrate on permanent changes in programs and staffing levels (Berne and 
Stiefel 1993). Drawing from the research focusing on short-term effects of expenditure 
cuts (Gold 1995; Finegold et al 2003) and research with a longer time frame (Hackbart 
and Ramsey 2004), expenditure cuts may be effective at reducing future levels of fiscal 
stress. To do so, the focus of cuts is important, as is the extent to which the expenditure 
cut balance overall spending and revenue levels.   
2.5.3 Tax and Fee Increases 
As with expenditure cuts, tax and fee increases affect fiscal stress levels by 
helping states achieve revenue and expenditure balance. The effectiveness of tax and fee 
increases depends on several factors including the diversification of revenue sources and 
the type of taxes and fees increased by states. Certain taxes (e.g. sales taxes, corporate 
income taxes, capital gains tax) may have dramatically reduced revenue collections 
during economic downturns (Sjoquist and Wallace 2003; Sobel and Holcombe 1996b; 
Suyerhoud 1994). While other taxes (e.g. alcoholic beverage taxes, motor fuels taxes, and 
personal income taxes) are less susceptible to cyclical variations (Suyerhoud 1994; Sobel 
and Holcombe 1996b).  Other research explores differences in the cyclical variability of 
taxes depending on a state’s tax portfolio and finds that the same tax will have different 
cyclical variations depending on the suite of taxes employed by a state (Braun and Otsuka 
1998).  Based on research in this area, it appears that there is no single optimal portfolio 
of revenue sources (Braun and Otsuka 1998); however, there is evidence – although not 
entirely conclusive that having a mix of taxes able to adjust to cyclical changes may 
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improve state fiscal performance or at the very least provide a more stable revenue 
baseline (Hendrick 2002; Braun and Otsuka 1998; Brinner and Brinner 2002).  
As related to the effectiveness of tax and fee increases in reducing fiscal stress, 
this research has both short-term and long-term implications. In the short-term, especially 
during an economic downturn, tax and fee increases may not raise as much revenue as 
anticipated due to the cyclical variability of revenues. In the long-term, states that are 
willing to use tax increases may diversify their revenue base and enhance its flexibility in 
the face of cyclical variation. In addition, if the tax changes broaden the tax base or adjust 
previously inefficient tax systems, this may contribute to a more flexible tax system that 
then can protect the state against future periods of fiscal stress or reduce the severity of 
stress at a future period (Gold 1995). 
A theme throughout the literature on state responses to fiscal stress is that certain 
responses have long-term effects (Levine et al 1981b; Druker and Robinson 1993; 
Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980; Berne and Stiefel 1993). This suggests an important 
distinction between the types of responses: whether a response improves the efficiency in 
either spending or taxation or rather is sufficient only in allowing the state to muddle 
through to the next crisis (Gold 1995). This research does suggest that the use of certain 
responses over others – rainy day funds instead of broadening tax bases or reassessing 
spending priorities – may not only ease states fiscal stress in the current year, but set 
states up for more troubles in subsequent years.  
2.6 Summary of Hypotheses 
Taken together the theories of incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium and 
cutback management provide a theoretical framework, albeit at times contradictory, for 
understanding how states can and might respond to fiscal stress and the factors that 
influence their decisions. Despite differences in the root causes of behavior, several 
common relationships and activities emerge from these theories. The empirical research 
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provides a framework for understanding how and why institutional and political factors 
will affect state responses to fiscal stress and the level of fiscal stress they experience. 
Empirical research also provides guidance on the effectiveness of state responses, in both 
the short- and long-term, in mitigating fiscal stress. 
A major theme that emerges around the question—how will states respond to 
fiscal stress—is that states are unlikely to react immediately or urgently to fiscal stress. 
Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that it takes a while for tension to build up in the 
system for change to occur; in addition, it is difficult to get the multiple decision-making 
layers to see the need for change. Cutback management theory suggests decision-makers 
will try to delay their acknowledgement of a problem. Even in cases where this does not 
occur, decision-makers will hope that the fiscal stress is temporary or transient and that a 
quick fix, such as using rainy day funds, will meet the balanced budget requirement and 
obviate the need for further action (Hackbart and Ramsey 2004; Levine et al 1981a). 
Based on this research my first hypothesis is: 
H1: States are strategic in their response to fiscal stress. 
Flowing from these implications is that state actions will differ by the level of 
fiscal stress. They may not differ in a clean, sequential pattern as initially predicted by 
Levine et al (1981a), but it stands to reason that certain actions are more likely at lower 
levels and others at higher levels of fiscal stress. When answering the question —will 
state actions differ depending on the level of fiscal stress—these theories provide 
guidance. As described above cutback management theory predicts fiscal stress responses 
proceed based on the severity of fiscal stress.   
As such, we should expect to see smaller, less disruptive measures at first and 
then as fiscal stress continues or worsens, more drastic changes. Low fiscal stress is 
accompanied by denial and delay tactics such as using cash balances (e.g., rainy day 
funds) and deferring maintenance. Moderate fiscal stress then calls for hiring freezes, 
productivity improvements and across-the-board cuts. These are the activities generally 
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associated with incremental budget theory as they are non-confrontational and tend to 
affect all interest groups equally. These tactics would also likely be observed in the 
punctuated equilibrium lens before or after a punctuation. Severe fiscal stress is more 
likely to necessitate targeted cuts, privatization of public services, program terminations, 
layoffs and an increase in user fees or taxes. Many of these actions are more typically 
associated with a punctuation in budget policy, especially targeted cuts. Based on this 
research, the second hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses are: 
H2: Responses will differ based on the severity of fiscal stress. 
 H2.1: Rainy day funds will be used in periods of lower fiscal stress. 
 H2.2: Incremental budget strategies (e.g. across-the-board cuts and hiring freezes) 
will be used in periods of moderate fiscal stress.  
 H2.3: Punctuated equilibrium strategies (e.g. targeted cuts, privatization, and 
layoffs) will be used in periods of high fiscal stress.   
Based on the empirical literature we can form several hypotheses linking state 
characteristics with their responses and experience of fiscal stress. In addition, based on 
these theories we should expect state responses to differ depending on the flexibility 
granted decision-makers as well as their ability to reach decisions. As punctuated 
equilibrium theory suggests, factors that increase decision, transaction, and/or 
information costs will lead to more punctuations and less gradual change.  
H3: Institutional factors will affect state responses to fiscal stress. 
 H3.1: States with balanced budget rules will take more actions to address fiscal 
stress. 
 H3.2: States with TELs will use more expenditure cuts and other non-tax measures 
to address fiscal stress. 
 H3.3: States with divided governments will take fewer actions to address fiscal 
stress. 
H4: Institutional factors will affect states’ levels of fiscal stress. 
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 H4.1: States with balanced budget rules will experience lower fiscal stress. 
 H4.2: TELs will affect state levels of fiscal stress. 
 H4.3: States with divided governments will experience higher fiscal stress. 
The difference between states experiencing fiscal stress due to cyclical fluctuations 
and structural imbalance is mentioned throughout this chapter. This distinction is 
important because the cause of fiscal stress is likely to impact both the experience and 
response to it. Hackbart and Ramsey (2004) suggest that states may take measures to 
meet the yearly balanced budget requirement, while ignoring a structural imbalance – 
setting the stage for drastic action farther down the road. Based on this, it seems that 
states with structural imbalances are more likely to follow the punctuated equilibrium 
pattern or jump to the last stage of the response pattern detailed by Levine et al (1981a). 
In addition, the extent to which a structural imbalance demonstrates states deferring 
decisions on prioritizing spending and/or adjusting revenue levels, we expect states with 
structural imbalances to have higher levels of fiscal stress.  
H5: States with structural deficits will engage different responses and experience higher 
fiscal stress. 
 H5.1: States with structural deficits will be more likely to engage punctuated 
equilibrium responses in periods of high fiscal stress. 
 H5.2: States with structural deficits will experience higher fiscal stress. 
Based on both the theoretical guidance and empirical research it is harder to 
hypothesize the effectiveness of different responses to fiscal stress. Certain educated 
guesses can, however, be made. Although response effectiveness is not addressed 
directly, the unintended consequences and paradoxes of cutback management highlighted 
in the cutback management theory suggest that all responses are not equal. Some may 
have negative unintended consequences that result in recurring or extended fiscal stress; 
while other responses may reduce future fiscal stress levels. In the short-term, multiple 
exogenous factors influence a state’s level of fiscal stress, including the growth of the 
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state economy and federal stimulus activities, are more likely to have an impact on the 
immediate fiscal stress levels. In addition, the timing of fiscal stress responses may not be 
soon enough to counteract current levels of fiscal stress. The hypotheses below 
differentiate between the short-term and long-term effects of state responses to fiscal 
stress.  
H6: The short-term effect of state responses (e.g. tax increases, expenditure cuts, rainy 
day fund use) on fiscal stress will be minimal. 
H7: The long-term effects of state responses (e.g. tax increases, expenditure cuts, and 
rainy day fund use) on fiscal stress will differ.  
 H7.1: Tax increases and/or expenditure reductions will, in the long-term, reduce 
fiscal stress.  
 H7.2: Rainy day fund use will increase fiscal stress in the long-term.  
2.7 Conclusion 
Rubin (1990) encourages budget researchers to see what is in front of them and to 
begin theorizing from what is there. In this analysis, the focus is on what occurs in 
practice and how to better present this in the academic literature. Despite this practical 
focus, this research will have implications for the theoretical literature discussed above; 
specifically do patterns emerge in line with incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium or 
cutback management theory predictions? And what role do institutions play in how states 
respond to resource constraints? 
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CHAPTER 3 
FISCAL STRESS: DEFINITIONS AND MEASURES 
 
 In order to answer the questions at the core of this analysis, a reliable and valid 
measure of fiscal stress is needed. To begin, this chapter reviews the definitions of key 
terms: financial condition, fiscal stress, and fiscal crisis. After defining these terms, this 
chapter explores the evolution of fiscal stress measures. The most used state fiscal stress 
measures are identified and assessed on their comparability across years and between 
states as well as their ability to express the definition of fiscal stress. 
3.1 Definitions of Financial Condition, Fiscal Stress and Fiscal Crisis 
 Many terms – fiscal stress, fiscal distress, poor fiscal health, poor financial 
condition, and weak fiscal condition – are used to describe the predicament of states and 
municipalities dealing with economic difficulties (Wang et al 2007; Rubin and 
Willoughby 2009; Levine et al 1981a; Stonecash and McAfee 1981). In some instances 
within both academic research and practitioner-oriented guidance, these terms are treated 
as synonyms (Hendrick 2004; New York State Comptroller’s Office 2006). In fact, no 
definition of fiscal stress is universally accepted.  Scholars often create their own 
definition to accommodate their research focus or they may refine a definition used in 
prior research (Jimenez 2009; Rubin and Willoughby 2009; Sobel and Holcombe 1996a; 
Maag and Merriman 2007; Alm et al 1993; Rubin 1982).  
Definitions of related terms such as fiscal condition, financial condition, and 
fiscal health are also ambiguous in the current literature. An illustrative example of the 
imprecision evident in these literatures is provided by Wang et al (2007). In their review 
of the literature about public financial condition, the authors only use the term financial 
condition; however, in their effort to accurately represent the original language of the 
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articles they cite, they use the terms fiscal stress, fiscal condition, and financial crisis. For 
this reason, poor financial condition may, and often does, denote the same concept as the 
term fiscal stress.  
The lack of an accepted definition spans the literatures regarding both state and 
local fiscal stress. To address the imprecision of these terms, this section reviews the 
definitions of fiscal stress and related terms in both of these literatures and then 
synthesizes definitions. This section also details where fiscal stress fits within the 
continuum of public financial conditions.   
Three terms, along with close variations, appear consistently in the literature: (1) 
financial condition, (2) fiscal stress, and (3) fiscal crisis. These terms persist in the 
literature over time and across varying units of analysis.  Regarding financial condition, 
and its close variants fiscal condition and fiscal health, these terms typically describe the 
overall fiscal circumstances of a state or local government (Wang et al 2007; Hendrick 
2004; Kamnikar et al 2006). An entity’s financial condition can be characterized as 
strong or weak, or even somewhere in between.  
Definitions of fiscal stress and its variants fiscal strain and fiscal distress, on the 
other hand, suggest an identifiable problem (Levine et al 1981a; Gold 1995; Chaney et al 
2002a; Conant 1992). The problem that fiscal stress describes regards the financial/fiscal 
condition of a government (New York State Comptroller’s Office 2006; Rubin and 
Willoughby 2009; Hendrick 2004; Wang et al 2007). Fewer researchers use the term 
fiscal crisis as distinct from fiscal stress; indeed Honadle (2003) notes the practice of 
using the terms interchangeably. Honadle (2003) and Conant (1992) describe fiscal crisis 
as the end stage of fiscal stress. Given these relationships, Figure 3.1 shows the spectrum 
of financial condition and where fiscal stress and fiscal crisis fall within this continuum. 
Fiscal stress is defined as weak financial condition and fiscal crisis is defined as 
exceedingly weak financial condition. 
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Figure 3.1: Spectrum of Public Financial Condition 
 
3.1.1 Financial Condition 
Financial condition describes a complex set of relationships covering a 
government’s ability to raise revenues, borrow funds, make expenditures, and provide 
services. Definitions of financial condition (and fiscal condition or fiscal health) tend to 
contain two components, government’s ability to meet financial obligations and 
government’s ability to provide services to its residents. Hendrick (2004, 80) and Jimenez 
(2009, 81) define fiscal health as “the ability of a government to meet its financial and 
service obligations.”  Wang et al (2007, 2-3) hews closely to this by defining financial 
condition as a “government’s ability to adequately provide services to meet current as 
well as future obligations,” while noting that the most common concept of financial 
condition is “the ability of an organization to timely meet its financial obligations.” 
Service obligations are the assumed cause of the financial obligations. With an 
accounting perspective, Kamnikar et al (2006, 32) present an approach that is along these 
same lines, defining financial condition as “a government’s ability to meet its obligations 
as they come due and the ability to continue to provide the services its constituency 
requires.” Berne and Schramm (1986, 5) define a government with a healthy financial 
condition as “being able to meet their financial obligations as they come due, in both the 
short run and the long run, while raising resources and providing public goods and 
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services.” Rubin and Willoughby (2009, 54) define fiscal condition as a state’s “ability to 
meet the public demand for public goods and services.” This definition explicitly lays out 
the service obligations while the financial obligations are assumed. Yet, each definition 
recognizes the two functions of government. First, government must provide services to 
its residents. Second, in order to provide these services now and in the future, 
government must meet its financial obligations.  
The main difference in these definitions is the description of a government’s 
service obligations. Gauging a government’s service obligations is difficult because it is 
nearly impossible to measure whether a government is meeting ‘adequate’ or 
‘constituency required’ services levels or ‘public demand’ (Rubin and Willoughby 2009; 
Chaney et al 2002a). Measuring public demand is fraught with difficulties, as is 
determining whether public demand in one state can be compared to public demand in 
others (Rubin and Willoughby 2009).  
To ensure consistency within this paper, financial condition will be defined as a 
government’s ability to meet its short-run and long run financial obligations as they arise, 
while raising resources and providing goods and services. This definition, drawing 
heavily from Berne and Schramm (1986), details the commitments government must 
meet without placing a standard or criteria on the level of services it must provide. The 
multiple time periods and multiple constituencies that must be served by government are 
also laid out in this definition. With these obligations defined, it will be easier to pinpoint 
the areas in which a government experiences fiscal stress.  
3.1.2 Fiscal Stress 
Fiscal stress is a term often used and occasionally defined. Rubin (1982) noted 
nearly thirty years ago that there are as many definitions of the term as there are scholars 
interested in studying it, and this situation has not changed. Fiscal stress is hard to define 
for the same reasons that it is difficult to measure – it is a transient condition with 
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multiple facets and presentations (Bahl 1984). Two states, California and Michigan, are 
routinely described as experiencing fiscal stress. Some point to Michigan’s declining 
population and eroded economic base as indicators of the fiscal stress that state is 
experiencing (Menchik 2002). By contrast, California’s fiscal stress manifests itself in 
large budget deficits and in the state’s inability to raise taxes or cut services to effectively 
close budget gaps (Schunk and Woodward 2005; Savage 1992). The causes of fiscal 
stress in these states differ, as does the manifestation of fiscal stress; still, most would 
agree that these two states are best characterized as experiencing fiscal stress.   
At the broadest level, the literature suggests that fiscal stress is a condition of 
imbalance (Gold 1992; Copeland and Ingram 1983; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). The 
imbalance may be between the services the public would like and what government 
provides (Copeland and Ingram 1983) or more clearly, the case of expenditures 
exceeding available financial resources (Gold 1992).  Operational definitions of fiscal 
stress are also common. Levine (1980, 4) defines fiscal stress as when an “economy is 
unable to generate enough economic growth to expand (or even sustain in some places) 
tax supported programs without putting unacceptable demands on taxpayers take home 
pay.” For Conant (1992, 4) fiscal stress occurs when “the predicted growth in revenues 
for the upcoming biennium is sufficient to fund only the current year’s base appropriation 
level and a small addition to the base.” Along these lines, Sobel and Holcombe (1996a, 
33-34) define fiscal stress as “the amount of discretionary tax increases plus the amount 
that expenditures were reduced from their long run trend growth during a recession.” 
Kloha et al (2005, 314) defines fiscal distress as “a failure to meet standards in areas of 
operating position, debt, and community needs and resources over successive years.” 
Again, these definitions share an interpretation of fiscal stress as imbalance between 
revenues and expenditures.   
Some definitions of fiscal stress include the reactions to or symptoms of fiscal 
stress, rather than the condition itself. To avoid this tendency, recent authors relate fiscal 
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stress directly to financial condition and financial indicators (Wang et al 2007; Kamnikar 
et al 2006). In state level research, the trend is away from demographic and response-
based definitions of fiscal stress toward a narrower focus on financial definitions that are 
then used to determine how stress affects the delivery of services, demographic changes, 
poverty levels, and tax systems.  
Fiscal stress encompasses situations where a government is unable to meet either 
its financial or service obligations. The causes of such situations may differ among 
governments. Research identifies a number of potential causes of fiscal stress as well as 
reactions to fiscal stress. A definition of fiscal stress needs to be broad enough to capture 
its different dimensions– budgetary imbalance, overreliance on debt to finance current 
expenditures, inability to pay for essential services – without including the causes and 
consequences of fiscal stress. Otherwise comparisons across time and governments will 
be difficult.  
For this analysis, fiscal stress is defined as a government’s inability to meet its 
short or long run financial obligations as they arise and may be accompanied by an 
inability to raise revenues or provide goods and services.4 Using this definition, a state 
may experience fiscal stress in one year but not the next. It is also possible for a state to 
experience fiscal stress for several years in a row. The above definition is intentionally 
similar to the definition of financial condition used in this analysis. Using similar 
definitions underscores the relationship between fiscal stress and financial condition; 
specifically, that fiscal stress is weak financial condition. 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
4 Goods and services include the goods and services directly provided by state governments and those 
provided by government enterprises. 
 
51 
3.1.3 Fiscal Crisis 
Fiscal crisis is a term used with even less precision than fiscal stress; however, it 
does appear to suggest a financial condition worse than fiscal stress. Although fiscal 
stress and fiscal crisis are used interchangeably in some cases (Downing 1991; Gold 
1995), recent research attempts to distinguish between the two terms. Honadle (2003, 
1433) defines fiscal crisis as “a threat to the continued operation of the government, a 
true emergency situation in which government is unable to meet payroll, bills, and debt 
repayment.” Conant (1992, 4) defines fiscal crisis as the “funds needed to meet current 
year program obligations substantially exceed appropriated levels.”  Inman (1995, 378) 
defines fiscal crisis as when “a city’s potential to raise revenues is insufficient to cover 
the city’s legally required expenditures.”  Hirsch and Rufolo (1990) determine fiscal 
crisis as when a city lacks the flexibility to deal with revenue losses. Taking these 
definitions together, fiscal crisis is a situation where government faces an inability to 
meet financial obligations even after engaging typical fiscal actions. For example, tax 
revenues cannot be raised, or raised sufficiently, expenditures cannot be cut without 
compromising the provision of a minimum level of services, rainy day funds are not 
available or the government faces default or bankruptcy. In the present research, fiscal 
crisis is defined as a government’s inability to meet its short-run and long-run financial 
obligations as they come due coupled with an inability to raise revenues or provide goods 
and services.  
Perhaps the state that has come closest to fiscal crisis in recent times is California. 
In July 2009, the state issued registered warrants (IOUs) in lieu of cash for general fund 
obligations. After revising the budget, the state stopped issuing IOUs in September 2009 
and the IOUs were then redeemable (California State Controller’s Office 2009). Since the 
state still provided goods and services to its residents and resumed meeting its financial 
obligations, in this instance, the state does not meet the definition of fiscal crisis defined 
in this chapter or any of those found in the fiscal crisis literature. Indeed, the unit of 
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analysis for most research on fiscal crisis is municipalities. Due to the fiscal options open 
to cities, their size, and the services they typically provide, fiscal crisis is much more 
likely to occur at the local than at the state level (Honadle 2003). As shown in Figure 3.1, 
fiscal crisis is placed to the right of fiscal stress on the continuum of financial condition. 
This is to indicate that fiscal crisis signifies extremely poor financial condition.  
3.1.4 Connotation of Fiscal Stress 
For states, fiscal stress is a problem that requires a solution (New York State 
Comptroller’s Office 2006; Municipal Fiscal Stress Task Force 2010). For this reason 
within the academic literature, fiscal stress tends to have a negative connotation. While 
fiscal stress may have negative consequences for government constituents and 
stakeholders, such as layoffs of public employees, cuts in school funding that may lead to 
lower test scores, or fewer benefits for the most vulnerable citizens that increases 
demands on homeless shelters, food banks, and free clinics; fiscal stress may result in 
positive management or fiscal changes within a government (Poister and McGowan 
1984; Willoughby and Lauth 2003). Public managers may work to increase worker 
productivity or reduce program inefficiencies in anticipation of fiscal stress or in response 
to it (Poister and McGowan 1984). In response to the 1991 recession, Willoughby and 
Lauth (2003) found that some state program managers in Georgia used efficiency 
measures to reduce costs. Other researchers argue that extensive and sustained fiscal 
stress can result in less productive state work forces (Druker and Robinson 1993). Indeed 
outside of the state government context, research points to fiscal stress putting strain on 
management systems, not fostering productive changes (Rubin 1982; Schick 1988; 
Caiden 1980). In a review of OECD countries’ responses to fiscal stress, Schick (1988) 
did not find a reliance on efficiency or effectiveness reviews or programs, rather 
governments tended to look for the easiest places to reduce spending. Nonetheless, 
whether fiscal stress is positive or negative, depends on the actions that state governments 
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take. Lewis and Logalbo (1980) provide a checklist of actions local governments can take 
to manage cutbacks and increase efficiency in government operations. If state managers 
are compelled to reassess their priorities, manage programs more effectively, and cut 
unnecessary expenses; then fiscal stress may play a positive role in the production of 
government goods and services. However, and this is what receives the majority of 
academic and journalistic attention, if fiscal stress results in severe cuts to services and/or 
state employee layoffs, then fiscal stress has a negative connotation. In this research, 
fiscal stress is not classified as either positive or negative, but rather as a condition that 
state governments, in this case, try to avoid or minimize. 
3.2 Measures of Fiscal Stress 
As with the definition of fiscal stress, there are nearly as many measures of fiscal 
stress as there are studies that mention it. Coupled with the abundance of measures is a 
lack of consensus on how best to operationalize the concept of fiscal stress (Gold 1992). 
The need to measure fiscal stress emerged in the aftermath of financial and fiscal 
problems at the local level. As the phenomenon of fiscal stress spread to states and other 
municipalities, so too did the need to operationalize what was meant by fiscal stress. 
Researchers quickly realized that measuring fiscal stress was difficult (Bahl 1984; 
Benson et al 1988) as it was poorly defined and difficult to measure directly. 
Measurement methods depend on data availability, researcher’s preferences, and unit of 
analysis. As a result, despite thirty years of research at the local level and nearly as long 
at the state level, there is no accepted measure of fiscal stress (Jimenez 2009). This 
section begins with an overview of the measurement of fiscal stress at the state and local 
level and how it has changed over the past thirty years. Then we will investigate the best 
framework to use to operationalize our definition of fiscal stress and address the factors it 
must account for. The most used measures of fiscal stress at the state level will be 
grouped into five categories and the merits and drawbacks of each discussed. In the final 
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section, the role of data availability in constructing an accurate measure of fiscal stress 
and the impact of recent changes to statewide reporting will be discussed.  
3.2.1 The Evolution of Fiscal Stress Measurement 
Fiscal stress measurement has changed over the years, but there is still no 
consensus on the best measure or what it should encompass.  The study of fiscal stress 
began at the municipal level in response to financial problems in urban areas like New 
York and Cleveland (Savage and Schwartz 1999). As such fiscal stress measures initially 
focused on municipal data sources and municipal problems. The main purpose at this 
stage was to identify which cities were the most fiscally stressed in order to determine the 
destination and size of federal and state aid as well as to distinguish between fiscally 
reliable and non-reliable investments (Burchell et al 1981; Ross and Greenfield 1980; 
Benson et al 1988). The debate over the appropriate measurement of fiscal stress focused 
on the breadth of the measure – should it reflect singular events, long-term decline, or a 
city’s ability to adapt to socioeconomic changes (Pammer 1990).  
Early researchers on the topic used many financial indicators (29 – Clark (1977) 
and 101 – Howell and Stamm (1979)).  Factor analysis and principle component analysis 
were used to extract the dimensions of fiscal stress or reduce the indicators into one 
composite measure. As scholars teased out the most important measures of stress (highest 
loading factors), they began to focus on specific indicators. Morgan and England (1983) 
used three measures: (1) long-term debt per capita divided by per capita income, (2) per 
capita expenditures for nine common functions divided by per capita income, and (3) 
own source revenue per capita divided by per capita income. Pammer (1990) takes this 
parsimony to an extreme, using one measure (the difference between ratio of total long 
term outstanding debt to total city income) to assess fiscal stress. 
Criticism of this direction in fiscal stress research also began early. In many cases, 
the criticism focused on the causal models of fiscal stress; these included the socio-
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economic decline model, internal political determinants model, and the bureaucratic 
expansion model (Pammer 1990). The socio-economic decline model focused on external 
determinants of fiscal stress, namely economic and demographic trends such as 
recessions and migration from urban to suburban areas. The internal political 
determinants model focuses on the role of municipal employee unions and other interest 
groups in creating a spendthrift political culture. The bureaucratic expansion model has 
its roots in public choice theory and supposes that excessive government spending causes 
municipal fiscal and financial problems. These models are not mutually exclusive but 
they have affected the focus of fiscal stress research and the type of fiscal stress measures 
used. Stonecash and McAfee (1981) questioned the causal model underlying many 
measures of fiscal stress. Specifically, they doubted the assumption that all city leaders 
react to local economic problems in the same way.  In other words, measuring how cities 
react to stress does not necessarily capture the level of fiscal stress. 
Ladd and Yinger (1989) took a different approach to measuring fiscal stress and 
fiscal health. A major goal of their research was to compare the effect of state imposed 
restrictions and general economic trends on cities’ fiscal health and ability to provide 
services. As mentioned above fiscal stress can be assessed as the inability to provide a 
certain level of services to citizens. Ladd and Yinger (1989) developed a methodology 
that allowed them to standardize the amount of expenditures needed to provide the 
average amount of services – they then compared this to each city’s revenue raising 
capacity. Using this system, they were able to look at a city’s fiscal health with and 
without fiscal institutions and at the general trends in city fiscal health.   
More recently, research presents indices with predictive power using financial 
measures (Kloha et al 2005; Brown 1993; Honadle and Lloyd-Jones 1998; Patton and 
Kahn 2003). Despite different constructions, these measures are quite similar to earlier 
efforts to measure fiscal stress using financial variables. Brown (1993) proposes ten 
ratios, including per capita revenue, percentage of general fund from own sources, 
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operating expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures, total revenues divided by 
total expenditures, and per capita direct long-term debt.  Once these measures are 
calculated, Brown (1993) proposes a scoring scheme by which a city’s relative risk of 
fiscal distress can be ranked and compared to other cities. Kloha et al (2005) builds on 
this scale by adding population growth and then setting standards by which an absolute 
level of risk can be determined. Several researchers have used these indices to assess 
municipal fiscal stress (Honadle and Lloyd-Jones 1998; Patton and Kahn 2003; Miller 
2001). 
Another method of fiscal stress measurement was put forward by Hendrick (2004) 
in which fiscal health is described as encompassing multiple dimensions that have 
different time frames. The financial context used to develop this measure is that 
developed by Berne and Schramm (1986).  The three major dimensions of fiscal health 
proposed are: properties of each government’s environment (factors outside the control of 
government), the balance of government fiscal structures with that environment 
(comparison of the environment to government financial choices), properties of each 
government’s fiscal structure (how the government adapts to its environment). The author 
presents this measure as a starting point for exploring the multidimensional nature of 
fiscal health within suburban communities and the need to account for different time 
horizons and interactions. A major finding of this research is that either using a single 
measure to denote fiscal health or combining a number of different measures into a single 
index distorts the actual nature of fiscal health. As with the methodology developed by 
Ladd and Yinger (1989), the applicability of this framework is limited by the amount of 
data needed to develop the measure.  
At the state level, fiscal stress measures tend to be directly relevant to the subject 
of the article and availability of data. The different types of state fiscal stress measures 
along with their strengths and weaknesses will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
57 
3.2.2 Developing a Framework to Measure Fiscal Stress 
Several frameworks are used to measure financial condition – some more applied 
and some more theoretical (Mead 2006). To measure fiscal stress it is first necessary to 
define what are the important factors of a state’s financial condition – in other words to 
define what fiscal stress is a deviation from. In this analysis financial condition is defined 
as a government’s ability to meet its short-run and long-run financial obligations as they 
arise, while raising resources and providing goods and services. By extension fiscal stress 
is a state’s inability to meet either its short-run or long-run financial obligations, raise 
enough revenues to provide goods and services. A financial condition framework allows 
researchers and practitioners to operationalize the broader definition of financial 
condition and begin to apply these standards to local or state governments.  
In public policy research, many scholars and practitioners draw on the 
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) model defined by the work 
of Groves et al (1981) in which financial condition is divided into four types of solvency: 
cash, budgetary, service-level, and long-run (Mead 2006; Lewis 2003). With financial 
condition defined as all four of these solvencies, fiscal stress can be insolvency in any of 
these four areas. Cash solvency concerns a government’s liquidity and its ability to pay 
its bills (Groves et al 1981). Budgetary solvency concerns a government’s ability to meet 
spending obligations without causing a deficit (Groves et al 1981). Long-run solvency is 
a government’s ability to pay for all of its costs including those that may occur only every 
few years or in the future (Groves et al 1981). Long-run solvency allows financial 
condition to capture government’s management of debt and capital assets. While cash 
and budgetary solvency look at short-term financial management, long-run solvency 
looks at a government’s management of longer-term issues. Service level solvency 
concerns a government’s ability to provide and pay for the level and quality of services 
required to meet the general health and welfare of a community (Groves et al 1981). The 
importance of dividing financial condition into different types of solvency is echoed in 
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more recent research (Berne 1992; Hendrick 2004; Wang et al 2007; Kamnikar et al 
2006; Gomez et al 2009). In this analysis the scope and focus of this financial condition 
framework is appealing for three reasons. First, it concerns financial and fiscal factors 
without straying into variables that may differ state to state not due to underlying 
financial factors but rather state financial management practices or preferences. Second, 
state data that is currently available that allows the operationalization of these four 
solvencies. Third, the importance of each type of solvency is understandable. For 
instance, budget solvency is necessary to ensure states’ do not run budget deficits and run 
afoul of balanced budget requirements.  
Mead (2006, 385) details the factors that are important to consider when assessing 
government financial health: 
• Fund balances, equity or net assets 
• Revenues and expenditures/expenses as well as surpluses and deficits 
• Changes in revenue bases 
• Spending pressures and expenditure needs 
• Outstanding debts, debt service, and post-employment benefits 
• Liquidity 
 
Each of these factors is covered by the concepts of cash, budget, service-level, 
and long-run solvency. So this assures us that using this framework captures the relevant 
factors in understanding financial condition. Wang et al (2007) demonstrate the 
usefulness of this framework in analyzing state financial condition. This is an important 
consideration given the municipal focus of many financial condition frameworks. Even 
the financial condition framework developed by the Florida Auditor General is to assess 
local government financial condition (Mead 2006). As will be discussed later, Wang et al 
(2007) also provides the financial ratios that measure each solvency. 
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3.2.3 A Good Measure of Fiscal Stress  
What is a good measure of fiscal stress? To a certain extent the answer depends 
on the unit of analysis and the availability of data. The literature on financial condition 
and fiscal stress measurement points to several issues that should be considered in 
constructing a measure of fiscal stress. Four considerations – using a composite or 
multiple measures, the time frame of different indicators, the operationalization of public 
demand, and the criteria by which to declare fiscal stress – are discussed in several 
articles focusing on measurement (Hendrick 2004; Ross and Greenfield 1980; Jimenez 
2009; Brown 1993; Kloha et al 2005). These issues can help guide the construction of a 
good fiscal stress measure for this analysis.  
A fundamental concern for researchers creating measures of financial condition 
and by extension fiscal stress is whether a composite measure combining indicators of 
different underlying conditions should be used or instead each dimension of financial 
condition should be defined and then indicators used to measure them separately. Both 
methodologies have been used. Hendrick (2004) notes that since governments may differ 
in their levels of solvency on different measures, combining different dimensions of 
financial condition would be misleading. The author proposes constructing the 
dimensions separately and then assessing how governments perform on each. Wang et al 
(2007) uses both a set of indices measuring budget, cash, long-run and service-level 
solvency and a single index that combines the underlying financial indicators to create a 
composite measure of financial condition. Brown (1993) and Kloha et al (2005), in their 
models to predict local government fiscal stress, use multiple measures to arrive at a 
single score with which to assess a local government’s condition. Despite the persistence 
of researchers using a single measure, many have noted the difficulty of measuring a 
multidimensional concept such as fiscal stress with a single measure or a composite 
measure (Jimenez 2009; Ross and Greenfield 1980). Another concern with creating a 
composite measure is how to set the correct weights on different indicators (Hendrick 
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2004). These philosophical and technical concerns point to the usefulness of multiple 
measures along different dimensions of financial condition and fiscal stress rather than a 
single measure.  
A consideration that flows directly from the discussion of multiple versus single 
measures is how to account for measures or dimensions of fiscal stress that have different 
time frames. Hendrick (2004) provides an example of how this problem would arise. 
Some indicators of fiscal stress such as a government’s ability to pay its bills on time are 
short-term. They deal with liquidity in how the government currently operates. Whether a 
government is able to meet its obligations over an entire budget year or whether it is able 
to generate enough revenue in a budget year to pay for planned expenditures within the 
budget year are mid-term measures of fiscal stress. A government’s ability to meet debt 
obligations is a long-term measure. Since financial indicators and other types of fiscal 
stress measures may differ in terms of their time horizon, the usefulness of a measure that 
combines these measures is questionable.  
 A continuing difficulty in the measurement of financial condition or fiscal stress, 
as touched on in the previous section – is how or whether to attempt to measure public 
demand for government goods and services. To deal with this, many researchers use per 
capita income as a proxy for public demand (Hendrick 2004; Ladd and Yinger 1989). 
Ross and Greenfield (1980, 102) suggested that other measures, such as financial 
indicators do not assess whether a local government provides its citizens with the 
appropriate level of services. Financial indicators are not designed to measure public 
demand or to assess whether a government is meeting its service obligations; however, 
Chaney et al (2002a) proposes that it may be better to assess a government’s ability to 
pay for services. By focusing on the ability to meet service obligations, we assume that 
the other factors that lead to choices about the level of goods and services occur. That 
way we do not end up penalizing a government for not providing ‘enough’ services when 
in fact citizens in that area may not want many or a certain level of government services. 
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However, we are still able to discern governments in stress based on their ability to 
provide these goods and services. Wang et al (2007) proposes three indicators to measure 
a government’s ability to provide goods and services: tax per capita, revenues per capita, 
and expenses per capita. The higher any of these measures are, the less ability a 
government has to increase the provision of goods and services.  
 Finally, setting a criterion or standard for fiscal stress is highly subjective (Bahl 
1982). Researchers disagree on whether to use an absolute or relative measure of fiscal 
stress. With relative measures, cities or states values on different indicators are compared 
to one another. One method uses a location quotient to compare one unit’s indicators 
against the median or mean value for the entire cohort (Berne and Schramm 1986; 
Chaney et al 2002a; Miller 2001). Brown (1993) assigns scores based on a city’s 
performance on ten indicators relative to cities of roughly the same population. A score is 
given for each indicator depending on the quartile a city falls into. Then the scores are 
assigned meaning – a city that performs in either the third or fourth quartile for all 10 
indicators receives a rating of “among the best” (24). Falling in the lowest quartile will 
earn a city a rating of “among the worst”. Since the cities used for comparison purposes 
were not randomly selected, Brown (1993) notes that a city with a low score may not be 
in poor financial condition – just in poorer financial condition than the cities in the 
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Financial Indicators database. Ross 
and Greenfield (1980) hold that the concept of fiscal stress (urban distress in their 
parlance) is relative and therefore can only have meaning when comparing localities. 
Kloha et al (2005a) also use financial and socioeconomic indicators to measure cities’ 
financial conditions; however, they devise absolute criteria for poor financial condition. 
To do this, the authors note they have to assign values to variables that may seem 
subjective. Based on these values, cities can compare their point values to the authors’ 
scale – 0 to 4 points and no action needed; 5 points and recommend fiscal watch, 6 to 7 
points and recommend fiscal warning, and 8 to 10 points and the city is in fiscal 
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emergency. In state fiscal measures, the use of unreserved budget balance as a percent of 
total expenditures has invited much discussion of the point of fiscal stress (Joyce 2001). 
An often-cited threshold of good financial condition is a balance of 5 percent or greater 
(Rubin and Willoughby 2009); however, the appropriate value is far from settled. The 
purpose of this discussion is to illustrate that regardless of whether an absolute or relative 
measure is used; assigning value is subjective – whether the values are relative to other 
governments or relative to fixed criteria. Especially in the absence of agreed upon 
external criteria, comparing governments to one another and viewing their level of fiscal 
stress relative to other states makes sense. 
3.2.4 Typology of State Fiscal Stress Measures  
Armed with a framework for measuring fiscal stress as well as the factors we 
should consider in constructing a fiscal stress measure, this analysis now turns to the 
most common measures of state fiscal stress used. Five broad categories of state level 
measures are examined here: budget deficits, year-end unreserved budget balance, 
declines in state revenue performance, tax increases relative to expenditure trends, and 
financial ratios. In this section, only state measures are used since the focus is of this 
analysis is fiscal stress at the state level. Also, many municipal measures include factors 
or measures that do not apply to states and would only distract from the analysis. Each 
category of measures will be described, the strengths and weaknesses of each measure 
discussed, and the extent to which each measure covers the four types of fiscal stress 
illustrated in Table 3.1.  
Budget Deficits 
An instinctual indicator of fiscal stress is a budget shortfall or deficit. Budget 
deficits can occur throughout a fiscal year – when a budget is proposed, after the budget 
is passed by the legislature or at the end of a fiscal year (Poterba 1994). Budget deficits 
 
63 
result from an overestimation of revenue collections or an underestimation of 
expenditures or both. Due to balanced budget rules in place in nearly all states, budget 
deficits require timely action – either revenue increases, expenditure reductions or both. 
Budget deficits are an effective measure of fiscal stress because they show that estimated 
revenue levels do not support the services a state intended on providing in the next fiscal 
year. This measure is often used in case study analysis to identify which states are 
experiencing difficulty (Conant 2010). 
Year-end Unreserved Budget Balance 
The most often-cited measure of fiscal stress is the year-end unreserved budget 
balance (calculated using the general fund balance plus rainy day fund balances as 
percentage of general fund expenditures) (Jimenez 2009; Rubin and Willoughby 2009; 
Chaney et al 2002b; Gold 1995). This measure indicates how much money a state has left 
over at the end of a fiscal year. States with higher levels of fiscal stress should have lower 
balances and states experiencing less stress should have higher balances. This measure is 
collected annually by the National Association of State Budget Officers’ (NASBO) Fiscal 
Survey and is available for all states over a 30-year time frame.  
Revenue Performance 
A relatively simple measure of fiscal stress is the change in a state’s revenue 
performance across years. Reduced revenues are one sign of fiscal stress. This measure 
has been used both in state and municipal level analysis (Lewis 1988; Hendrick 1989; 
Alm et al 1993; Giertz and Giertz 2004; Jimenez 2009). Different specifications of 
changes in revenue performance are used – with some studies using a single measure of 
revenue performance and others using multiple measures. Alm et al (1993) use different 
measures of state revenue, including percentage change in real state government tax 
revenues and percentage change in real intergovernmental transfers to state government. 
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Also included is the percentage change in real state personal income; this functions as a 
measure of the size of the tax base (Alm et al 1993). Jimenez (2009) uses tax revenue per 
$1,000 real personal income in addition to those used in Alm et al (1993). Jimenez (2009) 
acknowledges that higher tax effort may be due to citizen preferences, while controlling 
for citizens ideology. The citizen ideology variable is an attempt to reduce the distortion 
of citizen preferences on tax effort levels. Changes in revenue collection are a common 
cause of fiscal stress in the states, so using this as an indicator of stress makes sense. 
Tax Increases Relative to Expenditure Trends 
Other measures of fiscal stress attempt to incorporate both sides of stress – 
maintaining government-provided services and minimizing tax increases. Measures in 
this category address specific research questions and as such are not applicable to other 
research areas (Jimenez 2009).  In their study of how rainy day funds affect fiscal stress, 
Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) and Douglas and Gaddie (2002) use “the amount of 
discretionary tax increase plus the amount the expenditures were reduced from their long-
run growth during a recession” (Sobel and Holcombe 1996a, 33). States that maintain 
their expenditures in line with the real trend growth rate for expenditures and do not 
increase taxes are considered to be without fiscal stress. The authors make clear that this 
measure of fiscal stress is intended to be relevant to rainy day fund use and not as an 
absolute measure of fiscal stress. Maag and Merriman (2007) modify the fiscal stress 
measure used by Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) by defining state fiscal crises as when the 
policy-neutral revenue in one year is less than the actual revenue in the previous year. 
Policy-neutral revenue is defined as a state’s observed revenue minus tax increases and 
plus tax cuts – it is intended to measure the effect of economic conditions on a state’s 
revenues (Maag and Merriman 2007).  While simpler, this measure effectively ignores 
the expenditure side of the fiscal stress equation. However, it does address a major 
shortcoming of the measure developed by Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) – that changes in 
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expenditure levels may be unrelated to fiscal stress. As noted by Maag and Merriman 
(2007), states may change their expenditure levels by pruning ‘optional’ or ‘expendable’ 
programs.  As such, a decrease in expenditures below the trend line may reflect a change 
in preferences or a relatively mild response to expected reductions in revenues.  
Financial Ratios 
 Suggestions have been made in the state fiscal stress literature to use financial 
ratios as measures of fiscal stress (Rubin and Willoughby 2009; Chaney et al 2002a).  
Kamnikar et al (2006) collected two years worth of data from state Comprehensive 
Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) and computed three financial ratios for each state 
measuring liquidity, leverage, and ability to provide continuing services. The liquidity 
ratio measures a government’s ability to pay for its immediate obligations. The leverage 
ratio measures the extent that the government’s assets are financed through borrowing. 
The continuing services ratio measures the government’s ability to provide the same level 
of services in the future. These ratios assess a state’s financial condition, in this case 
defined as “a government’s ability to meet its obligations as they come due and the 
ability to continue to provide the services its constituency requires” (Kamnikar et al 2006, 
31). Wang et al (2007) also used financial indicators to measure state financial condition 
by building 11 financial indicators using government wide statements in fiscal year 2003 
CAFRs. Based on research about municipal fiscal stress and the preliminary work 
conducted about state fiscal stress, there is room for expansion of fiscal stress measures 
to include financial ratios. The strength of financial ratios in measuring changes in fiscal 
stress depends on which ratios are used. As the discourse within the municipal fiscal 
stress literature shows, there are many different financial ratios and they can be combined 
in multiple ways. Since relatively little work using financial ratios has been done at the 
state level, starting with the three ratios proposed by Kamnikar et al (2006) seems 
reasonable – the liquidity and continuing services ratios measures as short-term indicators 
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of fiscal stress and the match between state spending and revenues as a long-term 
measure of stress.  The leverage ratio provides a check on whether states are financing a 
large proportion of activities through borrowing. The work of Wang et al (2007) takes 
this further by proposing financial indicators that measure budget, cash, service-level, and 
long-term solvencies. These indicators were found to accurately measure the underlying 
dimensions of solvency and to change in the expected direction given a set of socio-
economic variables.  
 
 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of State Fiscal Stress Measures 
Measure State-to-
State 
Comparison 
Year-to-
Year 
Comparison 
Budget 
Solvency 
Cash 
Solvency 
Service 
level 
Solvency 
Long-run 
Solvency 
Sources 
Budget 
Deficits 
Weak Moderate      Lauth 2010; 
Conant 2010; 
Dautrich et al 
2010; Bunch 
2010 
Year-End 
Unreserved 
Weak Moderate     Rubin and 
Willoughby 
2009; 
Jimenez 
2009; Chaney 
et al (2002a); 
Gold (1995) 
Revenue 
Performance 
Weak Weak     Alm et al 
1993; 
Jimenez 2009 
Tax 
Increases 
relative to 
Expenditure 
Trends 
Weak Weak     Sobel and 
Holcombe 
(1996a); 
Douglas and 
Gaddie 
(2002); Maag 
and 
Merriman 
(2007) 
Financial 
Ratios 
Moderate Moderate     Wang et al 
(2007); 
Kamnikar et 
al (2006) 
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State-to-State Comparison 
Analysis of fiscal stress among all fifty states is critical to assessing the factors 
that make some states more vulnerable to fiscal stress as well as what makes some states 
more successful at moving out of fiscal stress. As shown in Table 3.1, the five categories 
of fiscal stress measures do not allow state-to-state comparisons equally. Four of the 
measures – revenue performance, tax increases relative to expenditure trends, year-end 
reserve, and budget deficits – are classified as having low quality state-to-state 
comparisons. The reason for this poor rating is that each of these measures is calculated 
differently by different states. Concerning budget deficits, Reschovsky (2004) outlines 
two methodological issues that make comparisons across states inaccurate. First, states 
use different methods to estimate revenues and make different assumptions regarding 
revenue levels. Second, states use different methodologies to estimate expenditure levels. 
Some states use a current services budget – expenditures are equal to the amount of 
money needed in the next fiscal year to continue providing the same level of services 
provided in the current fiscal year. Budget gaps in these states would truly measure the 
difference between services provided last year and current year revenues. Some states 
estimate expenditures with increases as required by state statutory requirements. Because 
of differences in estimation methods for both revenues and expenditures, budget deficits 
in one state are not comparable to those in another state. 
Recent work on the use of rainy day funds and general fund unreserved 
undesignated balances as countercyclical devices points to methodological problems in 
using this measure for fiscal stress, particularly in comparing across states (Hou 2003; 
Hou 2004). An array of rules govern the funding and use of rainy day funds and these 
play a large role in the size of the year-end unreserved budget balance. Since the rainy 
day fund balance is added to the general fund balance to determine the level of fiscal 
stress, factors apart from fiscal stress that cause states to have different funding levels are 
important. Findings by Hou (2004) highlight several factors –besides fiscal stress – that 
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result in states having different fund balances. First, minimum or maximum budget 
stabilization fund balances may be specified by law. States with higher caps on the 
maximum balance amount are associated with higher funding levels. Second, states 
without rules about carrying deficits over to the next fiscal year also have higher rainy 
day fund balances – despite having a higher risk of fiscal stress. Third, states in which the 
governor is from a different party than the majority of the legislature tend to carry higher 
rainy day balances; likely due to the difficulty in removing money from the fund. And 
fourth, the designated purpose for use of the rainy day fund also affects their funding 
level. In states that allow rainy day funds to be used for ‘any purpose’, the fund balance is 
likely to be lower. States with rainy day funds to be used for ‘revenue shortfalls’ will 
have balances lower during poor economic conditions; however, these states do not have 
statistically higher balances when economic conditions improve. These relationships 
demonstrate that factors unrelated to fiscal stress affect the level of rainy day fund 
balances – often in the opposite direction hypothesized by the literature. These findings 
bring into question the validity of using this measure to capture interstate fiscal stress 
differences.  
Cross-state comparisons using year-end unreserved fund balance are also 
problematic. States are often able to defer expenditures or speed up receipt of revenues.  
For this reason, the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) suggests caution 
in comparing this measure across states (Chaney et al 2002b). Researchers have also 
found that states do not always report their correct general fund balance – that is, the 
amount in their audited Comprehensive Annual Financial Report differs from the amount 
reported to NASBO (Hou 2003).  
As with the fund balance measure, there are circumstances in which changes in 
revenue levels will not reflect changes in levels of fiscal stress. First, states may cut taxes 
during a period of relative economic prosperity. This change in tax revenue will be 
unlikely to reduce revenue collections to levels seen during the period fiscal stress, but it 
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may produce inconsistencies in analysis. Second, using revenue performance alone as an 
indicator of fiscal stress does not take into account expenditure levels. Fiscal stress occurs 
because of a mismatch between ongoing revenues and expenditures. While it is likely that 
revenue decline will produce fiscal problems; it is difficult to know the scale of these 
problems without considering the level of expenditures to be sustained. As for comparing 
revenue changes across states, it will likely be clear which states are experiencing severe 
fiscal stress and which are on firmer fiscal ground. The problem arises in determining a 
standard to rank states as experiencing low, moderate, or high fiscal stress.  
Using tax increases relative to expenditure trends is also problematic as an 
interstate measure of fiscal stress. Measures that use either change in tax policy or change 
in expenditure policy run the risk of measuring a state’s response to fiscal stress but not 
actual fiscal stress. Another concern is the use of a long-run growth rate of expenditures 
set for each state. As mentioned regarding the causes of fiscal stress, some states simply 
spend too much vis-à-vis the size and capacity of their tax base. If these states reduce 
their expenditures during a recession, it may be a sign of rational spending prioritization 
rather than response to fiscal stress. Also, this measure does not account for states that 
continue their expenditure trend using short-term debt rather than tax increases. This 
might allow gimmicks used by some states to obfuscate their level of fiscal stress 
experienced.  First, since states may have different responses to fiscal stress (some may 
increase taxes, others may not; some may decrease expenditures, others may not), it is 
difficult to use this as an absolute measure of fiscal stress. Also the presence of different 
anti-deficit and balanced budget rules in states will allow certain states to tolerate higher 
budget deficits and take less action to remedy them. As such they may not register as 
experiencing fiscal stress using this measure.  
Using financial indicators based on government-wide statements in annual 
CAFRs, by contrast, presents fewer problems for cross-state comparability. These 
statements allow a comparison across the entire state government and the factors counted 
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are relatively standardized. An advantage of this measure is that it does not directly 
incorporate state responses to fiscal stress into the measure of stress. In addition, using 
government-wide measures accounts for deficits in funds outside the general fund that 
may impact the financial condition of a state (Conant 2010). Certain factors such as the 
infrastructure asset reporting and approach to recording infrastructure assets’ depreciation 
will affect state-to-state comparisons, but work on this so far has shown relatively minor 
distortions. In addition, these factors can be accounted for in a regression analysis. 
Year-to-Year Comparison 
Many of the issues that compromise state-to-state comparability also affect the 
validity of year-to-year comparisons. Budget deficits are a good measure of fiscal stress 
within one state when the methodology used to estimate deficits remains constant from 
one fiscal year to the next. For instance, Georgia experienced budget deficits in fiscal 
years 2008 and 2009 mainly due to declines in revenue collections (Lauth 2010; Lauth 
2003); however, in fiscal year 2007 the budget was balanced. The budget deficits in 2008 
and 2009 reflect the effects of the national recession in Georgia and the relatively 
inelastic tax system. In this sense, budget deficits do manifest changes in fiscal stress 
levels. However, differences in economic assumptions that underlie revenue estimates 
may vary year to year even within the same states (Gold 1992). Similarly, despite the 
differences that arise in states’ year-end unreserved fund balance due to differential rules 
governing rainy day funds, as long as these rules remain constant year-to-year, then this 
measure should show differences in states financial condition year after year. Tax 
increases relative to expenditure performance and revenue performance are graded as 
weak year-to-year measures because these measures are particularly vulnerable to 
political changes. Tax increases or decreases may have more to due with the political 
preferences of whichever political party is in power, than a state’s financial condition.  
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Financial ratios are rated as moderately effective year-to-year measures for 
similar reasons as they are moderately effective state-to-state measures. The 
standardization of government-wide statements and the comprehensiveness of the data 
are key factors in this comparability. However, as with the state to state comparisons, the 
phasing in of the GASB 34 requirements (discussed in the last section of this chapter) 
will result in some differences year after year as it does state to state.  
3.3 Operationalizing the Financial Condition Framework 
The extent to which these five measures of state fiscal stress captures the four 
dimensions of financial solvency differs significantly. Only financial indicators have the 
ability to incorporate all four dimensions due to the flexibility of the measure and the 
ability to add financial ratios that measure these dimensions. A budget deficit is a clear 
deficiency in budget solvency. Missing from the measure is an assessment of cash 
liquidity, long-run solvency and service-level solvency. Unreserved fund balance gets at 
the ability of a state to match revenues and expenditures (budget solvency) as well as its 
ability to pay short-term obligations (cash solvency); however, a state’s ability to provide 
services and to meet long-term obligations are absent. Neither revenue performance nor 
tax increases relative to expenditure trends directly measure any of the four solvencies. In 
Table 3.1, they are checked as measuring service-level solvency mainly due to their focus 
on tax levels. 
3.3.1 Elements of a Good Measure 
Based on the literature, we have established that a measure that has the flexibility 
to measure aspects of fiscal stress separately is preferable to one that lumps them all 
together, that measuring the ability of a state to meet public demand for goods and 
services is important as is accounting for the different time frames of certain fiscal stress 
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measures, and that comparing states to each other to determine fiscal stress is more 
defensible than an external and absolute standard.  
Although financial ratios can be added together to form a composite measure of 
fiscal stress, they are the only fiscal stress measure discussed here that allow for different 
dimensions of fiscal stress to be separately measured. This characteristic also means that 
financial ratios are better able to measure the ability of a state to meet public demand and 
to account for different time frames of underlying measures than other fiscal stress 
measures. On the question of what level qualifies as fiscal stress, all of the measures 
allow for flexibility on this consideration. Typically a lower year-end balance, smaller 
deficit, better tax performance or fewer tax increases relative to expenditures are taken to 
mean less fiscal stress. These are relative measures of fiscal stress and depend on how 
other states perform. Year-end unreserved fund balances typically are considered 
sufficient if they are at least five percent of total expenditures (Joyce 2001); however, this 
interpretation is used loosely (Rubin and Willoughby 2009). 
3.4 Data Availability and GASB 34 
The ability to collect data on government-wide indicators only recently became 
possible. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34: 
Basic Financial Statements – and Management’s Discussion and Analysis – for State and 
Local Governments issued in 1999 required governments to use a new financial reporting 
model that included consolidated government-wide financial statements that use the full 
accrual accounting basis (Plummer 2007 et al). These new requirements, particularly the 
production of the Statement of Activities and Statement of Net Assets make the use of 
financial ratios for cross-state comparison possible and practical. The Statement of 
Activities reports all revenues and costs of providing government activities; while the 
Statement of Net Assets reports on current financial assets and liabilities, capital assets 
and long-term liabilities (Mead 2006). GASB 34 is widely seen as the biggest change in 
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state and local financial reporting in decades (Mead 2006; Plummer et al 2007; Robbins 
and Houston 2002; Kravchuk and Voorhees 2001). The requirement which for states took 
effect in 2002 and is reflected in fiscal year 2002 state CAFRs (with the exception of 
New York state) is different from the prior CAFR presentation which focused on 
reporting by fund and allowed states to use different accounting systems (Chaney et al 
2002b). Besides the government-wide financial statements with full accrual bases of 
accounting, GASB 34 also requires: 
• A discussion of a government’s financial activities and financial position 
• Capital assets and long term debt must be reported in the Statement of Net Assets 
• The required supplemental information (RSI) must include the MD&A, budgetary  
comparison schedules for government funds and information about infrastructure 
assets that do not have depreciation recorded on financial statements 
• General infrastructure assets must be reported prospectively on the government- 
wide balance sheet net of accumulated depreciation (Kravchuk and Voorhees  
2001). 
Two changes required by GASB 34 that concern the reporting of infrastructure 
assets are particularly relevant for this analysis. All states are required to retroactively 
report infrastructure assets; however, states have up to three years to begin reporting this 
information. States are also provided the choice between a traditional or modified 
approach to reporting depreciation on infrastructure assets (Wang et al 2007). States that 
defer retroactive reporting of infrastructure assets – in other words they report on the debt 
of purchasing infrastructure assets at a different time than they record the infrastructure 
as an asset – results in lower net assets, total assets, capital assets net of related debt or 
unrestricted net assets (Wang et al 2007).  The different timing of states reporting on 
infrastructure assets will result in spurious differences in the financial indicators listed 
above. Differences may also result from the different reporting practices of depreciation 
on infrastructure assets. States using the modified approach do not have to depreciate 
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infrastructure assets. Instead they must have an asset management system for 
infrastructure assets that must meet the following requirements: 
• The government keeps up to date inventory records of its assets, 
• Regular assessments are performed (every 3 years) using a measurement scale of  
the condition its infrastructure assets (and must be reported in RSI), 
•  An annual estimate is made of the costs required to maintain and preserve  
infrastructure assets at the condition level established by the government. 
 
States adopting the modified approach may have lower expenses (Wang et al 
2007). These two requirements, particularly the modified depreciation approach, reduce 
the uniformity of these government-wide statements (Kravchuk and Voorhees 2001).  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the various definitions and measures of fiscal stress are discussed. 
By synthesizing multiple definitions of fiscal stress, this chapter articulates a single 
definition that encompasses four types of solvency: budget, cash, long-run, and service-
level. A typology of fiscal stress measures is created and the different measures found 
throughout fiscal stress literature are assessed on their ability to operationalize the four 
types of solvency that contribute to fiscal stress. Financial indicators are found to best 
measure fiscal stress due to the amount of information they can represent.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSTRUCTING AND TESTING A FISCAL STRESS MEASURE 
4.1 Introduction 
Given an understanding of fiscal stress, a definition and measurement aspects, we 
now must determine how to express the concept numerically with the available data. This 
chapter focuses on the second research question of this analysis - is there a better measure 
of fiscal stress than has been presented in the past, and why is this new measure valid and 
reliable? In this case, a measure of fiscal stress is constructed from financial indicators 
that operationalize the following definition of the term: a government’s inability to meet 
its short or long run financial obligations, as they arise, that may also be accompanied by 
an inability to raise revenues or provide determined levels of goods and services. The 
definition of fiscal stress is then broken into various components.  The first component, a 
state’s ability or inability to meet short run financial obligations as they arise, is captured 
by a cash solvency index. The second component, a state’s ability or inability to meet 
long run financial obligations as they arise, is measured by a long-run solvency index. 
The third component, a state’s ability or inability to raise revenue, is captured by a budget 
solvency index. And finally, the fourth component, a state’s ability or inability to provide 
a previously determined level of goods and services, is measured by a service-level 
index. 
There are many financial indicators that can measure aspects of a state’s financial 
condition and by extension, fiscal stress. The eleven financial indicators used in this 
chapter are based on prior research and data availability. Using these financial indicators, 
four indices – cash, budget, long-run and service-level – are constructed. The reliability 
and validity of these indices as measures of fiscal stress will also be assessed. Once these 
indices are constructed, tested and combined, a measure of fiscal stress exists that allows 
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comparison across years and among the American states. This will improve scholars’ 
ability to conduct time series and panel analysis of the state experience of fiscal stress 
and their responses to fiscal stress as well as policy makers’ ability to make judgments 
about policies affecting the financial condition of their specific government. 
4.2 Financial Indicators and Index Construction 
The financial indicators used in this analysis were chosen based on their past use 
to measure state financial condition as well as because of the availability of data. Wang et 
al (2007) operationalized the cash, budget, long-run and service-level solvency 
definitions introduced by Groves et al (1981). The authors use eleven financial 
indicators5 to construct four separate indices of financial condition: cash ratio, quick 
ratio, current ratio, operating ratio, surplus (deficit) per capita, net assets ratio, long-term 
liability ratio, long-term liability per capita, tax per capita, revenue per capita, and 
expenses per capita. Table 4.1 lists each financial indicator, its definition, the 
interpretation of its value, and the fiscal stress index to which it contributes. The data 
used to create these financial indicators are available in the government-wide financial 
statements in state Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs).  
As mentioned above and detailed in table 4.1, four indices of fiscal stress are 
created in this chapter: cash, budget, long-run, and service-level. These indices capture 
                                                
 
 
5 Other financial ratios are proposed in the literature and are available using state government-wide 
financial statements in CAFRs. Kamnikar et al (2006) proposes three measures to assess state financial 
condition: cash quick ratio (cash+cash equivalents+investments/current liabilities), debt to asset ratio (total 
liabilities/total assets), and continuing services ratio (unrestricted net assets/expenses). Chaney et al 
(2002b) list six financial ratios to measure local government financial condition including cash ratio, 
operating ratio, and long-term debt/total assets. In sum, multiple financial ratios exist and all measure some 
component of a government’s financial condition. The value of using those proposed by Wang et al (2007) 
is that these financial ratios are linked to each of the four dimensions of solvency. And, as explained later in 
this chapter, these financial ratios are internally and externally consistent measures of each dimension of 
financial condition examined here. 
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both the financial condition of a state as well as its level of fiscal stress. The methodology 
for creating these indices draws from Wang et al (2007).  
 
Table 4.1: Financial Indicators Used to Measure Fiscal Stress  
ID Financial 
Indicator 
Definition Meaning Dimension 
1 Cash Ratio (Cash+Cash Equivalents+ 
Investments)/Current Liabilitiesa 
Higher ratio indicates 
greater cash solvency 
Cash 
2 Quick Ratio (Cash+Cash Equivalents+ 
Investments +Receivables)/ 
Current Liabilities 
Higher ratio indicates 
greater cash solvency 
Cash 
3 Current Ratio Current Assetsb/Current 
Liabilities 
Higher ratio indicates 
greater cash solvency 
Cash  
4 Operating 
Ratio 
Total Revenues/Total Expenses 1 or above indicates 
budget solvency 
Budget  
5 Surplus 
(deficit) per 
capita 
Total Surpluses 
(Deficits)/Population 
Positive indicates budget 
solvency 
Budget  
6 Net Asset 
Ratio 
Restricted and Unrestricted Net 
Assets/Total Assets 
Higher ratio indicates 
stronger long-run 
solvency 
Long-run 
7 Long-term 
Liability 
Ratio 
Long-term (non-current) 
Liabilities/ Total Assets 
Lower ratio indicates 
stronger long-run 
solvency 
Long-run 
8 Long-term 
Liability per 
capita 
Long-term (non-current) 
Liabilities/ Population 
Lower value indicates 
greater long-run 
solvency 
Long-run 
9 Tax per 
capita 
Total Taxes/Population Higher value indicates 
lower service-level 
solvency 
Service-level  
10 Revenue per 
capita 
Total Revenues/Population Higher value indicates 
lower service-level 
solvency 
Service-level 
11 Expenses per 
capita 
Total Expenses/Population Higher value indicates 
lower service-level 
solvency 
Service-level 
Source: Wang et al (2007, 8-9) 
aCurrent liabilities were classified for twenty-four states. Twenty-six states did not classify liabilities 
as current or noncurrent for all eight years. Using the same method as Wang et al (2007) liabilities are 
assumed to be listed in order of maturity. Current liabilities as measured in this analysis do not include 
any liability items listed as or after noncurrent liabilities or long-term liabilities. Since states list 
different items as liabilities, the composition of current liabilities across states is not identical. 
bCurrent assets were classified for twenty-four states. Twenty-six states did not classify assets as 
current or noncurrent for all eight years. Using the same method as Wang et al (2007) assets are 
assumed to be listed in order of liquidity. In this analysis, current assets include assets listed before 
restricted or capital assets.  Receivables include all items listed as receivable that are listed before 
restricted assets. Since states list different items as assets, the composition of current assets across 
states is not identical. 
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Five of the financial indicators (Surplus per capita, Long-term liability per capita, Tax per 
capita, Revenues per capita, and Expenses per capita) are not presented as ratios and 
therefore, require adjustment due to yearly fluctuations in inflation. These financial 
indicators are deflated using the GDP price index. To ensure that the financial indicators 
are interpreted correctly when added together, five are transformed so that higher values 
denote higher solvency. This was done by taking the inverse of the original variable.6 All 
the financial indicators were standardized and converted to z scores. Each index was 
created as follows; the standardized financial indicators underlying each solvency index 
were added together and then averaged. The resulting score is the value for each index. 
All states for which data is available are included in the analysis. 
4.3 Data 
Data was collected from Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRS) for 
all 50 states for fiscal years 2002 through 2009. With the exception of New York, all 
states had implemented GASB 34 by 2002 and therefore their CAFRS were prepared 
using the GASB 34 financial reporting model.7 Two financial statements in each CAFR – 
the Statement of Net Assets and the Statement of Activities – are the sources of 
government-wide financial information. Information on how states report on their 
infrastructure assets was also collected from the CAFRs. Annual estimates of resident 
population by state for the years 2001 through 2009 was taken from the U.S. Census 
                                                
 
 
6 Long-term liability ratio, long-term liability per capita, tax per capita, revenue per capita and expenses per 
capita indicate a lower level of solvency the higher the value. The other six financial indicators indicate a 
higher-level solvency the higher the value. When aggregating these values and comparing between the 
different indexes, it is necessary that a higher value have the same meaning for all financial indicators. To 
ensure this, the inverse of the five ratios listed above are taken. By taking the inverse, a higher value on the 
five indicators listed also indicates a higher level of solvency. 
7 GASB Statement No.34: Basic Financial Statements – and Management’s Discussion and Analysis – for 
State and Local Governments required governments to report consolidated government-wide financial 
statements that use the full accrual accounting basis. This included the production of the Statement of 
Activities and Statement of Net Assets. 
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Bureau, Population Division. Data on the economic growth within a state in one year is 
taken from the State Coincident Index published by the Federal Reserve Bank in 
Philadelphia. The Bank generates and reports an indexed measure of economic growth in 
each state by month based on four economic indicators: nonfarm payroll employment, 
average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary 
disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city average) (Crone 2006). 
Total personal income by state for the years 2001 through 2009 was collected from the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, State Annual Personal Income tables. The general 
fund ending balance and total expenditures figures used to create the ending budget 
balance as a percent of total expenditures variable are consistently taken from the 
NASBO Fall Fiscal Survey of the States for the years 2002 through 2010. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for the eleven untransformed financial indicators are shown 
in Table 4.2.  
Cash Solvency  
Three indicators comprise the cash solvency index, including the cash, quick and 
current ratios. For these ratios, a higher value means a state has more current assets 
available to cover current liabilities. As defined by Groves et al (1981), cash solvency is a 
“government’s ability to generate enough cash or liquidity to pay its bills” (6). The cash 
ratio includes only the most liquid of current assets, with the quick and current ratios 
including increasingly less liquid current assets. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for Financial Indicators 
 Nb Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum Skewness 
Cash Ratioa 391 1.854 1.560 1.067 6.893 .321 1.448 
Quick Ratioa 391 2.663 2.206 1.521 10.421 .825 2.152 
Current Ratioa 391 2.850 2.344 1.616 11.691 .978 2.612 
Operating Ratio 399 1.025 1.015 .119 2.08 .323 2.980 
Surplus (deficit) 
per capita 
399 172.718 92.308 1151.54 11904 -9447.86 3.403 
Net Asset Ratio 399 .543 .608 .287 .940 -.751  
-1.764 
Long-run 
Liability ratio 
399 .311 .248 .255 1.405 .017 1.835 
Long-run 
Liability per 
capita 
399 2006.43 1462.19 1538.15 6883.65 122.49 1.308 
Tax per capita 399 2409.4 2238.55 907.38 12408.13 1095.42 4.316 
Revenue per 
capita 
399 5307.77 4892.34 1967.64 22,927.35 5307.77 4.530 
Expenses per 
capita 
399 5163.60 4833.54 1455.95 14241.26 2704.53 1.77 
a For the Cash, Quick and Current ratios, Alaska is omitted for the purposes of reporting the descriptive 
statistics. Unlike other states, Alaska keeps a very large current asset balance – including cash and cash 
equivalents – that positively skews the mean.  
bNew York state is excluded for 2002 because the state did not implement GASB 34 and government-
wide financial reporting until 2003. 
 
 
As such, these three indicators provide a sense of how liquid a government is, 
implying its ability to pay off current liabilities. As shown in Table 4.2, the mean of the 
cash ratio is 1.854 and the standard deviation is 1.067.8  
The mean of the quick ratio is 2.663 and the standard deviation is 1.521.9 A quick 
ratio greater than 1 is the commonly accepted standard for sufficient cash reserves 
                                                
 
 
8 With Alaska included, the mean is 2.154 and the standard deviation is 3.001. Unlike the other states in the 
dataset for the years 2002 -2005, Alaska kept a large amount of cash and investments on hand compared to 
its level of current liabilities. For these years, Alaska’s cash ratio ranged from 34.8 to 20.2 with a high of 
41.07 in 2003. However, from 2005 to 2009, Alaska’s cash ratio, while still high, fell more in line with 
maximums in the dataset with cash ratio’s ranging from 5.6 to 10.4 in 2005 and 2009 (respectively) with a 
high of 12.2 in 2008. 
9 The experience of Alaska described in the cash ratio, is virtually identical to that with the quick ratio. The 
mean of the quick ratio is 2.702 and a standard deviation of 1.695. When Alaska is included the mean is 
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(Finkler 2005). As a comparison, in 2003, 40 states have quick ratios greater than 1; 
where as in 2009, 33 states have quick ratios greater than 1. This suggests that the quick 
ratio is sensitive to economic trends.  The mean of the current ratio is 2.85 and the 
standard deviation is 1.616.10 The rule of thumb for sufficiency equals a current ratio of 2 
(Finkler 2005). As with the quick ratio, more states achieved sufficiency in 2003 (64 
percent) than in 2009 (54 percent). This suggests that more states were in a position to 
meet short-term obligations in 2003 than in 2009, presumably given the effects of the 
economic downturn that began in December 2007. 
Budget Solvency 
Two financial indicators make up the budget solvency index: operating ratio and 
the surplus (deficit) per capita. Since budget solvency is a state’s “ability to generate 
sufficient revenues over its normal budgetary period to meet its expenditure obligations 
and not incur deficits” (Groves et al 1981, 6), both of these indicators concern the balance 
between revenues and expenses. The operating ratio is calculated as total revenues 
divided by total expenses. The surplus (or when the value is negative, deficit) per capita 
is calculated using the change in net assets divided by state population. The mean 
operating ratio is 1.025 and the standard deviation is 0.119. An operating ratio greater 
than 1 indicates budget solvency or that a state can cover all expenses within a year with 
its current year revenues. The mean surplus per capita is $172.71 with a standard 
deviation of $1,151. This indicates a great deal of variation in surplus/deficits among the 
states over the years. Forty-six states had deficits in 2009 compared to 27 states with 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
2.957 and the standard deviation is 3.192. As with the cash ratio, the truly divergent values are for the years 
2002 through 2005. 
10 With Alaska included the mean of the current ratio is 3.146 with a standard deviation of 3.26. 
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deficits in 2003. As with the cash solvency index, this index is sensitive to economic 
changes. 
Long-run solvency 
Three indicators measure long-run solvency: net assets ratio, long-term liability 
ratio, and long-term liabilities per capita. Long-run solvency is a government’s “long-run 
ability of a government to pay all the costs of doing business, including expenditure 
obligations that normally appear in each annual budget, as well as those that show up 
only in the years in which they must be paid” (e.g. replacement of capital assets, pension 
costs, etc.) (Groves et al 1981, 6). A higher net assets ratio indicates a better ability to 
meet and pay long-run obligations (Wang et al 2007). A higher value for the long-term 
liability ratio and long-term liability per capita denote a higher long-term liability load of 
a state, and indicates potentially greater difficulty paying the liability off. The mean net 
assets ratio is 0.543 with a standard deviation of 0.287. The mean long-term liability ratio 
is 0.311 with a standard deviation of 0.255. The mean long-term liability per capita is 
$2,006 with a standard deviation of $1,538.  Long-term liability per capita differs greatly 
between states, although it is less sensitive to economic trends. 
Service-level solvency       
Three measures also compose the service-level solvency index: tax per capita, 
revenue per capita, and expense per capita. Service-level solvency measures “whether a 
government can provide the level and quality of services required for the general health 
and welfare of a community” (Groves et al 1981, 6). The first two indicators, tax and 
revenue per capita assess the revenue burden on state residents. Expense per capita 
assesses the cost of providing services to state residents (Wang et al 2007). As it is 
operationalized, a higher value on these three indicators suggests lower overall service-
level solvency. Higher values suggest a higher tax burden (and subsequently less room 
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for increases) and higher costs of providing services. The mean of tax per capita is $2,409 
and the standard deviation is $907. The mean revenue per capita is $5,308 with a 
standard deviation of $1,967. Finally, expense per capita has a mean of $5,164 and a 
standard deviation of $1,456 (all numbers rounded). 
4.4.2 Measurement Reliability  
Measurement reliability is the extent to which a measure is free from random 
measurement error. Wang et al (2007) proposes three criteria to test the reliability of 
these indices. First, correlation should be present between the financial indicators used to 
make up each index. Second, there should be correlation between the indices themselves. 
This correlation assesses the extent to which they are measuring different dimensions of 
the same concepts (financial condition and fiscal stress). Third, the extent to which 
reporting-related differences affect the reliability of individual state financial ratios 
should be either minimal or correctable.  
The financial indicators making up each index are highly correlated at a 
significant level, meeting the first criterion of measurement reliability. The correlation 
between the three cash solvency index financial indicators is high. The current ratio is 
highly correlated with the quick ratio (r=0.9969, p<0.000) and the cash ratio (r=0.9691, 
p<0.000). The correlation between the quick ratio and the cash ratio is also high 
(r=0.9749, p<0.000). For the budget solvency index, the operating ratio and surplus per 
capita are highly correlated (r=0.9111, p<0.000). For the long-run solvency index, the 
financial indicators are also highly correlated, although the correlation is not positive for 
two of the three indicators. Long-term liability ratio and net asset ratio are highly 
negatively correlated (r=-0.9730, p<0.000). The net asset ratio and long-term liability per 
capita (r=-0.7039, p<0.000) are also highly negatively correlated. Long-term liability 
ratio and long-term liability per capita are highly positively correlated (r=0.7563, 
p<0.000). In the final solvency index, service-level, the financial indicators are also 
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highly correlated. Tax per capita is highly correlated with revenues per capita (r=0.6843, 
p<0.000) and expenses per capita (r=0.6982, p<0.000). Revenue per capita and expenses 
per capita are also highly correlated (r=0.8225, p<0.000).  
 The second criterion of measurement reliability is that each dimension of 
solvency is related. Table 4.3 shows the correlation and significance of the association 
between each of the indices. For the most part, the association between each index is as 
expected. Cash solvency is positively associated with budget solvency, so states with 
more current assets are also more likely to have balanced revenues and expenses. Both 
cash and budget solvency are associated with long-run solvency, indicating that states 
with higher cash and budget solvency have higher long-run solvency (and lower long-
term debt levels). Service-level solvency is also significantly related to long-run 
solvency. The association between service-level solvency and cash and budget solvency 
is less clear. The relationship between cash solvency and service-level solvency is not 
significant and the relationship between budget solvency and service-level solvency is 
significant, but negatively associated. The data suggests that states with higher  
 
 
Table 4.3: Correlation Matrix for Cash, Budget, Long-run and Service-level 
Indices 
 Cash Budget Long-run Service-level 
Cash  1.000    
Budget  0.1102  
(0.0277) 
1.000   
Long-run  0.2625 
(0.0000) 
0.2381  
(0.0000) 
1.000  
Service-level -0.0475  
(0.3440) 
-0.1981  
(0.0010) 
0.3054  
(0.0000) 
1.000 
Correlation coefficient reported with the significance level in parentheses.  
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budget solvency have lower service-level solvency. One interpretation of this relationship 
is that states with budget balance have higher taxes per capita, expenses per capita or 
revenue per capita. In this setting, having higher per capita indicators is not a problem 
because these states realize budget balance without the need to raise taxes or revenues. 
However, for states with low budget solvency, low service-level solvency presents a real 
problem. In this situation, a state would not have much room to improve budget solvency 
by increasing revenues without potentially cutting expenditures significantly. 
 An additional measure of the reliability related to these 11 financial indicators as 
a measure of fiscal stress is Cronbach’s alpha. Cronbach’s alpha for the standardized 
values of these 11financial indicators is 0.7037 (including all 50 states). Based on 
previous research on municipal and state financial condition and using CAFRs, a range of 
Cronbach’s alpha values between 0.600 and 0.800 are considered acceptable (Wang et al 
2007).  
The final examination of measurement reliability concerns differences in how 
each state records infrastructure assets, as allowed by the GASB 34 financial reporting 
model. As discussed in the previous chapter, states have the option to record 
infrastructure assets using typical depreciation or using a modified approach. States also 
had the option of delaying retroactive reporting on the value of all infrastructure assets 
until fiscal year 2006. 
For states that deferred the retroactive reporting of infrastructure assets, this delay 
will affect the size of their net assets, total assets, and unrestricted assets (Wang et al 
2007). Based on a review of state CAFRs, only four states elected to defer reporting 
infrastructure assets: Alabama, California, Montana, and Rhode Island. The small number 
of states that chose to defer reporting reduces the likelihood that this reporting difference 
systematically affects the dataset; however, a t-test is used to assess whether the affected 
financial indicators are significantly different between these states and those that did not 
defer reporting. The financial indicators likely to be affected by this reporting difference 
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are the net assets ratio and the long-term liability ratio. Since states only deferred 
reporting up to 2006 and most states started reporting assets retroactively before then, the 
t-tests are conducted on the difference in indicator means by year. For 2002, when all 
four states deferred; the mean difference for the net assets ratio between states that 
deferred and those that did not was 0.1321, not a statistically significant difference 
(t=0.9695, p=0.3372). For the long-term liability ratio, in 2002 the mean difference was                
-0.04144, also not statistically significant difference (t=-0.3583, p=0.7217). For 2003, 
when all four states deferred reporting, the mean difference between net assets ratios was 
0.2061, not statistically significant (t=1.4054, p=0.1663). The same was true for the long-
term liability ratio (t=-0.9938, p=0.3253). In 2004 and 2005, only two states still deferred 
retroactive reporting. The statistical significance for the mean difference between the 48 
states that reported retroactive assets and those that did not ranged from marginally 
significant to significant at the 0.05 level for both the net assets ratio and long-term 
liability ratio. However, it is unclear if this should be interpreted as solely due to the 
deferred reporting, or due to other differences between these two states, California and 
Rhode Island, and the other 48 states. Overall, these results suggest that the practice of 
deferred reporting has a relatively limited impact on the financial indicators. However, to 
correct for any systematic differences, controlling for deferred reporting practices is 
warranted.  
 The second difference in state reporting of infrastructure assets is how they report 
depreciation of infrastructure assets. In lieu of depreciating these assets, GASB 34 offers 
states the option of a modified approach in which they do not record depreciation but 
rather must maintain assets at an approved level and report on their ability to meet this 
criteria. According to Wang et al (2007), states using the modified approach may have 
lower expenses and higher net assets. This may affect the operating ratio, surplus per 
capita, net asset ratio, and expenses per capita. Twenty-three states chose the modified 
approach. No state changed their approach to recording infrastructure depreciation 
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between 2002 and 2009. There was a significant difference between the means of the net 
assets ratio (t=-3.597, p=0.000) and expenses per capita (t=5.236, p=0.000). The impact 
of modified approach is not significant for the operating ratio (t=-0.3024, p=0.7625) and 
surplus per capita (t=0.3426, p=0.7320). The mean net assets ratio is higher for states 
using the modified approach, while the mean expenses per capita is lower. By testing the 
means of the long-run and service-level solvency indices for states that use the modified 
and traditional approach, we find that the two groups are significantly different. States 
using the modified approach have a higher mean long-run solvency index value (t=-4.14, 
p<0.000) and a higher service-level solvency index value (t=-4.81, p<0.000). Dropping 
these indicators is an option for eliminating these systematic differences. However, the 
expenses per capita indicator provides information on the cost of providing services, 
without which the revenues and taxes per capita are biased. The net assets ratio captures a 
state’s ability to pay off long-term liabilities. In order to keep these indicators and protect 
against bias, the approach to recording state infrastructure asset depreciation will either 
be added as a dummy variable to regression analysis or fixed effects will be used to 
capture systematic differences. 
4.4.3 Measurement Validity 
Measurement validity presumes that the measure is actually assessing the 
intended concept, in this case, fiscal stress. Wang et al (2007) lists three criteria for 
assessing the validity of these measures. First, the measures should have face validity; 
they should intuitively make sense as measures of fiscal stress. The reasoning behind 
using financial indicators as measures of fiscal stress is detailed in Chapter 3. Second, the 
measures should apply to the concept comprehensively. That is, the measures should 
apply to the entire state government. Third, the measures should have predictive validity. 
Since financial condition (and by extension, fiscal stress) is related to socioeconomic 
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variables, then we would expect to see a relationship between these fiscal stress measures 
and certain socio-economic variables.  
Total state population and state personal income per capita provide insight into 
the differences between larger and smaller states, as well as among higher and lower 
income states. In previous research, Wang et al (2007) found that larger states and higher 
income states tend to have poorer financial condition. Viewing states over eight years, we 
find a similar relationship. All four indices had a significant correlation with population 
size. Cash (r=-0.1956, p=0.000), budget(r=-0.1586, p=0.002), and long-run (r=-0.2795, 
p=0.000) indices had a negative relationship with state population size. Service-level 
index had a positive significant relationship with population size (r=0.1309, p=0.009), 
indicating that larger states have higher service-level solvency. States with increasing 
populations tend to have higher cash (r=0.109, p=0.029), long-run (r=0.1530, p=0.002), 
and service-level (r=0.3255, p=0.000) solvency. Three of the indices had a significant 
negative relationship with income per capita. The budget index did not have a significant 
relationship with income per capita; however, it did have a significant positive 
relationship with the percentage change in income per capita (r=0.4238, p=0.000). This 
relationship suggests that higher income states tend to have lower cash, long-run, and 
service-level solvency, but states with growing income per capita tend to have higher 
budget solvency.  
To assess the relationship between the indices and changes in economic condition, 
the State Coincident index (described in the data section above) is used. The State 
Coincident index is available for each month for over 30 years. Using the month-to-
month percentage changes, we can calculate the yearly change in the State Coincident 
index for each state. When the individual indices are used, only the budget index has a 
significant positive correlation with the economic change measure (r=0.2565, p=0.000). 
These results show that the budget index is the only one that is sensitive to changes in 
economic conditions. 
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As a final check on the validity of these indices as measures of fiscal stress, we 
correlate each index with the unreserved budget balance as a percent of total 
expenditures. This variable is one of the most common measures of fiscal stress (Rubin 
and Willoughby 2009, Chaney et al 2002a) and as such if no correlation exists this would 
throw doubt on these indices and their ability to measure fiscal stress. Table 4.4 shows 
the Pearson’s correlations and significance levels between the unreserved budget balance 
as a percent of total expenditures (UUB) and each index. The table highlights the 
statistically significant relationship between the UUB and the budget index. Only 
marginally significant correlations are present  
 
Table 4.4: Correlation between Indices and Unreserved Budget Balance  
 Cash Budget Long-run Service-level 
Unreserved Budget Balance 
as a % of Total 
Expenditures 
-0.0491 
(0.3282) 
 0.1895 
(0.0010) 
 0.0898 
(0.0732) 
-0.0381 
(0.4482) 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States and State CAFRs 
 
 
between the UUB and the long-run index. These findings support the statements made in 
Chapter 3 that the UUB only measures one aspect of fiscal stress – budget solvency.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 This chapter proposes, constructs, and tests a new measure of fiscal stress and in 
so doing, answers the question as to whether a more reliable and valid measure of fiscal 
stress is available. This new measure, based on financial ratios, divides fiscal stress into 
four different dimensions: cash, budget, long-run and service-level solvency. These 
dimensions express in numerical terms the definition of fiscal stress described in Chapter 
3. With tests of measurement reliability and validity, this measure of fiscal stress is 
 
90 
shown to be a robust and multi-faceted expression of fiscal stress at the state level. With 
this measure of fiscal stress, states may be compared to one another over multiple years 
with some degree of confidence. This new measure provides the flexibility to categorize 
fiscal stress levels and then compare state actions to theoretical models. This measure 
also provides the ability to assess the short-term and long-term effectiveness of state 
responses at reducing different types of fiscal stress.  
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CHAPTER 5 
TRENDS IN STATE RESPONSES TO FISCAL STRESS 
5.1 Introduction 
Without consistent and comparable fiscal stress measures, analysis of state 
responses to fiscal stress has been piecemeal and subjective (Dougherty and Klase 2009; 
Jimenez 2009). Using the fiscal stress measures described in the previous Chapter allows 
for a systematic and multi-year analysis of state responses during fiscal stress. In this 
Chapter, the relationships between state responses, fiscal stress levels, economic 
conditions, political dynamics and legal requirements are examined. Incorporating the 
passage of time into this analysis also allows for the determination of the temporal order 
of responses to fiscal stress. Analysis of these issues will provide answers to the third 
question posed in the introduction: Do certain characteristics affect states’ experience of 
fiscal stress and/or influence the choice of responses? 
States have a range of possible responses to fiscal stress: across-the-board cuts, 
tax and/or fee increases, hiring freezes, employee furloughs, and/or layoffs. Although 
states receive revenue from a number of sources, including the federal government, taxes 
and fees are the only sources of revenue mostly under their control (Wulf 2002).  
Institutional, political and other factors influence a state’s choice of tactics. These 
factors include local and national economic conditions, legislation governing budget 
deficits, and state spending and taxing powers. The combination of these factors results in 
a wide variety of state responses, the mix of which can indicate either a clear pattern of 
decision making or an unstructured decision making process with no clear guiding 
principles. Despite tools available to state policy makers to smooth revenue volatility and 
avoid abrupt shifts in spending and taxation (e.g. more accurate revenue estimation 
techniques, multi-state rainy day funds, diversification of tax structures), states may lack 
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either the legal power or the political will to use these tools or implement them 
consistently (Thompson and Gates 2007; Willoughby 2007).  In this Chapter, state 
responses to close budget deficits between 2002 and 2009 are examined. This analysis 
teases out whether state responses in periods of fiscal stress differ among states with 
different political and legal arrangements.  And, states will be compared according to 
responses in periods of fiscal stress against those responses predicted by the theories of 
cutback management, incrementalism, and punctuated equilibrium.   
5.2 Data and Methodology 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the data used to create the budget, cash, long-run, and 
service-level solvency indices come from Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports 
(CAFRs) for the 50 states for fiscal years 2002 through 2009. Data on the economic 
growth within states by year is taken from the State Coincident Index published by the 
Federal Reserve Bank in Philadelphia. The Bank generates and reports an indexed 
measure of economic growth in each state by month based on four economic indicators: 
nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the 
unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price 
index (U.S. city average) (Crone 2006). State responses to budget gaps are taken from the 
fall edition of the National Association of State Budget Officers’ (NASBO) Fiscal Survey 
of States from 2003 to 2010. This data is collected from the table titled, Strategies Used 
to Reduce or Eliminate Budget Gaps and covers fiscal years 2002 – 2009. NASBO 
collects specific information from states regarding strategies used to reduce or eliminate 
budget gaps. Eleven strategies indicated across years are included here.  Hiring freezes 
are not listed in this table, though such information is included in the table notes. 
Beginning with the 2009 NASBO Fiscal Survey, fees are separated into five categories 
(user, higher education-related, court-related, transportation/motor vehicle and business-
related). For this analysis, a state that engaged any type of fee is recorded as “using fees.” 
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Using this set of responses is appropriate for two reasons: 1) budget gaps are a 
manifestation of fiscal stress, particularly budget fiscal stress (e.g., a lack of budget 
solvency) and 2) the types of responses recorded are the same discussed in the theoretical 
literature (e.g., rainy day funds, across-the-board cuts, and layoffs). Tax increases as a 
response to budget gaps are not included in the table mentioned above. Information on 
tax changes is taken from the Fall NASBO Fiscal Survey, specifically the table titled, 
Enacted Revenue Actions by Type of Revenue and Net Increase or Decrease. For each 
fiscal year, this table presents the tax changes enacted by state, along with the expected 
revenue change. State balanced budget requirements are taken from Hou and Smith 
(2006). Hou and Smith (2006) analyze state laws and constitutions to determine which 
types of balanced budget rules are present. Based on their review, the authors find 
differences between what states report as their balanced budget rules and the rules 
actually inscribed in state laws. From their review, Hou and Smith (2006) find that only 
North Dakota has no balanced budget requirements. Three other states, Indiana, 
Tennessee, and Vermont, do not have one of the four balanced budget rules modeled in 
this analysis; but they do have other balanced budget requirements.11 One potential 
limitation of this data source is changes to state balanced budget requirements since 2006. 
The NASBO Budget Processes in the States, 2008 contains a more recent survey of state 
balanced budget requirements. However, Hou and Smith (2006; 2010) raise questions as 
to the accuracy of this data source given the interpretation of state law that occurs. The 
National Conference of State Legislatures also weighs in on the difficulty of determining 
exactly which balanced budget rules are in place (2010).  To allow for comparability 
                                                
 
 
11 Indiana has a constitutional and statutory requirement that own source revenue and debt must match 
expenditures. In addition to this requirement, Tennessee has requirements that a limit is in place on the 
amount of debt that may be assumed for the purpose of deficit reduction and within fiscal year controls are 
in place to prevent deficits.  Vermont has a statutory requirement the same as Indiana (Hou and Smith 
2006). 
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across states and because balanced budget requirements be they statutory or 
constitutional do not change with great frequency, this analysis uses the rules identified 
by Hou and Smith (2006). Political party affiliation of state governors and legislatures are 
recorded from the Book of the States, 2002-2009. Data on tax and expenditure limitations 
(TELs) comes from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2008). Structural 
balance information is taken from the Government Performance Project (GPP), 2008 
“Grading the States” report, published in Governing. Determining which states suffer 
from structural deficits is difficult and ultimately subjective. The GPP divides states into 
three categories of structural balance: weakness, mid-level and strength. The GPP has 
assessed states, including their structural balance, for multiple years. For the purposes of 
this analysis, the 2008 structural balance score is used for the entire data set (2002-2009).  
The 2008 score is used for several reasons: 1) since an annual structural balance score is 
not available, it is not clear how to impute the data for other years, 2) the values of the 
structural balance scores do not change much between 2005 and 2008 (see Appendix C), 
3) since the GPP scores are based on a combination of surveys, interviews, and document 
reviews, it is possible that changes between 2005 and 2008 reflect the scorers preferences 
and not a substantive change in a state’s structural balance. Table 5.1 summarizes the 
variables, sources and years collected.   
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Table 5.1: Sources of Data for Relevant Variables 
Variable Data Source Years 
Collected 
Budget Balancing Strategies  NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States FY 2002-
2009 
Balanced Budget Requirements Hou and Smith (2006) – Content Analysis 
of State Laws 
2006 
Tax and Expenditure Limitations National Conference of State Legislatures 2008 
Structural Balance Government Performance Project – Pew 
Center for the States 
2008 
Political Party Affiliation  
• Governor’s Party 
• Unified Government 
Book of the States 2002-2009 
Economic Growth State Coincident Index –Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia 
2002-2009 
Fiscal Stress State Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Reports (CAFRs) 
FY 2002-
2009 
 
 
Using k-means cluster analysis12, states are categorized into high, moderate, and 
low levels of fiscal stress based on their four index scores (budget, cash, long-run and 
service-level solvencies). As a result, each state in each year has four scores of fiscal 
stress. Using the means of each cluster, states were assigned to one of three fiscal stress 
clusters (low, moderate, and high). For the budget solvency indices, four clusters rather 
than three were created. The fourth cluster captured those states with high, positive 
values in the budget index. For the budget index, the two clusters with positive means are 
classified as the low fiscal stress cluster. As discussed in Chapter 4, Alaska is a positive 
outlier for the cash, current and quick ratios (the three ratios that comprise the cash 
                                                
 
 
12 K-means cluster analysis allows the researcher to specify the number of clusters. An algorithm is used to 
minimize within-cluster variance and maximize variability between clusters. Since initial clusters are 
chosen randomly, the sequence of the dataset may influence the initial clusters. To correct for this, the 
dataset was randomly sorted before cluster analysis was performed. 
http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/cluster.htm#kmeans 
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solvency index). Since k-means cluster analysis is sensitive to outliers and to avoid the 
positive skew produced by Alaska’s values for these three ratios, the cluster analysis 
performed using the cash solvency index excluded Alaska for 2002 to 2009. After the 
cluster analysis was conducted, Alaska was added back into the dataset and assigned to 
the appropriate group using the cluster means. 
The means of the fiscal stress clusters provides context as to the difference 
between high, moderate, and low for each index. Since four clusters were generated for 
the budget index, there are four means – the two highest of which are classified as low 
fiscal stress. Figure 5.1 shows the means of the low, moderate and high clusters for each 
index. Cluster analysis results are presented in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
While some states have similar cluster results for the different indices (e.g. falling 
in the “moderate” group for the four indices), others show variability in their fiscal stress 
levels across the different measures. In 2009, California was categorized in the high fiscal 
stress cluster for all four of the solvency indices. By contrast, in the same year, Alaska 
Figure 5.1: Cluster Means for Fiscal Stress Indices  
 
Budget Cash 
Long-
run 
Service-
level 
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was categorized in the high fiscal stress cluster for budget and service-level solvency, but 
in the low fiscal stress cluster for the cash and long-run solvency. These findings suggest 
that California has entrenched fiscal stress in both the short-term and long-term. By 
contrast, Alaska’s divergent fiscal stress clusters suggest difficulty in the short-term, but 
sound long-term solvency. 
Descriptive analysis and the difference between means test (t-test) are used to 
analyze patterns in state responses relative to the level of fiscal stress and other 
characteristics. See Appendix B to see the state response profiles. These profiles include 
the year, responses indicated, and fiscal stress level for each dimension of fiscal stress. In 
reviewing state responses, the following questions guide this analysis: 
• Are states responding to fiscal stress?  
o If so, to which types of fiscal stress are they responding? 
• How fast do states respond to fiscal stress? 
• Which responses are the most common – is there a clear pattern? 
• Are there differences in responses among states with different economic, 
political and legal environments? 
 
These findings will be examined within a broader context of national and state trends to 
help illuminate why states may have favored some actions over others 
5.3 Findings  
Cluster Analysis Results 
In this section, the states are sorted into three levels of fiscal stress: low, 
moderate, and high. Since each state in each year is treated as a separate observation, it is 
possible for a state to have a moderate level of fiscal stress one year and a high level the 
next. Also, unique to this analysis is that states are assessed on their level of fiscal stress 
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by the four different dimensions of financial condition: cash, budget, long-run and 
service-level solvency. The results of this analysis are presented in Appendix A.  
Categorizing states as experiencing low, moderate and high fiscal stress is crucial for the 
subsequent analysis on state responses and the influencing factors on response.  
States fiscal stress levels are affected by economic conditions and vary year to 
year as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. In 2005, a year in which most states experienced 
positive economic growth,13 only two states are grouped into the high fiscal stress group 
for budget solvency. By contrast in 2009, a year of very poor state economic growth,14 18 
states are in the high fiscal stress cluster for budget solvency. In addition, the number of 
states with high fiscal stress for all four of the indices increased from one to six between 
2005 and 2009, as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5. 3. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the budget solvency index is the only one of the four 
indices with a statistically significant correlation with state economic growth. This 
relationship is underscored by the pattern shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. While the number 
of states with high budget fiscal stress increased between 2005 and 2009, the number of 
states with high cash, long-run, and service-level fiscal stress is nearly the same. On the 
other hand, while the total number of states with high cash, long-run, and service-level 
fiscal stress remains nearly static, states that move from low or moderate budget fiscal 
stress to high budget fiscal stress are also more likely to have high cash, long-run, and/or 
service-level fiscal stress. 
 
                                                
 
 
13 As measured by the State Coincident Index - includes four economic indicators: nonfarm payroll 
employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary 
disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city average) - only two states (Louisiana and 
Michigan) experienced negative monthly changes or a decrease in index level between the start and end of 
the year.  
14 In 2009, all states, except for one, experienced negative monthly changes and a decrease in their State 
Coincident Index between the start and end of the year.  
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Table 5.2: States with High Fiscal Stress in 2005 by Index 
Cash Budget Long-run Service-Level 
Arizona Massachusetts California Alaska 
California New Jersey Connecticut California 
Colorado  Hawaii Connecticut 
Connecticut  Illinois Delaware 
Delaware  Massachusetts Hawaii 
Florida  Nevada Massachusetts 
Georgia  New Jersey Minnesota 
Illinois  New York New Jersey 
Indiana  North Dakota New Mexico 
Kansas  Ohio New York 
Kentucky  Oregon Rhode Island 
Maine  Rhode Island Vermont 
Maryland  Washington Washington 
Massachusetts  West Virginia West Virginia 
Michigan  Wisconsin Wyoming 
Minnesota    
Mississippi    
New Hampshire    
New Mexico    
New York    
North Carolina    
Oklahoma    
Oregon    
Pennsylvania    
Rhode Island    
South Carolina    
Texas    
Vermont    
Washington    
Wisconsin    
Wyoming    
 Total  31 2 15 15 
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Table 5.3: States with High Fiscal Stress in 2009 by Index 
Cash Budget Long-run Service Level 
Arizona Alaska California Alaska 
California Arizona Connecticut California 
Colorado California Delaware Connecticut 
Connecticut Connecticut Florida Delaware 
Delaware Delaware Hawaii Hawaii 
Georgia Hawaii Illinois Louisiana 
Hawaii Illinois Kentucky Maine 
Illinois Kentucky Maryland Massachusetts 
Kansas Maryland Massachusetts Minnesota 
Kentucky Massachusetts Michigan New Jersey 
Maine Nevada Nevada New Mexico 
Maryland New Jersey New Jersey New York 
Massachusetts New Mexico New York North Dakota 
Michigan New York Ohio Rhode Island 
Minnesota Oregon Oregon Vermont 
Mississippi Texas Rhode Island Washington 
New Hampshire Washington Washington West Virginia 
New Jersey Wyoming Wisconsin Wyoming 
New Mexico    
New York    
North Carolina    
Oregon    
Pennsylvania    
Rhode Island    
South Carolina    
Texas    
Vermont    
Virginia    
Wisconsin    
Wyoming    
Total: 30 18 18 18 
 
Analysis of Responses to Fiscal Stress and Economic Condition 
 In this section, state responses are compared by state economic condition. 
Certainly, state responses reflect economic conditions, given the relationship between the 
economic environment and revenues. Typical state responses to fiscal stress include 
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imposing new or raising fees/charges, drawing down rainy day funds, making across-the-
board and/or targeted cuts, hiring freezes, furloughs and/or layoffs of state employees, 
conducting state employee early retirement programs, reorganizing state programs or 
departments, reducing aid to local governments, or privatization of state services and/or 
programs. Fee changes may involve user fees, higher education-related fees, court-related 
fees, transportation/motor vehicle fees, and business-related fees. Still, as noted in 
Chapter 4, fiscal stress is not perfectly correlated with economic condition.  
Certain responses by states to stress are clearly favored over others, as indicated 
in Table 5.4. Across-the-board cuts and accessing rainy day funds are the two most 
commonly reported actions states use to balance budgets. Both responses can be applied 
very quickly to close gaps between expenditures and revenues. In contrast, privatization, 
the least used method, is highly unlikely to quickly garner a sustainable flow of revenues 
or reduce expenditures substantially. Tax increases are similar to privatization in that 
quick results are unlikely; still, this is a more common response to stress by states than 
privatization.  That fewer states imposed tax changes in response to the most current 
“Great Recession” compared to the recession in 2001 might represent state concern that 
such measures may compound the economic downturn. In addition, the large federal 
stimulus may have allowed states to avoid increasing taxes. Federal stimulus dollars may 
have taken the place of revenue losses.     
Table 5.4 also shows the year-to-year fluctuations in responses. Both the number 
of states taking actions to address stress as well as the use of more severe actions (e.g. 
layoffs, furloughs, and tax increases) of action is clustered around 2002 and 2003 and 
then again around 2008 and 2009, with very few actions taken between 2004 and 2007. It 
is important to note that just considering the NASBO Fiscal Survey data of state 
responses underestimates total responses. In 2004, for instance, states kept expenditure 
growth very low – below the historical average of 6.4 percent (Samuels 2004). State 
actions mitigated the need for additional expenditure cuts. In addition, states took actions 
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not recorded by the NASBO survey, including incentives to private industry to spur 
economic development, collecting back taxes and offering tax amnesty programs, 
engaging in partnerships with faith-based and non-profit organizations to share the cost of 
providing social welfare programs, and streamlining the provision of government 
services via the conduct of government business over the Internet (Willoughby 2004). 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 presents an interesting representation of the ebb and flow in the 
frequency and severity (e.g. use of layoffs, furloughs, and tax increases) of responses. 
Based on the Governors’ State of the State addresses and the State Coincident Index, 
fiscal years 2002 and 2003 indicate difficult economic conditions in the states. At first 
glance, the state responses in 2002 appear to be over-reactions to the small but positive 
growth levels in 2002. However, when coupled with the fact that the majority of states 
experienced negative or flat growth in 2001, the responses make more sense as the 
delayed response of states to the economic conditions of 2001. In 2003, despite broadly 
improved economic growth levels, states indicate taking more actions to combat stress 
Table 5.4: State Responses to Budget Gaps and Enacted Tax Increases Fiscal Years 
2002-2009 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Rainy Day Fund 26 25 4 3 2 1 9 26 96 
Across-the-Board Cuts 27 32 6 5 2 1 10 29 111 
Hiring Freezes 6 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 13 
Reorganizing State Agencies 13 13 2 2 1 0 4 7 42 
Early Retirement 5 13 1 0 1 0 1 6 27 
Targeted Cuts 2 2 4 1 0 0 2 33 45 
Privatization 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 6 
Reduce local aid 9 11 2 1 0 0 2 17 41 
Furloughs 6 9 2 0 1 0 0 15 33 
Layoffs 15 16 3 1 1 0 3 19 58 
Fees 5 16 2 0 0 0 1 14 38 
Taxes Increases 12 23 27 20 20 14 15 10 141 
Total Number of State 
Indicated Responses 
125 165 54 33 29 16 48 180  
          
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (Fall 2001-2010) 
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than in 2002.  As economic conditions continued to improve and stabilize, responses also 
fell in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Between 2004 and 2006, state revenue growth improved 
with many states experiencing budget surpluses by 2006 (Willoughby 2006; Willoughby 
2005; Boyd 2005; Samuels 2004). Unfortunately, economic conditions began to 
deteriorate in 2007, though most state revenue collections met their revenue estimates 
that year (Sigritz 2008). Since the economic downturn did not begin in earnest until 
December 2007, it is not surprising that few states indicate responses to fiscal stress in 
2007. By 2008, however, as the “Great Recession” gained momentum, states began to 
react, though not dramatically. Indeed, in gubernatorial State of the State addresses, many 
mentioned the housing and financial crises and their potential impact on state finances, 
though nearly half of governors presented plans to cut taxes (Willoughby 2008). By 
2009, with rapid declines in revenue occurring, most states took action and several 
engaged multiple responses (Sigritz 2009).  
Analysis of Fiscal Stress and Responses 
In this section, analyses regard the variation in state responses by fiscal stress 
level.  Patterns and trends of state fiscal stress level and responses are also considered. 
NASBO queries states as to their strategies used to close budget gaps.  While results here 
indicate no clear themes, some patterns of state response to budget fiscal stress do 
emerge. Specifically, states experiencing low budget fiscal stress are less likely than other 
states to initiate any response and very few take the dramatic steps of layoffs, furloughs, 
or raising fees. Surprisingly, even states experiencing high budget fiscal stress do not 
consistently take dramatic action, some indicate making no response at all. These results 
suggest that an economic downturn (negative economic growth rate) does not 
automatically result in a state experiencing moderate or high budget or other types of 
fiscal stress. Economic condition is a very important predictor of fiscal stress, but not the 
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only factor. Fiscal stress, as measured here, does not seem to compel immediate action by 
states; although it may set the stage for how states eventually respond. 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.5, states are unlikely to take action if they are experiencing 
only low or moderate fiscal stress – this is particularly true every year from 2004 to 2007. 
Results indicate less of a pattern regarding state actions when experiencing high budget 
fiscal stress. In 2002 and 2003, despite only a handful of states with high budget fiscal 
stress, most states responded, with many taking more than one type of action. In 2009, 
the pattern is more as expected; as more states move into high budget fiscal stress and 
many into moderate budget fiscal stress, the number of responses by states in reaction to 
this stress increases.  Fiscal stress may have an impact on the types of state responses, but 
it is not clear that responses are immediate.   
Table 5.5: State Responses to Budget Gaps and Enacted Tax Increases 
Compared to Fiscal Stress Level For Fiscal Years 2002-2009 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
# of states with high budget 
fiscal stress 
7 2 1 2 0 0 2 18  
# of states with moderate 
budget fiscal stress 
38 40 28 21 17 21 38 30  
Rainy Day Fund 26 25 4 3 2 1 9 26 96 
Across-the-Board Cuts 27 32 6 5 2 1 10 29 111 
Hiring Freezes 6 5 1 0 0 0 1 1 13 
Reorganizing State 
Agencies 
13 13 2 2 1 0 4 7 42 
Early Retirement 5 13 1 0 1 0 1 6 27 
Targeted Cuts 2 2 4 1 0 0 2 33 45 
Privatization 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 6 
Reduce local aid 9 10 2 1 0 0 2 17 41 
Furloughs 6 9 2 0 1 0 0 15 33 
Layoffs 15 16 3 1 1 0 3 19 58 
Fees 5 16 2 0 0 0 1 14 38 
Tax Increases 12 23 27 20 20 14 15 10 141 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (Fall 2001-2010) and State Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (2002-2009) 
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Looking at individual state responses between 2002 and 2009, it is possible to 
ascertain whether states engage in an escalating number of responses to fiscal stress or a 
“throw everything at it at once and see what works” strategy. This analysis is based on 
the state response profiles in Appendix B. Of the 50 states, some appear to show an 
escalating response while others do not. Between 2002 and 2009, 31 states15 indicate 
sustained budget fiscal stress (high, moderate, or a combination of the two for at least 
three consecutive years). Fifteen states16 realized an increase in budget fiscal stress from 
low to high over two or more years. Some states are counted in both groups. Patterns of 
responses examined include an increase in the number and severity of responses by states 
as budget fiscal stress persists or becomes more severe. While there is no definitive 
method to categorize severity of responses, for the purposes of this analysis, use of rainy 
day funds, hiring freezes, early retirement, and across-the-board cuts are considered less 
severe responses and furloughs, layoffs, and fees are considered more severe responses.  
Thirteen17 out of the 31 states indicating sustained budget fiscal stress show a pattern of 
escalating responses. Eleven18 out of the 15 states with an increase in budget fiscal stress 
over two or more years showed a pattern of escalating responses. In Arizona, budget 
fiscal stress increased from low to moderate to high from 2007 to 2009. Arizona’s 
responses to fiscal stress also increase in number over time, starting with targeted cuts 
when fiscal stress increased from low to moderate and then engaging rainy day fund, 
across-the-board cuts, targeted cuts, reduction in local aid, fees, furloughs and layoffs 
                                                
 
 
15 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin 
16 Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming 
17 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nevada, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin 
18 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, and Washington 
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when fiscal stress advanced from moderate to high. Nevada and New Mexico both 
respond to stress in a pattern similar to Arizona. With other states, responses to balance 
the budget only begin after budget fiscal stress reached high levels (e.g. Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Washington).  
Based on individual state analysis it does not appear that budget fiscal stress (or 
the other fiscal stress indices) necessarily predicts the type or number of state responses. 
Table 5.5 shows that responses tend to closely follow economic conditions. However, 
many states experienced moderate and sustained budget fiscal stress during the years 
2004-2007, years in which economic growth was mostly positive in the states. These 
were also the years in which responses to fiscal stress were minimal. To the extent that 
fiscal stress worsens when the economy worsens and improves when the economy 
improves, the state responses follow the expected pattern. However, when states continue 
to experience fiscal stress during periods of economic growth, they do not automatically 
respond to the stress.  The effect of response choice on fiscal stress levels is explored in 
the next chapter. 
Analysis of Responses by Fiscal Stress Level 
Table 5.6 shows state responses by low, moderate, and high budget fiscal stress. 
For all responses, except for tax increases, states with low budget fiscal stress indicate 
using fewer responses.  For states with low budget fiscal stress, tax increases are the most 
common response followed by across-the-board cuts and rainy day fund use.  The 
prevalence of tax increases for all levels of budget fiscal stress suggests that these are 
being used for reasons other than to address budget deficits. Excluding tax increases, the 
states with moderate budget fiscal stress use across-the-board cuts most often, followed 
by rainy day funds, and layoffs. States with high budget fiscal stress, again excluding tax 
increases, use rainy day funds, across-the-board cuts, and targeted cuts most often. 
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Comparing across low, moderate, and high fiscal stress, (excluding tax increases) states 
with high budget fiscal stress indicate using responses at higher levels than  
states with moderate or low budget fiscal stress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: State Responses to Budget Gap by 
Level of Budget Fiscal Stress 
Budget Fiscal Stress Level 
 Low Moderate High 
Rainy Day Funds 8 
(6%) 
72 
(31%) 
16 
(50%) 
Across the Board 
Cuts 
9 
(7%) 
87 
(37%) 
15 
(47%) 
Hiring Freeze 1 
(1%) 
11 
(5%) 
1 
(3%) 
Re-Org 0 
(0%) 
38 
(16%) 
4 
(13%) 
Early Retirement 1 
(1%) 
20 
(9%) 
6 
(19%) 
Furloughs 1 
(1%) 
22 
(9%) 
10 
(31%) 
Targeted cuts 4 
(3%) 
26 
(11%) 
15 
(47%) 
Fees 0 
(0%) 
30 
(13%) 
8 
(25%) 
Privatization 0 
(0%) 
5 
(2%) 
1 
(3%) 
Cut Local Aid 1 
(1%) 
30 
(13%) 
10 
(31%) 
Layoffs 2 
(1%) 
45 
(19%) 
11 
(34%) 
Tax Increase 44 
(33%) 
86 
(37%) 
11 
(34%) 
Total 134 233 32 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) and 
State Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2002-2009) 
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Table 5.7: State Responses to Budget Gaps by 
Level of Cash Fiscal Stress 
Cash    
 Low Moderate High 
Rainy Day Funds 9 
(23%) 
29 
(24%) 
58 
(24%) 
Across the Board 
Cuts 
7 
(18%) 
33 
(27%) 
72 
(30%) 
Hiring Freeze 2 
(5%) 
1 
(1%) 
11 
(5%) 
Re-Org 3 
(8%) 
9 
(7%) 
30 
(13%) 
Early Retirement 2 
(5%) 
10 
(2%) 
15 
(6%) 
Furloughs 2 
(5%) 
9 
(7%) 
22 
(9%) 
Targeted cuts 2 
(5%) 
11 
(9%) 
31 
(13%) 
Fees 4 
(10%) 
6 
(5%) 
28 
(12%) 
Privatization 0 
(0%) 
2 
(2%) 
4 
(2%) 
Cut Local Aid 2 
(5%) 
5 
(4%) 
34 
(14%) 
Layoffs 5 
(13%) 
20 
(16%) 
33 
(14%) 
Tax Increase 8 
(20%) 
40 
(33%) 
93 
(39%) 
Total 40 122 237 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) and 
State Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2002-2009) 
 
 
Table 5.7 shows state responses to budget gaps by the level of cash fiscal stress. 
State responses are used slightly more often with higher levels of cash fiscal stress. For 
states with low cash fiscal stress, the most often used responses are rainy day funds, 
across-the-board cuts, and tax increases. For states with moderate cash fiscal stress, the 
most often used responses are tax increases, across-the-board cuts, and rainy day funds. 
For states with high cash fiscal stress, the most often used responses are tax increases, 
across-the-board cuts, and rainy day funds. As these indicate, all states regardless of their 
level of cash fiscal stress tend to use tax increases, rainy day funds, and across-the-board 
 
109 
cuts most often. The only response with a large difference in use between high, moderate, 
and low cash fiscal stress is cuts to local aid.  
Table 5.8 shows state responses to budget gaps by low, moderate, and high long-
run fiscal stress.  As with cash fiscal stress, the three most common responses for states 
with low, moderate, and high long-run fiscal stress are tax increases, rainy day fund use, 
and across-the-board cuts.  The less often used responses – targeted cuts, reorganization, 
early retirement, furloughs, cuts to local aid, fees, and layoffs – are used at higher levels 
by states with high long-run fiscal stress.  
 
Table 5.8: State Responses to Budget Gaps by 
Long-Run Fiscal Stress Level  
Long-run    
 Low Moderate High 
Rainy Day Funds 14 
(25%) 
57 
(25%) 
25 
(22%) 
Across the Board 
Cuts 
12 
(21%) 
66 
(29%) 
33 
(28%) 
Hiring Freeze 1 
(2%) 
10 
(4%) 
2 
(2%) 
Re-Org 4 
(7%) 
24 
(11%) 
14 
(12%) 
Early Retirement 2 
(4%) 
12 
(5%) 
13 
(11%) 
Furloughs 4 
(7%) 
15 
(7%) 
14 
(12%) 
Targeted cuts 4 
(7%) 
21 
(9%) 
20 
(17%) 
Fees 1 
(2%) 
19 
(8%) 
18 
(16%) 
Privatization 1 
(2%) 
3 
(1%) 
2 
(2%) 
Cut Local Aid 3 
(5%) 
23 
(10%) 
15 
(13%) 
Layoffs 7 
(13%) 
30 
(13%) 
21 
(18%) 
Tax Increase 19 
(34%) 
64 
(28%) 
58 
(50%) 
Total 56 227 116 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) 
and State Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2002-
2009) 
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Table 5.9 shows state responses to budget gaps by service-level fiscal stress. 
When divided by service-level fiscal stress, the distribution of state responses is very 
different than shown in table 5.6. States with lower service-level fiscal stress have higher 
use of responses for all but tax increases.  
 
 
Table 5.9: State Responses to Budget Gaps by 
Service-level Fiscal Stress Level 
Service-level    
 Low Medium High 
Rainy Day Funds 41 
(34%) 
35 
(23%) 
17 
(13%) 
Across the Board 
Cuts 
38 
(32%) 
47 
(31%) 
26 
(21%) 
Hiring Freeze 6 
(5%) 
3 
(2%) 
4 
(3%) 
Re-Org 19 
(16%) 
12 
(8%) 
11 
(9%) 
Early Retirement 7 
(6%) 
12 
(8%) 
8 
(6%) 
Furloughs 13 
(11%) 
11 
(7%) 
9 
(7%) 
Targeted cuts 12 
(10%) 
19 
(12%) 
14 
(11%) 
Fees 17 
(14%) 
8 
(5%) 
13 
(10%) 
Privatization 4 
(3%) 
2 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
Cut Local Aid 17 
(14%) 
13 
(8%) 
11 
(9%) 
Layoffs 25 
(21%) 
23 
(15%) 
10 
(8%) 
Tax increase 34 
(29%) 
45 
(29%) 
62 
(49%) 
Total 119 154 126 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) and 
State Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (2002-2009) 
 
Analysis of fiscal stress and responses based on political differences 
In this section, the role of political dynamics is considered in relation to state 
fiscal stress and responses to stress. Two questions guide this analysis: Do governments 
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with a partisan split between the branches experience different levels of fiscal stress? 
And, do such states engage different types of budget balancing responses?  
Between 2002 and 2009, 44 percent of states were of one party – the same party 
was in control of the executive and legislative branches. The average values of the fiscal 
stress indicators of states with divided government were statistically significantly lower 
for three of the four measures. 
 
 
Table 5.10: T-Test Results Comparing Divided and Unified Governments 
 Divided Government Unified Government T-Test 
Budget Solvency -0.102 0.128 T=2.35 
P=0.019 
 
Cash Solvency -0.10 0.124 T=2.25 
P=0.025 
Long-run Solvency -0.757 0.095 T=1.99 
P=0.047 
Service-level Solvency -0.077 0.097 T=1.89 
P=.059 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.10, states with divided governments have statistically significant 
lower mean values on the budget, cash, and long-run fiscal stress indices than states with 
unified governments.  
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Table 5.11: State Responses to Budget Gaps by Political Differences  
 Executive and 
Legislative Branches 
Political Affiliation 
 
 
Governor’s Political Affiliation 
 Divided Unified Democrat Republican 
Rainy Day Fund 49 
(22%) 
47 
(27%) 
42 
(22%) 
52 
(25%) 
Across-the-Board Cuts 65 
(29%) 
47 
(27%) 
60 
(31%) 
51 
(25%) 
Hiring Freezes 9 
(4%) 
5 
(3%) 
7 
(4%) 
6 
(3%) 
Reorganizing State Agencies 27 
(12%) 
15 
(8%) 
17 
(9%) 
24 
(12%) 
Early Retirement 14 
(6%) 
13 
(7%) 
10 
(5%) 
17 
(8%) 
Targeted Cuts 20 
(9%) 
24 
(14%) 
25 
(13%) 
18 
(9%) 
Privatization 4 
(2%) 
2 
(1%) 
2 
(1%) 
4 
(2%) 
Reduce local aid 24 
(11%) 
17 
(10%) 
22 
(11%) 
18 
(9%) 
Furloughs 19 
(9%) 
14 
(8%) 
14 
(9%) 
19 
(7%) 
Layoffs 29 
(13%) 
29 
(16%) 
24 
(12%) 
33 
(16%) 
Fees 22 
(10%) 
16 
(9%) 
15 
(8%) 
23 
(11%) 
Taxes 89 
(40%) 
52 
(29%) 
69 
(36%) 
70 
(34%) 
Total 222 177 193 204 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) and The Book of the States (2002-2009) 
 
 
The political party of governors also appears to play a role in fiscal stress levels. 
While there is no significant difference in the mean values of budget and long-run 
solvency scores for states with Democratic or Republican governors, there are significant 
differences for cash and service-level solvency indices. States with Republican governors 
have mean cash solvency values of 0.124 and states with Democratic governors have 
mean values of -0.127 (t=2.52; p=0.012). States with Republican governors also have 
 
113 
higher service-level solvency values with an average of 0.096 compared to states with 
Democratic governors, -0.098 (t=2.11, p=0.035). 
 The use of balanced budget responses is quite similar between unified and divided 
governments as well as Democratic and Republican governors, as shown in Table 5.11. 
The one exception to this is the use of tax increases by states with unified and divided 
government. States with divided government are more likely to respond to fiscal stress 
with tax increases. This is an interesting since tax increases are not a quick response to 
balance the budget. This finding supports those of Alt and Lowry (1994), specifically that 
divided government does not always result in gridlock.  
Analysis of fiscal stress and responses based on legal differences 
 States have a variety of institutional arrangements including legal restrictions on 
taxing and spending, as well as requirements regarding gubernatorial and legislative 
treatment of balanced budgets and deficits. In this section, states with different balanced 
budget and tax and expenditure rules are examined to determine any differences in fiscal 
stress levels and responses to budget gaps. 
 Most states have statutory or constitutional requirements that governors must 
submit a balanced budget (Hou and Smith 2006; NCSL 2010). For the budget, cash, and 
service-level solvency indices, there are significant differences in means between states 
with requirements that governors submit a balanced budget and those that do not. 
Interestingly, states with this requirement had a lower mean score, -0.05, on the budget 
solvency index – indicating higher budget fiscal stress – than states without the 
requirement, 0.20 (t=2.10, p=0.037). States that require the governor to submit a balanced 
budget had higher mean scores on the cash (t=-2.04, p=0.042) and service-level (t=-3.35, 
p=0.001) solvency indices – indicating lower fiscal stress on these dimensions – than 
those without the requirement. The difference in mean values of the long-run solvency 
index between states with and without this requirement was not significant.  
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In most states, legislatures must also pass a balanced budget. A significant 
difference in mean scores between states with and without this requirement is indicated 
for the long-run solvency index only. States that require legislatures to pass a balanced 
budget have a higher mean long-run solvency score, 0.475, as compared to states without 
this requirement, -0.135 (t=6.20, p=0.000).  
Another balanced budget requirement requires that the governor must sign a 
balanced budget (the enacted budget). Just three states require the governor to meet this 
requirement (Hou and Smith 2006). While differences between states with and without 
this requirement are only marginally significant for the budget and cash solvency index 
values19; there is a significant difference between these groups in the mean values of the 
long-run and service-level solvency indices. Interestingly, states with this requirement 
have lower scores on the long-run solvency index (-1.08 versus 0.048; t=5.54, p=0.000) 
and service-level solvency (-0.785 versus 0.035; t=3.66, p=0.000), than those states 
without the requirement. 
Some states also have a requirement that prevents them from carrying over a 
deficit into the next fiscal year. Differences in the values of the budget and cash solvency 
indices are not significant, but there are significant differences in the values of the long-
run and service-level solvency indices between states with and without this requirement. 
For the long-run solvency index, states without the requirement have lower mean values 
(-0.0466 versus 0.244; t=-2.52, p=0.012). Similar findings are found with regard to the 
mean values of the service-level index (-0.069 versus 0.362; t=-3.49, p=0.001). Based on 
these results, states with the no deficit carryover requirement have lower cash and 
service-level fiscal stress levels than states without the requirement.  
                                                
 
 
19Mean budget solvency index score for states with this requirement is -0.419 and for states without the 
requirement is 0.0187 (t=1.81; p=0.071). Mean cash solvency index score for states with this requirement is 
-0.453 and for states without the requirement is 0.020 (t=1.93; p=0.054). 
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Besides legal requirements concerning budget balance, many states also have 
rules governing their ability to increase taxes and spending.  Spending limitations are 
more common than revenue limitations; 25 states have spending limits and six states have 
revenue limits. The differences in fiscal stress between states with and without spending 
limits are only significant with respect to the cash solvency index. States with spending 
limitations have a higher mean value on the cash solvency index than states without 
spending limitations – indicating lower fiscal stress levels (0.105 versus -0.115; t=-2.22, 
p=0.027).  
 States with revenue limitations have statistically significant different means from 
states without the requirement for the long-run and service-level solvency indices; the 
differences are not significant for the budget and cash solvency indices. For the long-run 
solvency index states with revenue limits have lower mean values, -0.242, than states 
without revenue limits, 0.033 (t=2.11, p=0.036). For the service-level index, states with 
revenue limits have higher mean values, 0.431, than states without the limits, -0.059 (t=-
3.52, p=0.001). This means that states with revenue limits compared to those without 
such limits have higher long-run solvency and lower service-level solvency. 
 Table 5.12 shows differences in the use of balancing responses of states with and 
without the four types of balanced budget requirements. Compared to states without 
balanced budget requirements, states with these requirements are more likely to take 
action in the face of budget deficits. For ten out of the 12 possible actions, states 
requiring their governor to submit a balanced budget engage more responses. States 
requiring their legislature to enact a balanced budget used seven out of the 12 possible 
responses more often than states without the requirement, although at a much closer 
percentage of use.  In eight of 12 responses, states that require the governor to sign a 
balanced budget also were more likely to engage responses than states without the 
requirement. In contrast to the other three balanced budget requirements, states with the 
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no deficit carryover requirement use balancing responses at a similar level as those 
without this requirement.  
 
Table 5.12: State Responses to Budget Gaps by Balanced Budget Requirements 
Governor must 
submit a 
balanced 
budget 
Legislature must 
pass a balanced 
budget 
Governor must 
sign a balanced 
budget 
No deficit 
carryover 
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Rainy Day 
Fund 
88 
(28%) 
8 
(1%) 
77 
(25%) 
19 
(22%) 
6 
(35%) 
90 
(24%) 
19 
(30%) 
77 
(23%) 
Across-the-
Board Cuts 
92 
(29%) 
20 
(25%) 
90 
(29%) 
22 
(25%) 
3 
(18%) 
109 
(29%) 
20 
(31%) 
92 
(27%) 
Hiring Freezes 11 
(3%) 
3 
(4%) 
12 
(4%) 
2 
(2%) 
0 
(0%) 
14 
(4%) 
1 
(2%) 
13 
(4%) 
Reorganizing 
State Agencies 
38 
(12%) 
4 
(5%) 
33 
(11%) 
9 
(10%) 
4 
(24%) 
38 
(10%) 
5 
(8%) 
37 
(11%) 
Early 
Retirement 
26 
(8%) 
1 
(1%) 
22 
(7%) 
5 
(6%) 
3 
(18%) 
24 
(6%) 
2 
(3%) 
25 
(7%) 
Targeted Cuts 38 
(12%) 
6 
(8%) 
34 
(11%) 
10 
(11%) 
2 
(12%) 
42 
(11%) 
6 
(9%) 
38 
(11%) 
Privatization 5 
(2%) 
1 
(1%) 
4 
(1%) 
2 
(2%) 
0 
(0%) 
6 
(2%) 
2 
(3%) 
4 
(1%) 
Reduce local 
aid 
37 
(12%) 
4 
(5%) 
31 
(10%) 
11 
(11%) 
4 
(24%) 
37 
(10%) 
5 
(8%) 
36 
(11%) 
Furloughs 31 
(10%) 
2 
(3%) 
28 
(9%) 
5 
(6%) 
4 
(24%) 
29 
(8%) 
4 
(6%) 
29 
(9%) 
Layoffs 56 
(18%) 
2 
(3%) 
46 
(15%) 
12 
(14%) 
4 
(24%) 
54 
(14%) 
9 
(14%) 
49 
(15%) 
Fees 34 
(11%) 
4 
(5%) 
33 
(11%) 
5 
(6%) 
4 
(24%) 
34 
(9%) 
2 
(3%) 
36 
(11%) 
Tax Increases 112 
(35%) 
29 
(36%) 
104 
(33%) 
37 
(42%) 
7 
(41%) 
134 
(35%) 
14 
(22%) 
127 
(38%) 
Total 319 80 311 88 17 382 64 335 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) and Hou and Smith 2006 
 
 
Table 5.13 looks at differences in budget balancing response use between states 
with and without spending and revenue limitations. Since spending limits are less likely 
to influence state action during a resource constrained situation, it is not surprising that 
states with and without spending limits tend to engage all the responses with about the 
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same frequency. States with revenue limitations, however, are much more likely to 
engage specific responses including, reduce local aid, furloughs, layoffs and fees. This 
suggests that states with limits on their revenue raising abilities (specifically, to making 
tax increases) are more likely to resort to more severe personnel actions as well as the use 
of fees – since they are not included under the limitation. 
 
 
Table 5.13: State Responses to Budget Gaps by Spending and Revenue 
Limits 
Spending Limitation Revenue Limitation  
Response Present Not Present Present Not Present 
Rainy Day Fund 51 
(25%) 
45 
(24%) 
11 
(23%) 
85 
(24%) 
Across-the-Board Cuts 61 
(29%) 
51 
(27%) 
12 
(25%) 
100 
(28%) 
Hiring Freezes 7 
(3%) 
7 
(4%) 
2 
(4%) 
12 
(3%) 
Reorganizing State 
Agencies 
21 
(10%) 
21 
(11%) 
6 
(13%) 
36 
(10%) 
Early Retirement 19 
(9%) 
8 
(4%) 
5 
(10%) 
22 
(6%) 
Targeted Cuts 22 
(11%) 
22 
(12%) 
6 
(13%) 
38 
(11%) 
Privatization 4 
(2%) 
2 
(1%) 
0 
(0%) 
6 
(2%) 
Reduce local aid 20 
(10%) 
21 
(11%) 
13 
(27%) 
28 
(8%) 
Furloughs 22 
(11%) 
11 
(6%) 
7 
(15%) 
26 
(7%) 
Layoffs 34 
(16%) 
24 
(13%) 
11 
(23%) 
47 
(13%) 
Fees 20 
(10%) 
18 
(9%) 
8 
(17%) 
30 
(9%) 
Taxes 80 
(38%) 
61 
(32%) 
14 
(29%) 
127 
(36%) 
Total 208 191 48 351 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) and National Conference 
of State Legislators 
 
 
Analysis of Fiscal Stress and Responses based on Structural Balance 
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Table 5.14 shows the different responses taken by states at different levels of 
structural balance. For nine out of the 12 responses, states with a weakness in structural 
balance use a response more often than states with mid-level and strength in structural 
balance. Tax increases, rainy day fund use, and across-the-board cuts are the most 
common responses regardless of a state’s structural balance capacity.  
 
 
Table 5.14: State Responses to Budget Gaps by 
Level of Structural Balance 
 Structural Balance 
  
Strength 
 
Mid-level 
 
Weakness 
Rainy Day Funds 21 
(29%) 
49 
(21%) 
26 
(27%) 
Across-the-Board 
Cuts 
21 
(29%) 
60 
(26%) 
31 
(33%) 
Hiring Freeze 3 
(4%) 
4 
(2%) 
7 
(7%) 
Re-Org 11 
(15%) 
17 
(7%) 
14 
(15%) 
Early Retirement 3 
(4%) 
17 
(7%) 
7 
(7%) 
Furloughs 6 
(8%) 
15 
(6%) 
12 
(13%) 
Targeted cuts 5 
(7%) 
25 
(11%) 
14 
(15%) 
Fees 8 
(11%) 
11 
(5%) 
19 
(20%) 
Privatization 1 
(1%) 
3 
(1%) 
2 
(2%) 
Cut Local Aid 5 
(7%) 
20 
(9%) 
16 
(17%) 
Layoffs 11 
(15%) 
31 
(13%) 
16 
(17%) 
Tax increase 19 
(26%) 
75 
(32%) 
47 
(49%) 
Total 72 232 95 
Source: Government Performance Project (2008) and 
NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2002-2010) 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.15, 85 percent of states scored as having a weakness in 
structural balance in 2008 had either high or moderate budget fiscal stress as compared to 
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62 percent of states scored as mid-level and 55 percent of states scored as strong. At least 
by this definition of structural deficit, those states with a weakness in their capacity to 
achieve structural balance are more likely to experience high or moderate fiscal stress. 
Results of an analysis of variance test (ANOVA) also show that these groups are 
significantly different.20 
 
 
Table 5.15: State Structural Balance by 
Budget Fiscal Stress Level 
 Strength Mid-
Level 
Weakness 
Low 32 
(44%) 
87 
(38%) 
15 
(16%) 
Moderate 39 
(54%) 
126 
(54%) 
68 
(72%) 
High 1 
(1%) 
19 
(8%) 
12 
(13%) 
Total 72 232 95 
Source: Government Performance Project 
(2008) and State CAFRs (2002-2009) 
 
 
5.4 Discussion of Hypotheses 
These findings provide context as well as clarification to the multiple hypotheses 
introduced in Chapter 2. These results bring into question a basic assumption of some of 
the hypotheses, specifically that fiscal stress drives the use and choice of responses. 
While relationships appear to exist between the frequency and choice of responses and 
fiscal stress levels, it does not appear that fiscal stress levels are the driving force. There 
are several reasons why this may be the case. First, states may not be aware of their fiscal 
                                                
 
 
20 ANOVA results of the budget cluster and structural balance F=10.89 and p=0.000 
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stress level, certainly not as defined and measured here. States may be more focused on 
immediate circumstances such as budget deficits, declining revenue numbers, or political 
pressures for increased spending and/or tax decreases. Second, states may experience 
fiscal stress but not exhibit symptoms. For example, in 2004 and 2005, many governors’ 
noted in their State of the State addresses that despite improvements in revenue 
collections there was still a mismatch between spending and tax levels (Willoughby 
2005). This suggests difficulties in achieving budget solvency despite increasingly 
positive economic conditions. Without the outward manifestations of budget fiscal stress, 
states took very few balancing measures. Third, achieving budget, cash, long-run, and 
service-level solvency may put competing pressures on a state.  
Instead of responses flowing directly from fiscal stress levels, the findings here 
suggest more tenuous relationships. States respond to fiscal conditions, but they appear to 
be reacting to specific events (e.g. revenue collection declines and budget deficits). To 
the extent that those events denote fiscal stress, we would expect to see a response. This 
turns the relationship between fiscal stress and state responses posited in Cutback 
Management theory on its head.  
H1: States are strategic in their response to fiscal stress 
As discussed above, based on descriptive analysis it is not clear that states take 
budget-balancing actions in response to fiscal stress. While multiple factors play a role in 
how states respond to fiscal stress, economic conditions appear to be the most important 
indicator of use. As shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, states are more likely to take quick 
action when economic conditions are also deteriorating, so this hypothesis appears to 
hold only under specific circumstances.  
H2: Responses will differ based on the severity of fiscal stress. 
Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show responses of states with different fiscal stress 
levels for each of the measures, budget, cash, long-run and service-level. Especially with 
regards to budget fiscal stress, responses differ depending on severity of this stress. States 
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with lower budget fiscal stress take fewer actions than states with moderate or high 
budget fiscal stress. In the findings above, budget fiscal stress was the index found to be 
most related to use of budget-balancing actions by states. It is also the only fiscal stress 
index to be correlated with economic activity. (See Appendix A for an indication of the 
relatively static nature of the cash, long-run, and service-level solvencies.) 
H2.1: Rainy day funds will be used in periods of lower fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is mostly unsupported. For budget, cash, and long-run fiscal 
stress, the use of rainy day funds is not more prevalent among states with lower levels of 
fiscal stress. Indeed, states with moderate or high budget fiscal stress tend to access their 
rainy day funds with the same frequency or more often than states with lower fiscal stress 
levels. Arranging states by the service-level fiscal stress values indicates higher use at 
lower levels of fiscal stress.  
H2.2: Incremental budget strategies will be used in periods of moderate fiscal stress. 
As with the use of rainy day funds, states at each level of budget, cash, long-run, 
and service-level fiscal stress use incremental strategies. As shown in Table 5.6, states 
with moderate budget fiscal stress do use re-organizations and hiring freezes slightly 
more often than states with high budget fiscal stress; however, states with high budget 
fiscal stress use across-the-board cuts with more frequency than those in the moderate 
category. Similar distributions between states with high, moderate, and low cash and 
long-run fiscal stress exist. States with moderate service-level fiscal stress do not use 
across-the-board cuts, hiring freezes, and other productivity improving strategies more 
often that states with low service-level fiscal stress.  
Regarding the use of an incremental budget strategy, Table 5.4 shows that two of 
the most popular responses to balance budgets are across-the-board cuts and rainy day 
funds. Hiring freezes and other productivity improvements such as re-organizations are 
much less common. Tax increases are also used quite often by states; however, these are 
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not necessarily in response to budget gaps. At the very least, this suggests that more 
states use the responses associated with incremental budget strategy. 
 
H2.3: Punctuated equilibrium strategies will be used in periods of high fiscal stress. 
Punctuated equilibrium strategies (e.g. targeted cuts, privatization, layoffs, and 
increases in fees) are used more by states with high levels of budget, cash, and long-run 
fiscal stress. However, these are not the only strategies used by states with high levels of 
fiscal stress. Interestingly, for budget fiscal stress, use of tax increases is similar across 
the three levels. For the other three types of fiscal solvency, use of tax increases is more 
common for states with high fiscal stress. The impact of tax increases on fiscal stress 
levels will be investigated in the next chapter. There is a marked increase in the use of 
targeted cuts in response to the recent recession. Thirty-three out of 50 states used 
targeted cuts in 2009 to deal with budget deficits. This suggests no clear strategy either 
incremental or punctuated prevails. 
H3: Institutional factors will affect state responses to fiscal stress. 
As suggested by the literature review in Chapter 2, institutional factors – both 
political and legal – appear to influence states’ choice of responses. Overall the findings 
support this set of hypotheses. 
H3.1: States with balanced budget rules will take more actions to address fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is partially supported by the analysis comparing responses 
between states with and without these balanced budget requirements. States with rules 
requiring the governor to submit and sign a balanced budget and the legislature to pass a 
balanced budget take more actions than states without these requirements. States with 
requirements preventing the carryover of deficits only use rainy day funds and across-the-
board cuts more often than states without this requirement. This finding is unexpected 
because the no deficit carryover requirement is the strictest of the balanced budget 
requirements (Hou and Smith 2006). One explanation for this finding is that states with 
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this requirement must act quickly (after the budget is passed, often mid-year or near the 
end of the fiscal year) at which point they need an action that takes effect immediately. 
Rainy day funds (if flush) provide instance access to balance. Another explanation is 
related to the research by Hou and Smith (2006; 2010) concerning the importance of 
viewing balanced budget requirements as part of a system as well as the extent to which 
policy makers interpret and reinterpret the meaning of balanced budget rules. The fluidity 
and flexibility of these rules year to year may influence ability to conclusively prove that 
one type of balanced budget rule results in a specific action.  
H3.2: States with TELs will use more expenditure cuts and other non-tax measures to 
address fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is partially supported by the findings. According to Table 5.13, 
states with revenue limits are more likely to use fees, layoffs, furloughs, and reduce local 
aid. The use of fees may be a method of raising revenue without violating the tax limits. 
Beyond these responses, states with either spending or revenue limits do not appear to be 
substantially less likely to take action. However, the frequency of engaging the response 
may mask its total effects (Poterba 1994). 
H3.3: States with divided governments will take fewer actions to address fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is not supported by the findings as the use of balancing actions by 
states with divided and unified governments are very similar. The one response that 
divided governments are more likely to take is the use of tax increases. There are 
divergent opinions on the effect of divided government – does it lead to moderation or 
delay (Alt and Lowry 1994). These findings do not fully support either of these. Since 
divided governments engage fewer budget balancing strategies, this tends to support the 
delay theory. However, the higher use of tax increases supports the findings of Alt and 
Lowry (1994) who find that higher spending is often supported by more taxes. 
H4: Institutional factors will affect states’ levels of fiscal stress. 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, institutional factors appear to influence differences 
among states and their experience of fiscal stress. Overall this set of hypotheses is 
supported by the findings. 
H4.1: States with balanced budget rules will experience lower fiscal stress. 
The t-test results also partially support the hypothesis that states with balanced 
budget requirements will experience lower fiscal stress levels. None of the balanced 
budget requirements resulted in states having lower budget fiscal stress levels. Indeed, 
states that require the governor to submit a balanced budget tended to have higher budget 
fiscal stress. One explanation of this finding is that all but ten states have this 
requirement. Also even in states without this requirement there is the political norm and 
public expectation that the governor will submit a balanced budget (Hou and Smith 
2006), as a result states without this requirement are expected to act in a similar, fiscally 
disciplined way. Also, submitting a balanced budget does not guarantee that the 
appropriate measures are taken to prevent budget deficits emerging in the middle or at the 
end of the fiscal year.  
States that require their legislatures to pass a balanced budget and that are not 
allowed to carry forward deficit have lower long-run fiscal stress than states without 
these requirements. However, states with the requirement that the governor must sign a 
balanced budget appear to have higher long-run fiscal stress than states without the 
requirement. As discussed with regard to H3.4, these balanced budget rules are more 
flexible than their modeling implies. While modeling in this manner is consistent with 
past research, work by Hou and Smith (2006; 2010) suggests that balanced budget rules 
are products of their environment and their interpretation may change due to state 
circumstances. 
H4.2: TELs will affect state levels of fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is also partially supported by the findings. Some differences in 
fiscal stress levels exist between states with and without tax and expenditure limitations. 
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States with spending limits have lower cash fiscal stress levels. This means they tend to 
keep more cash and other liquid assets available to handle short-term liabilities. States 
with revenue limits have higher long-run fiscal stress but lower service-level fiscal stress. 
The revenue limits may result in these states taking on additional debt to finance state 
activities, hence the higher long-run fiscal stress. The lower service-level fiscal stress is 
likely related to lower tax levels per capita.  
H4.3: States with divided governments will experience higher fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is mostly supported by the findings. States with divided 
government appear to experience higher levels of fiscal stress, particularly budget, cash, 
and long-run fiscal stress. This finding is interesting given that the frequency of responses 
is very similar for divided and unified governments.  
H5: States with structural deficits will engage different responses and experience higher 
fiscal stress. 
This set of hypotheses is supported by the findings.  
H5.1: States with structural deficits will be more likely to engage punctuated equilibrium 
responses in periods of high fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is supported. States having a weakness in structural balance use 
targeted cuts, furloughs, fees, tax increases, layoffs and cut local aid more than states 
defined as indicating mid-level structural balance, as shown in Table 5.14. At the same 
time, they are still using the less severe responses such as rainy day funds and across-the-
board cuts at about the same rate as other states. These findings suggest that poor 
structural balance result in states using a broader range of responses and more permanent 
responses to deal with structural deficits.  
H5.2: States with structural deficits will experience higher fiscal stress. 
This hypothesis is supported by the findings. More states with a strength in 
structural balance are in the low budget fiscal stress grouping than are states with a mid-
level or weakness score in structural balance. At the same time, more states with a 
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weakness in structural balance are in the high budget fiscal stress grouping than are states 
with a mid-level or strength score in structural balance.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to answer the question: Do state characteristics affect their 
experience of fiscal stress and/or influence their choice of responses? As a corollary, the 
theoretical implications of this question were also investigated. Using the dataset 
developed in Chapter 4, with four fiscal stress indices measuring budget, cash, long-run, 
and service-level solvency, the relationship between fiscal stress, state responses to 
balance, and institutional factors are assessed. Findings here indicate that state fiscal 
stress levels do not appear to be the main reason for responses taken. Institutional factors 
– such as legal requirements and political dynamics – effect fiscal stress levels and 
responses. The next chapter will continue to probe this question and others by using 
regression analysis to determine how the size and choice of response (expenditure, tax, 
and rainy day) along with institutional factors affect the level of fiscal stress experienced 
by states.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE RESPONSES TO FISCAL STRESS 
6.1 Introduction 
Fiscal stress – due to balanced budget rules and budget deficits – compels state 
action (Gold 1995; Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010). State responses to fiscal stress can 
have profound effects on state residents as the actions of three states with high budget 
fiscal stress in 2009 demonstrate. State spending cuts in Arizona resulted in one million 
low-income residents losing access to state funded Medicaid services as well as layoffs, 
furloughs and pay cuts for state employees (Johnson et al 2011). In California, state aid to 
local school districts for K-12 classes was reduced by billions of dollars (Johnson et al 
2011). In Nevada, spending cuts have resulted in furloughs and pay cuts to state 
employees as well as elimination in funding for local schools’ gifted and talented 
programs (Johnson et al 2011; Johnson et al 2009).  
Although the effect of state tax levels on business location and job creation is 
uncertain (Buss 2001; Fisher 2002; Chirinko and Wilson 2008), governors (and 
legislators) typically abhor the political consequences of tax increases (Gold 1995; 
Poterba 1994). Given the social and political impact of state responses to fiscal stress, 
their effectiveness at reducing fiscal stress is an important and salient question. If certain 
state responses to fiscal stress are more effective at reducing fiscal stress, either in the 
short-term or long-term, this is information state budget and policy makers could use in 
response to future fiscal stress. To broaden our understanding of the effectiveness of state 
responses to fiscal stress, this chapter addresses three questions: 1) Are some states able 
to navigate better through periods of fiscal stress than other states, and if so, why?; 2) Are 
certain state responses more effective at reducing or alleviating fiscal stress?; and 3) Does 
the type of response a state uses in one period of fiscal stress affect its stress levels in 
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subsequent periods of fiscal stress? In answering these questions, this analysis tests 
hypotheses on the effect of institutional factors on fiscal stress as well as the short-term 
and long-term effectiveness of state responses to fiscal stress as outlined in Chapter 2. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, research on responses to state government response to 
fiscal stress tends to use case studies and concentrate around recessionary periods 
(Willoughby and Lauth 2003; Grizzle and Trojan 1994; Gold 1995; Finegold et al 2003; 
Dougherty and Klase 2009). The current research attempts to categorize and explain state 
responses to stress across periods that include economic growth and decline. Largely 
missing from the literature is an investigation of state response strategies over time and 
with a focus on the effectiveness of responses (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).  
To address these gaps in the literature on responses to fiscal stress, this analysis 
adds several elements. First, the use of a panel data set as opposed to a cross-sectional 
data set is a step forward in deepening our understanding of states and their experience of 
fiscal stress. The panel data set also allows investigation of the impact of responses and 
budget institutions across more than one national recession. Second, this analysis takes a 
quantitative approach to the effectiveness of the three most common fiscal stress 
responses. While some quantitative analysis on the effectiveness of rainy day funds in 
plugging budget gaps has been conducted, the effectiveness of tax increases and 
expenditure cuts to address stress has not been adequately addressed in the literature. 
Third, in this analysis, state responses are modeled to measure actions actually taken by 
states. The three responses – tax increases, expenditure cuts, and rainy day fund use – are 
modeled to capture state-initiated change.21 Fourth, this analysis uses measures of fiscal 
                                                
 
 
21 States may maintain high rainy day fund balances but still not use them to address budget shortfalls. The 
debate in Texas over the fiscal year 2011 $4.3 billion dollar shortfall illustrates this point. Despite having a 
rainy day fund of $9.4 billion, the Governor and Legislature decided to use a combination of expenditure 
cuts  ($853.6 million) and rainy day funds ($3.1 billion) to close the budget shortfall (Watts 2011). 
Similarly, only using the change in tax collections is not an accurate measure of policy changes regarding 
 
129 
stress that comprise a broader and more comparable definition of fiscal stress. By 
assessing the factors that affect these fiscal stress indices, the analysis allows us to assess 
the sensitivity of state budget, cash, long-run, and service-level imbalances to typical 
state responses. For example, the use of rainy day funds may assist in reducing budget 
fiscal stress but not prove useful in alleviating cash or long-run fiscal stress.  
6.2 Data and Methodology 
6.2.1 Data and Sources 
Dependent Variables 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the data used to create the budget, cash, long-run, and 
service-level solvency indices was collected from Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Reports (CAFRS) for all 50 states (except New York in 2002) for fiscal years 2002 
through 2009. The values used for these variables are index scores; the higher the score 
the lower the level of fiscal stress. The indexes were created by standardizing the relevant 
financial indicators (see Table 4.1, Chapter 4) and averaging them. 
Independent Variables 
The three variables of interest are those measuring state responses to fiscal stress: 
expenditure decreases, tax and fee increases, and rainy day fund use. State general fund22 
expenditure data is taken from the NASBO Fiscal Survey. Expenditure decreases are 
coded as a dichotomous variable with a 1 representing a negative percentage change in 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
taxes and fees. Revenue collection changes are very sensitive to economic conditions. Simply measuring 
the change in total revenue collections is more likely to measure changes in state income levels, than 
changes in state policy. 
22 The state general fund is the largest depository of state funds and is usually used to fund daily operations 
of government (Finkler 2005).  
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expenditures. A 0 represents a state with an increase or no change in expenditures. This 
operationalization is used to describe a state’s action. Although some scholars use 
percentage change in expenditures (McGranahan 2002; Jordan 2003; Pagano 2002), to 
capture a state’s response to fiscal stress and accurately interpret it, this analysis models 
expenditure changes as a dichotomous variable. This allows an interpretation on the 
effect of using the response. 
Tax change data is taken from the NASBO Fiscal Survey, specifically the table on 
Enacted Revenue Actions by Type of Revenue and Net Increase or Decrease. For each 
fiscal year, this table shows the tax changes enacted along with the expected revenue 
change. State general fund revenue values are also taken from the NASBO Fiscal Survey. 
Using enacted revenue changes as opposed to variations in revenue collections from one 
year to the next is important to accurately assess policy actions. As explained by 
Auerbach (2000) changes in tax revenues are very sensitive to economic conditions and 
often change without a policy decision. As with expenditure reductions, this variable is 
modeled as a dichotomous variable. States that increased taxes and fees are coded as 1 
and states with no change or a decrease in taxes and fees are coded as 0.  
To model rainy day fund use, data on the dollar value of a state’s budget 
stabilization funds is taken from the NASBO Fiscal Survey. The change in the budget 
stabilization fund from one year to the next is divided by general fund expenditures for 
the current year. This calculates the size of the rainy day fund action – decreasing the 
fund means the state is using the rainy day fund and increasing the rainy day fund or 
leaving it with the same balance means the state is not using the rainy day fund. As with 
the other two variables, this is modeled as a dichotomous variable. States that used the 
rainy day fund (a decrease in fund balance between two years) are coded as 1 and states 
that did not use the rainy day fund (an increase or no change in the rainy day fund 
balance between two years) are coded as 0.  
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Institutional Variables 
As discussed in Chapter 2, several institutional factors may influence a state’s 
experience of fiscal stress, including balanced budget requirements and tax and 
expenditure limitations (TELs). This research takes advantage of Hou and Smith’s (2006) 
assessment of state legal frameworks to operationalize the state balanced budget 
requirements. In the models below balanced budget requirements are represented as 
BBREQ. The balanced budget requirements are represented as four dichotomous 
variables, each a dichotomous variables (e.g., (1) Governor must sign a balanced budget, 
(2) Governor must submit a balanced budget, (3) Legislature must pass a balanced 
budget, and (4) the state may not carry deficit over into the next fiscal year) and coded 1 
if present and 0 if not present. Tax and expenditure limitations are denoted in the model 
as TEL. This includes two dichotomous variables measuring whether a state has a legal 
restriction on spending increases or on revenue increases. The variable is coded 1 if a 
TEL is present and 0 if it is not present. Data on TELs come from the National 
Conference of State Legislatures.  
Political factors including party affiliation of the governor and the ability of the 
governor and legislature to work together may also play a role in state fiscal stress levels 
(Hou 2003; Alt and Lowry 1993; Poterba 1994). These factors are represented as 
POLITICAL in the equations below. This is measured using two dichotomous variables. 
One captures the political party affiliation of the state’s governor, 0 for Democrat and 1 
for Republican. The other measures whether different political parties control the 
branches of state government. For states with the same party in charge of the executive 
and legislative branches, the variable is coded 0. For states with a different party in 
charge of the executive and legislative branches or different parties in charge of the two 
legislative chambers is coded a 1. Political party affiliation of state governors and 
legislatures comes from the Book of the States 2002-2009.  
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Economic Variables 
A state’s economic growth rate, based on the findings in Chapter 5, appears to be 
an important factor in a state’s fiscal stress level. In the models below this is designated 
ECONOMIC. Owyang et al (2005) demonstrate that state-level recessions tend to 
correspond to national recessions, though state recessions differ in both timing and 
length. For a more nuanced representation of a state’s economic conditions, the average 
yearly change in the State Coincident Index is used here. This allows state and regional 
differences in economic conditions to be modeled. Economic growth is measured within 
a state in one year and is taken from the State Coincident Index published by the Federal 
Reserve Bank in Philadelphia. The Bank generates and reports an indexed measure of 
economic growth in each state by month based on four economic indicators: nonfarm 
payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate, 
and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city 
average) (Crone 2006). In the model, this variable is lagged by one year. As the findings 
in Chapter 5 indicate, the effects of economic growth or decline do not immediately 
affect fiscal stress levels. It takes several months for the effects of an economic 
slowdown or an economic recovery to be represented in a state’s balance sheet. 
Also included in the model is a measure of state structural balance, STRUCBAL. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, structural balance is a difficult phenomenon to capture and 
measure. For this analysis, structural balance information is taken from the 2008 
“Grading the States” report published in Governing by the Pew Trust, Center on the 
States Government Performance Project (GPP). This variable is a dichotomous variable 
coded 1 if a state was reported as having a strength in structural balance and coded 0 if a 
state was reported to have either mid-level or weak structural balance. For additional 
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discussion of this variable choice, see Chapter 5 and Appendix C.23 State and year-
specific differences are controlled for using dichotomous variables.  
6.2.2 Methodology 
In each regression model, several specification problems will be addressed. First, 
endogeniety is a concern in this research, specifically simultaneity between state fiscal 
stress and state actions to address it. In other words an increase in fiscal stress may cause 
the frequency and size of state actions also to increase. When the dependent variable and 
at least one explanatory variable are jointly determined, the explanatory variable is 
correlated with the error term, violating the classical regression assumptions (Wooldridge 
2006). This relationship may result in the independent variable, state responses, being 
inappropriately attributed to changes to the dependent variable, instead of the reverse 
(Studenmond 2006). Endogeniety, specifically simultaneity, results in biased estimators. 
To address these concerns, results from Chapter 5 and efforts in similar research (Hou 
2003, Hou 2004) are considered to correct this bias. In the previous chapter, descriptive 
analysis showed that the level of fiscal stress did not have a strong effect on state use of 
actions. The lack of connection between level of fiscal stress and the types of state action 
taken suggests the limited extent to which fiscal stress effects state response. Endogeniety 
is addressed here by following previous scholars and lagging state responses by one year 
(Hou 2003; Hou 2004; Poterba 1994).  
Second, serial correlation is a concern with a panel dataset. Serial correlation 
violates the classical assumption that different observations of the error term are 
uncorrelated with one another (Studenmund 2006). When the order of the observations 
                                                
 
 
23 Appendix C shows the regression analysis using an alternative coding of the structural balance variable. 
The structural balance variable is only marginally significant for the budget fiscal stress when the structural 
balance variable is coded using the 2005 and 2008 values. The difference between the two regression 
models suggests the structural balance variable is not very robust. 
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has meaning, in this case a time series, serial correlation is likely to occur since the error 
term in year 2 may depend on the error term in year 1. As a result, the correlation 
between error terms will not equal zero. First-order serial correlation occurs when the 
current value of the error term is a function of the previous value of the error term. While 
serial correlation does not cause bias in the coefficient estimates, the estimates may still 
be different from the true beta and the standard errors may be biased, resulting in 
inaccurate hypothesis testing. To test for first-order serial correlation, the Wooldridge test 
for panel datasets is conducted.24 When serial correlation is found, Prais-Winsten OLS 
estimation is used to correct for it. Prais-Winsten OLS estimations are also used by 
scholars using similar datasets (Hou 2003; Hou 2004). 
Third, heteroskedasticity is a concern in the dataset. Heteroskedasticity occurs 
when the variance of the error terms is not constant (Wooldridge 2006). 
Heteroskedasticity does not result in biased or inconsistent OLS estimates; however, the 
standard errors are no longer reliable for constructing confidence intervals and t-statistics. 
With states as the unit of analysis, it is possible for unobserved factors across states to 
result in not constant error terms. Heteroskedasticity is tested for in each model using the 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity.  For models that have a significant p-value, 
robust standard errors are used.  
Fourth, without controlling for time-invariant factors from year to year and within 
states, the specification is vulnerable to omitted variable bias. To address this issue, time 
and state-specific effects are controlled for using year and state dummy variables.  
The dataset used for the initial analysis is a panel dataset with 50 states25 over eight years 
(2002 to 2009). The three independent variables of interest, as defined above, are the 
                                                
 
 
24 The Durbin-Watson test does not work on panel datasets. The Wooldridge test (xtserial in STATA) sets a 
null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  
25 New York is not included for 2002. 
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expenditure, tax, and rainy day actions taken within a fiscal year. The regression equation 
below describes the model of fiscal stress within the states. The expenditure, tax and 
rainy day actions are included in the same model because the analysis attempts to tease 
out the effect26 of reducing expenditures, raising taxes, and using rainy day fund balances 
while holding the other responses constant. The other variables included in the model – 
economic, political, and institutional factors – are control variables used in previous 
research (Hou 2003; Jimenez 2009; Poterba 1994).  
Two-way scatter plots were used to identify outliers for each dependent-
independent variable model. With budget fiscal stress as the dependent variable and the 
three independent variables of interest (tax and fee increases, expenditure cuts, and rainy 
day fund use), two states, Alaska and Wyoming, consistently deviated from the scatter 
plot groupings. Similar analyses were done for the cash, long-run and service-level fiscal 
stress dependent variables. Alaska was an outlier for the cash fiscal stress model, 
Nebraska and Wyoming outliers for the long-run fiscal stress dependent variable and 
Alaska and Nevada outliers for the service-level fiscal stress dependent variable. These 
state outliers were removed from the relevant regression model.  
To address the first two questions: (1) Are some states able to navigate better 
through periods of fiscal stress than other states?, and (2) Are certain state responses 
more effective at reducing or alleviating fiscal stress?; the effects of institutional factors 
as well as expenditure cuts, tax increases, and rainy day fund use on fiscal stress will be 
tested.  
                                                
 
 
26 Literature shows that the three state responses are not used in a vacuum. Indeed states may use one 
instead of the other in a trade-off (Maag and Merriman 2007). However, a correlation matrix shows 
relatively low correlation between the enacted change in tax revenues as a percent of total tax revenue, 
percentage change in expenditures, and change in rainy day fund balance as a percent of total general 
expenditures (0.05 between the tax and expenditure variables, -0.02 between rainy day fund and tax 
variables, and 0.19 between expenditure and rainy day fund variables).  
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STRESSit = β1EXPENDITUREit-1 + β2TAXit-1 + β3RDFit-1 +β4BBREQit + β5TELit + 
β6ECONOMICit-1 + β7POLITICALit + β8STRUCBALi2008 + γt+ εit  
i = 50 or 49 
t = 8 (2002-2009) 
To address the third question, (3) Does the choice of response by a state in one 
period of economic downturn affect its experience of fiscal stress through a subsequent 
period of economic downturn?, the dataset will be restricted to three years (2007-2009). 
The model below includes the three state actions in 2002. In 2002, states experienced 
higher levels of fiscal stress due to the effects of a national (and subsequently regional 
and state) recession.  
STRESSit = β1EXPENDITUREit-1 + β2TAXit-1 + β3RDFit-1 +β4EXPENDITUREi2002 + 
β5TAXi2002 + β6RDFi2002 + β7BBREQit + β8TELit  + β9ECONOMICit-1  + 
β10POLITICALit +β11STRUCBALi2008 αi + γt+ εit 
i = 50  
t = 3 (2007-2009) 
6.3 Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 presents the frequency and size of the three state responses to fiscal 
stress from 2002 to 2009. Of the three responses, the use of rainy day funds most closely 
follows changes in economic growth. The number of states using their rainy day funds 
was at its highest in 2002 and 2009, both years marked by low to negative state growth 
rates. The size of the responses also varies year to year. The greatest variety in response 
size is seen with expenditure cuts, here represented as the percentage change in states 
reducing expenditures. Tax and fee increases are relatively small and constant between 
2002 and 2009, suggesting their limited use to address fiscal stress.  
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Table 6.1: Frequency and Size of State Rainy Day Fund Use, Tax Increases, and 
Expenditure Cuts  
 Rainy Day Fund Use Tax & Fee Increases Expenditure Cuts 
 Number Size (%) Number Size (%) Number Size (%) 
2002 28 5.1 14 1.6 15 2.5 
2003 23 2.1 23 3.1 27 4.3 
2004 6 .4 36 2.5 11 7.1 
2005 6 1.2 24 1.7 2 9.2 
2006 3 .6 25 1.3 5 3.6 
2007 7 2.8 14 1.2 2 3.9 
2008 11 2.8 18 2.0 7 1.8 
2009 27 2.8 14 1.0 33 6.6 
Source: NASBO Fiscal Survey of the States (2001-2010) 
 
Regression Results 
Table 6.2 shows the results of four regression models including one year lagged 
state actions on the four different measures of fiscal stress.  The following regression 
estimations are used for each dependent variable; with budget fiscal stress as the 
dependent variable, OLS estimation27 is used; with cash fiscal stress as the dependent 
variable, OLS estimation with robust standard errors28 is used; with long-run fiscal stress 
as the dependent variable a Prais-Winsten estimation with robust standard errors29 is 
                                                
 
 
27 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2 = 2.44, p>chi2 =0.1181; Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation F = 1.65, prob>F = 0.2049 
28 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2 = 227.08; p>chi2 = 0.000; Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data F = 1.24, prob>F = 0.2719 
29 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2 = 124.41, prob>chi2 =0.000; Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data F=50.30, prob>F=0.000 
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used; and with service-level fiscal stress as the dependent variable a Prais-Winsten 
estimation30 is used. The model fit for each specification is relatively high.  
Based on the regression results in Table 6.2, H4: Institutional factors will affect states’ 
levels of fiscal stress is supported. Specifically, H4.1: States with balanced budget rules 
will have experience lower fiscal stress is mostly supported. For three of the fiscal stress 
indices – cash, long-run, and service-level – requiring the Governor to sign a balanced 
budget results in lower fiscal stress. (Remember that the higher the value of each fiscal 
stress index, the lower the state’s level of fiscal stress.) States with the budget rule have a 
cash fiscal stress value 0.688 points higher than states without this requirement. The 
effect is larger for long-run and service-level fiscal stress. States with the budget rule 
have long-run fiscal stress values 1.77 points higher and service-level fiscal stress values 
1.57 points higher.  
States requiring the Governor to submit a balanced budget have budget fiscal 
stress values 0.494 points lower than states without this requirement. In contrast, states 
with this requirement have cash fiscal stress values 0.982 points higher, long-run fiscal 
stress values 2.06 points higher and service-level fiscal stress values 1.05 points higher. 
Therefore, for three types of fiscal stress, this budget rule results in lower levels of fiscal 
stress. The requirement that legislatures pass a balanced budget has the smallest effect on 
fiscal stress levels. Only long-run fiscal stress is affected by this requirement, as states 
have a long-run fiscal stress value 0.141 points higher than states without this 
requirement.  
The requirement of no carryover deficit into the next fiscal year, the strictest of 
the balanced budget requirements in the model, results in lower fiscal stress levels in two 
areas. States with this rule have higher budget and service-level fiscal stress values and 
                                                
 
 
30 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity chi2 = 0.40, prob>chi2=0.526; Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data F=42.62, prob>F=0.000 
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therefore lower levels of fiscal stress. Specifically, states with this requirement have a 
budget fiscal stress value 0.521 points higher and a service-level fiscal stress value 0.756 
points higher than states without this requirement. Balanced budget rules do not have a 
uniform effect on fiscal stress, but overall the effect is positive. 
Results here indicate support for H4.2: TELs will affect state levels of fiscal stress; 
TELs have an impact on three types of fiscal stress. Spending limits have a marginally 
significant positive impact on service-level fiscal stress; states with a spending limit have 
a service-level fiscal stress value 0.174 points higher than states without the spending 
limit. Revenue limits have a negative effect on cash, long-run and service-level fiscal 
stress values. States with revenue limits have cash fiscal stress values 1.10 points lower 
than states without the limit, long-run fiscal stress values 1.67 points lower than states 
without the limit and service-level fiscal stress values 0.487 points lower.  
Results do not support H4.3: States with divided governments will experience 
higher fiscal stress. The divided government variable is marginally significant in the 
budget fiscal stress model; however, the coefficient is positive suggesting states with 
divided government actually have budget fiscal stress values 0.068 points higher than 
states with unified government. This value is small and only marginally significant. 
Based on the regression results, the political affiliation and distribution of power between 
the executive and legislative branches do not appear to play a role in fiscal stress levels. 
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Table 6.2: Regression Model with State Actions Modeled  
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables (1) 
Budgeta 
(2) 
Cashb 
(3) 
Long-runc 
(4) 
Service-leveld 
Rainy Day Fund Use 
(Dummy) – 1 Year Lag  
0.018 
(.037) 
-0.035 
(.025) 
-0.012 
(.025) 
-0.003 
(.016) 
Expenditure Cuts 
(Dummy) – 1 Year Lag 
-0.001 
(.040) 
-0.023 
(.024) 
0.002 
(.019) 
-0.004 
(.017) 
Tax Increases (Dummy) 
– 1 Year Lag 
0.007 
(.030) 
0.004 
(.020) 
-0.003 
(.017) 
-0.013 
(.013) 
Governor signs balanced 
budget 
-0.266 
(.096) 
0.688** 
(0.077) 
1.77** 
(.216) 
1.57** 
(.161) 
Governor submits 
balanced budget 
-0.494* 
(.302) 
0.982** 
(.083) 
2.06** 
(.295) 
1.05** 
(.259) 
Legislature passes 
balanced budget 
0.130 
(.267) 
-0.027 
(.049) 
0.141** 
(.036) 
-0.135 
(.133) 
No Deficit Carryover 0.521** 
(.191) 
-0.067 
(.112) 
-0.009 
(.162) 
0.756** 
(.160) 
Spending Limit 0.040 
(.129) 
-0.127^ 
(.069) 
0.056 
(.087) 
0.174^ 
(.089) 
Revenue Limit 0.213 
(.179) 
-1.10** 
(.101) 
-1.67** 
(.297) 
-0.487^ 
(.259) 
Divided Government 0.068^ 
(.038) 
-0.001 
(.025) 
0.009 
(.037) 
-0.015 
(.020) 
Governor’s Political 
Party 
0.046 
(.042) 
0.013 
(.029) 
-0.028 
(.031) 
-0.028 
(.023) 
Structural Balance 0.324* 
(.162) 
1.02** 
(.078) 
-1.28** 
(.298) 
0.679** 
(.258) 
Economic Growth (%) –  
1 Year Lag 
0.038** 
(.009) 
0.006 
(.008) 
0.002 
(.004) 
-0.010* 
(.005) 
Observations 380 388 380 380 
Adjusted R2 0.6551 0.8567 0.8883 0.9038 
^ Significant at the 90% confidence level.  *Significant at the 95% confidence level.  **Significant at 
the 99% confidence level. All regression models include control variables for year and states. 
a OLS regression. Tests for first-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity do not show these 
problems. 
b OLS regression with robust standard errors. Tests show no serial correlation but heteroskedasticity is 
present. 
c Prais-Winsten OLS regression with robust standard errors.  
d Prais-Winsten OLS regression. 
 
 
These finding offer some support for H5.2: States with structural deficits will 
experience higher fiscal stress. States with a strength in structural balance have budget 
fiscal stress values 0.324 point higher than states with a weakness or mid-level capacity 
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in structural balance; cash fiscal stress scores 1 point higher than states with a weakness 
or mid-level capacity in structural balance, and service-level fiscal stress values 0.679 
points higher than the weaker states. However, the opposite relationship is observed with 
long-run fiscal stress. States with a strength in structural balance have long-run fiscal 
stress values 1.28 points lower (and therefore higher fiscal stress levels) than states with a 
weakness or mid-level capacity for structural balance. As shown in Appendix C, when 
the regression equation is run with an alternative coding for the structural balance 
variable, the findings change. Specifically, the nature of the relationship between 
structural balance capacity and fiscal stress levels becomes only marginally significant 
for budget fiscal stress and not significant for the other three types of fiscal stress.  
The final hypothesis tested concerns the short-term effects of rainy day fund use, 
expenditure cuts, and tax increases on fiscals stress. This hypothesis, H6: The short-term 
effects of state responses on fiscal stress levels will be minimal is supported by the 
regression results; the short-term effects of these state actions are minimal. None of the 
state response variables has a statistically significant relationship with fiscal stress levels. 
Table 6.3 shows the regression results of a model that looks at the effects of 
actions taken in 2002 on current levels of fiscal stress (2007-2009). Actions in 2002 are 
used because many states at the time were responding to both higher levels of fiscal stress 
and the effects of an economic slowdown that resulted from the 2001 national recession. 
This model tests H7 and its sub-hypotheses. The hypothesis, H7: The long-term effects of 
state responses on fiscal stress will differ is supported. The sub-hypothesis, H7.1: Tax 
increases and/or expenditure reductions will, in the long-term, reduce fiscal stress levels 
is partially supported by the findings. Expenditure cuts in 2002 result in cash fiscal stress 
values 0.446 points lower  (and therefore higher levels of fiscal stress) but service-level 
fiscal stress values 1.67 points higher (and therefore lower levels of fiscal stress) than 
states that did not use expenditure cuts in 2002. Tax increases in 2002 result in budget 
fiscal stress values 0.489 points higher and therefore lower fiscal stress levels. In contrast  
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Table 6.3: Regression Model with 2002 State Actions Modeled 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables (5) 
Budgeta 
(6) 
Cashb 
(7) 
Long-runc 
(8) 
Service-
leveld 
Rainy Day Fund Use – 1 Year 
Lag  
0.069 
(0.066) 
0.009 
(0.043) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
-0.017 
(0.036) 
Expenditure Cuts – 1 Year Lag 0.0152 
(0.082) 
0.031 
(0.042) 
0.074 
(0.046) 
0.106* 
(0.046) 
Tax Increases – 1 Year Lag 0.004 
(0.090) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
-0.086** 
(0.029) 
0.023 
(0.026) 
Rainy Day Fund Use – 2002 -0.125 
(0.144) 
0.777** 
(0.156) 
-2.75** 
(0.098) 
2.39** 
(0.145) 
Expenditure Cuts – 2002 -0.150 
(0.132) 
-0.446** 
(0.060) 
-0.233 
(0.048) 
1.67** 
(0.075) 
Tax Increases –   
2002 
0.489* 
(0.189) 
-0.065 
(0.100) 
-0.700** 
(0.090) 
-1.30** 
(0.093) 
Governor signs balanced 
budget 
-0.243* 
(0.100) 
0.481** 
(0.050) 
0.144** 
(0.045) 
0.376** 
(0.056) 
Governor submits balanced 
budget 
-0.449* 
(0.219) 
0.470** 
(0.117) 
0.349** 
(0.102) 
2.04** 
(0.126) 
Legislature passes balanced 
budget 
0.266 
(0.240) 
-0.079** 
(0.035) 
0.171** 
(0.031) 
-0.072 
(0.127) 
No Deficit Carryover 0.320^ 
(0.169) 
0.439** 
(0.132) 
-1.974** 
(.105) 
2.30** 
(0.112) 
Spending Limit -0.477** 
(0.099) 
-0.266** 
(0.065) 
-0.920** 
(0.064) 
0.436** 
(0.070) 
Revenue Limit -0.278^ 
(0.148) 
0.178 
(0.182) 
-2.09** 
(0.164) 
2.22** 
(0.165) 
Divided Government 0.064 
(0.083) 
-0.022 
(0.059) 
-0.046 
(0.040) 
-0.021 
(0.045) 
Governor’s Political Party 0.036 
(0.093) 
-0.012 
(0.070) 
0.072 
(0.085) 
-0.020 
(0.049) 
Structural Balance 0.047 
(0.133) 
1.69** 
(0.165) 
0.816** 
(0.166) 
-2.04** 
(0.174) 
Economic Growth (%) –  
1 Year Lag 
0.017 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.025** 
(0.008) 
Observations 144 147 144 144 
Adjusted R2 0.8203 0.9732 0.9928 0.9900 
^ Significant at the 90% confidence level.  *Significant at the 95% confidence level.  **Significant at the 
99% confidence level. All regression models include control variables for year and states. 
a OLS regression. Tests for first-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity do not show these 
problems. 
b Prais-Winsten regression with robust standard errors. Tests show serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity is present. 
c Prais-Winsten OLS regression with robust standard errors.  
d Prais-Winsten OLS regression. 
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tax increases in 2002 result in long-run and service-level fiscal stress values 0.700 and 
1.30 points lower (respectively), denoting higher service-level fiscal stress.  
Rainy day fund use in 2002 has similarly divergent effects, resulting in H7.2: 
Rainy day fund use will increase fiscal stress in the long-term being partially supported. 
For cash and service-level fiscal stress, using rainy day funds in 2002 results in values 
0.777 points and 2.39 points higher (respectively), supporting H7.2. However, regarding 
long-run fiscal stress, using rainy day funds in 2002 results in values 2.75 points lower, 
and so contradicts H7.2. 
6.4 Discussion of Hypotheses and Findings 
The regression findings provide information on the effectiveness of the three most 
common state responses to fiscal stress and the role of institutional factors in helping 
states mitigate fiscal stress.  
Role of Institutional Factors  
Hypothesis 4 and its three sub-hypotheses suggest that institutional factors will 
affect fiscal stress levels. As described in Chapter 5, there do appear to be some 
differences in state responses depending on institutional factors.  
H4.1: States with balanced budget rules will experience lower fiscal stress 
This hypothesis is mostly supported and regarding all four fiscal stress measures. 
Requiring the Governor to sign a balanced budget results in lower cash, long-run, and 
service-level fiscal stress levels. Requiring a Governor to submit a balanced budget 
results in lower cash, long-run and service-level fiscal stress levels. Requiring that 
deficits not be carried over into the next fiscal year results in lower budget and service-
level fiscal stress. The least effective balanced budget requirement at reducing fiscal 
stress is that rule requiring the legislature to pass a balanced budget. Since balance – 
either in terms of assets to liabilities, expenditures to revenues, or long-term liabilities to 
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total assets – is important to the measures of fiscal stress, the overall positive effect of 
these requirements makes sense. A more interesting question is why balanced budget 
requirements sometimes are associated with higher fiscal stress levels.   
The answer may be related to the limits balanced budget requirements put on 
automatic stabilization mechanisms (e.g., spending). If balanced budget requirements act 
as limits on spending increases needed to help stabilize a state economy suffering from an 
economic downturn, the result may be a longer period of slow or negative economic 
growth (Johnson 2010b).   
H4.2: TELs will affect state levels of fiscal stress. 
TELs have an impact on fiscal stress levels; however, the direction of the impact 
depends on whether a state has revenue or spending limits. Spending limits are 
marginally related to higher service-level fiscal stress values. Revenue limits appear to be 
related to lower cash, long-run and service-level fiscal stress values. The minimal impact 
of spending limits on fiscal stress levels may be due to the methods states have to 
circumvent these limits (Bowler and Donovan 2004); however, results here indicate these 
constraints do have a small positive effect on service-level fiscal stress levels. The 
negative effect of revenue limits on fiscal stress levels is likely due to their hampering 
state ability to increase taxes and thereby draw in more revenues to balance with 
spending (Finegold et al 2003).   
H4.3: States with divided governments will experience higher fiscal stress.  
When controlling for other factors occurring within state government, political 
factors do not appear to have a significant influence (at least as modeled here) on fiscal 
stress levels.  Despite prior research that partisan differences across branches hampers 
state action, this model does not find significant evidence of such a relationship. The case 
study by Lauth (2010) on Georgia’s experience with the most recent national recession 
and the struggles between Georgia’s Republican governor and Republican-controlled 
General Assembly sheds some light on this result. Even when the same party controls 
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both branches of state government, there is no guarantee that they will work effectively 
or cordially with one another.   
H5.2: States with structural deficits will experience higher fiscal stress. 
 For budget, cash, and service-level fiscal stress, a strong capacity for structural 
balance results in better fiscal stress conditions. Yet, for long-run fiscal stress, states with 
strength in structural balance capacity appear to experience greater fiscal stress than 
states with weaker structural balance capacity. States with weaker structural balance 
capacity are more likely to experience budget, cash, and service-level fiscal stress due to 
an on-going inability to match current revenues with current expenditures. It is unclear 
why long-run fiscal stress levels would be higher for states with strong structural balance 
capacity; however, it is possible states shift current problems to the long-term.  The long-
run fiscal stress index captures long-term liabilities and the ability of states to pay for 
them. Structural balance capacity is concerned with current and medium term 
management of revenues and expenditure levels. Adding debt at unsustainable levels is 
an example of a state action that may support structural balance in the near term, but 
result in worsening long-run fiscal stress. 
Effectiveness of State Responses 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 are partially supported by the regression findings. The 
effectiveness of state response to fiscal stress appears to depend on the time between an 
action and its’ effect. While this does not provide much help to states in the throes of 
fiscal stress, it does provide some guidance on how to mitigate future fiscal stress. This 
analysis adds to the fiscal stress literature by assessing the effectiveness of rainy day fund 
use, expenditure cuts, and tax and fee increases in addressing short-term and long-term 
state fiscal stress.  
H6: The short-term effect of state responses on fiscal stress levels will be minimal.  
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The results of the regression analysis demonstrate that none of the state actions of 
interest (expenditure cuts, rainy day fund use, tax and fee increases) reduce state fiscal 
stress in the current year, supporting hypothesis 6. It is important to remember that fiscal 
stress as measured here is not the same as a budget shortfall. States do use rainy day 
funds to fill budget gaps; expenditure cuts to reduce budget shortfalls, and tax and fee 
increases to boost revenues.  
H7: The long-term effects of state responses (e.g. tax increases, expenditure cuts, and 
rainy day fund use) on fiscal stress will differ. 
 Another aspect of this analysis is the effect of state responses during a previous 
period of fiscal stress on a more recent episode of stress, in other words, the long-term 
effects of state responses on fiscal stress. These regression results support hypothesis 7 
that the effects of responses will differ. Despite state responses having no short-term 
effect, state responses in one period of stress do appear to have effects in a subsequent 
period of stress.  Differences in their effects appear to be related to the type of fiscal 
stress as well as to the type of response. 
H7.1: Tax increases and/or expenditure reductions will, in the long-term, reduce fiscal 
stress levels. 
Tax increases in 2002 have a positive effect on budget fiscal stress levels in the 
years 2007 to 2009. In contrast, tax increases in 2002 have a negative effect on long-run 
and service-level fiscal stress levels in the years 2007 to 2009. Expenditure cuts in 2002 
have a positive effect on service-level fiscal stress levels and a negative effect on cash 
fiscal stress in 2007 to 2009.  
The budget fiscal stress measure is composed of a state’s operating ratio (total 
revenues/total expenses) and state surplus (deficit) per capita. This measure attempts to 
gauge a state’s ability to generate sufficient revenues over its normal budgetary period to 
meet its expenditure obligations and not incur deficits (Groves et al 1981).  Based on the 
regression results, of the three state responses, tax increases in 2002 were the most 
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effective way to reduce fiscal stress from 2007 to 2009. Tax increases in 2002 may result 
in lower budget fiscal stress in 2007 to 2009 by balancing on-going revenues and 
expenditures.  
The cash fiscal stress index attempts to measure a government’s ability to 
generate enough cash to pay its bills (Groves et al 1981). Three indicators are used to 
assess this definition: cash ratio (cash, cash equivalents and investments divided by 
current liabilities), the quick ratio (cash, cash equivalents, investments and receivables 
divided by current liabilities), and the current ratio (current assets divided by current 
liabilities). Given these definitions, actions that increase current assets and/or reduce 
current liabilities will assist in lowering cash fiscal stress levels. Based on the regression 
results, of the three state responses, rainy day fund use is the most effective at reducing 
future fiscal stress. Expenditure cuts in 2002 may result in inefficient cuts that commit 
the state to more spending in the future. For instance, reducing spending on education and 
other social services may translate to more spending in healthcare or law enforcement. 
While expedient in the short-term, expenditure cuts may not be cost-effective in the long-
term. Using rainy day funds may allow states to avoid expenditures cuts (Hou 2003) and 
some of their negative consequences on cash fiscal stress levels. 
The long-run fiscal stress index is measured by the net asset ratio (restricted and 
unrestricted net assets dived by total assets), the long-term liability ratio (non-current 
liabilities divided by total assets), and long-term liability per capita. This measure 
attempts to the ability of a government to pay its long-term liabilities (e.g. pension costs 
and replacement of capital assets) in the years that they will become due (Groves et al 
1981).  Actions that increase long-term liabilities or reduce assets will result in worsening 
long-run fiscal stress. Of the three state responses, none are effective at reducing future 
long-run fiscal stress levels. Both tax increases and rainy day fund use in 2002 may have 
a negative effect on long-run fiscal stress because they allow states to avoid reducing 
long-term liabilities. The extent to which these actions allow states to avoid decisions on 
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long-term liabilities permanently explains why this effect is significant in 2007-2009. The 
large negative effect of rainy day fund use may also be related to the reduction in total 
assets with the spending of rainy day funds.   
Service-level fiscal stress is measured as tax per capita, revenue per capita, and 
expenses per capita. This measure attempts to gauge a state’s ability to provide the level 
and quality of services required for the general health and welfare of the state’s residents 
(Groves et al 1981). The service-level index essentially measures the amount of room a 
state has to raise taxes, revenues, and expenses per capita. The lower these measures, the 
better the fiscal stress scores. Given the construction of the service-level fiscal stress 
index, it makes sense that expenditure cuts result in improved service-level fiscal stress 
and tax increases in worsening service-level fiscal stress. With expenditure cuts, the 
expenses per capita measure is lower and therefore a state is farther from an inefficiently 
high spending level. At the same time, tax increases result in a higher tax per capita and 
revenue per capita, resulting in higher service-level fiscal stress levels. Of the three state 
responses, rainy day fund use is the most effective at reducing service-level fiscal stress 
levels (expenditure cuts also have strong effect on reducing service-level fiscal stress). 
H7.2: Rainy day fund use will increase fiscal stress in the long-term. 
This hypothesis is partially supported because rainy day fund use in 2002 results 
in worsening long-run fiscal stress in 2007 to 2009. As described in Chapter 2, rainy day 
fund use can worsen fiscal stress levels by deferring difficult decisions and actions 
regarding spending and taxing levels. As Hackbart and Ramsey (2004) state, the use of 
rainy day funds to address fiscal stress is ineffective because such use does not address 
eroding tax bases or unsustainable spending policies.  That is, rainy day fund use is 
thought to push existing problems down the road (Hackbart and Ramsey 2004). Long-run 
fiscal stress, in particular, captures the extent to which a state is, over time, not 
addressing fiscal balance. Debt taken on to cover pension costs and maintenance costs 
deferred for capital are reflected in worsening long-run fiscal stress.  
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Rainy day fund use in 2002 results in improved cash and service-level fiscal stress 
levels in 2007 to 2009. One explanation for this relationship, suggested by Brinner and 
Brinner (2002), is that rainy day fund use may allow states to take more thoughtful and 
well-planned approaches to cutting spending or raising revenues. Hasty spending cuts can 
lead to cuts in programs or services that actually save states money in the long-term 
(Levine et al 1981). As such, rainy day fund use in 2002 may have resulted in lower 
current liabilities in 2007 to 2009. Rainy day fund use in 2002 may also have resulted in 
fewer tax increases, and therefore improve service-level fiscal stress levels. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine three questions regarding state experience and 
response to fiscal stress. The findings related to the first question – are some states able to 
navigate better through periods of fiscal stress than other states? – indicate that some 
factors make states more and less vulnerable to fiscal stress. Certain institutional 
characteristics that some states adopt and others do not appear to assist states in managing 
their experience of fiscal stress. Certain balanced budget requirements have positive and 
relatively strong impacts on state fiscal stress. Other institutional factors, such as 
limitations on states’ collections of revenues, appear to have a negative impact on state 
ability to manage through fiscal stress.   
The answer to the second question – are certain state responses more effective at 
reducing or alleviating fiscal stress? – is less clear. Of the three state responses tested in 
this analysis, none had a statistically significant relationship to fiscal stress levels. It is 
possible that in the short-term, state responses to fiscal stress take a backseat to other 
factors such as overall economic recovery. However, as indicated by the findings related 
to the next question, the real issue may be the time needed to see the impact of state 
responses. That is, the findings related to the third question – does the type of response a 
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state uses in one period of fiscal stress affect its stress levels in subsequent periods of 
fiscal stress? – indicate that the type of response will influence long-term fiscal stress 
levels. State actions that contribute to a balance between expenditures and revenues 
appear to result in less stress during the next episode of widespread fiscal stress among 
states. Merely using rainy day funds to cover cyclical deficits also appears to impact state 
experience of fiscal stress in later years. However, this impact differs depending on the 
type of fiscal stress experienced. These findings suggest that the sacrifices states take to 
address fiscal stress – tax increases, expenditure cuts, and use of rainy day funds – are 
effective at putting states on a more solid financial condition. On the other hand, the 
short-term impacts of these actions are unlikely to yield the quick and decisive results 
that state budget and policy makers might expect and hope for.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined measures and responses to fiscal stress in the U.S. states. Six 
questions were addressed:  
(1) How is state fiscal stress defined and measured in the existing literature?  
(2) Is there a better measure of fiscal stress? And, if so, why is such a measure   
      more reliable and valid?  
(3) Do state characteristics affect their experience of fiscal stress and/or influence    
      their choice of responses?  
(4) Are some states able to navigate better through periods of fiscal stress than  
     other states, and if so, why?  
(5) Are certain state responses more effective at reducing or alleviating fiscal  
      stress?  
(6) Does the type of response a state uses in one period of fiscal stress affect its  
      stress levels in subsequent periods of fiscal stress?  
 
This chapter summarizes the results of this research, the implications, and the 
contributions of this work to both theoretical and empirical research.  Limitations of the 
study will be addressed, as well as areas that are fertile ground for future research. 
7.1 Review of Main Research Findings 
The motivations for this study are several: (1) to contribute substantively to the 
scholarly work about public fiscal management, and more specifically state government 
fiscal health and management, (2) to determine better ways to understand and measure 
fiscal stress in U.S. state governments, and (3) to inform state government budget and 
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policy decision makers about the best means to reach and maintain state fiscal health, 
especially in both up and down economies. The theoretical and empirical framework of 
state budgetary responses to fiscal stress was addressed in Chapter 2.  In this chapter, the 
theoretical explanations for state responses to fiscal stress according to three budget 
theories, incrementalism, punctuated equilibrium, and cutback management, are detailed. 
In addition, empirical research on fiscal stress and the roles of institutional and political 
factors and the effectiveness of state responses is discussed. Finally this chapter forms 
seven sets of hypotheses based on the theoretical and empirical research.  
Chapter 3 presented the foundation for creation of a measure of fiscal stress that is 
comparable across years and the American states while allowing for an understanding of 
the different dimensions of fiscal stress. Using the framework of Groves et al (1981) and 
concept operationalization of Wang et al (2007), fiscal stress indices measuring four 
different dimensions of fiscal stress were created: budget, cash, long-run, and service-
level. The budget solvency index attempts to measure a state’s ability to generate enough 
revenue to cover expected expenditures in a fiscal year. The cash solvency index attempts 
to measure a state’s liquidity and its ability to pay current liabilities. The long-run 
solvency index attempts to measure a state’s long-term ability to pay its liabilities. The 
service-level solvency index attempts to measure a state’s ability to provide the required 
level and quality of goods and services.  
The measurement validity and reliability of these indices was assessed in Chapter 
4. While these indices are mostly valid and reliable, certain systematic differences exist. 
Inconsistencies in how states adopted and record depreciation results in systematic 
differences in two of the financial indicators used in the long-run and service-level 
solvency indices.  
In Chapter 5, this research then used this new measure of fiscal stress to test 
hypotheses suggested by theoretical and empirical literature about the relationship 
between fiscal stress levels and state government responses. Analyses also incorporated 
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the relationship between institutional factors and fiscal stress levels. Important findings 
from this research include that no single strategy of budgeting dominates among the 
states. That is, no theoretical perspective dominates state behavior. The actions states take 
to address fiscal stress are associated with the both “incremental” and what can be 
considered “punctuated equilibrium” responses. A main hypothesis of cutback 
management theory, specifically, that responses will vary by differences in the level of 
fiscal stress was not supported. The lack of a structured state strategy to deal with fiscal 
stress and economic downturn supports the research of Pammer (1990) and Bartle (1996) 
who claim that local governments have so many differences in structure, personality, and 
organizational culture that patterns are impossible to observe. 
Chapter 6 uses regression analysis to investigate institutional factors as well as 
short and long-term impacts of responses on fiscal stress. Institutional factors play a role 
in both the responses states take to combat fiscal stress and regarding the level of fiscal 
stress that they experience. Specifically, balanced budget rules and TELs either mitigate 
fiscal stress levels or foster a state policy environment that is more vulnerable to fiscal 
stress. Another finding is that the type of fiscal stress being measured – budget, cash, 
long-run, and service-level – can foster different institutional effects. For example, three 
of the four balanced budget rules modeled reduce the level of long-run fiscal stress. In 
contrast, of the four balanced budget rules, one contributed to higher levels of budget 
fiscal stress while another rule reduced budget fiscal stress. Structural balance was also 
found to be an important predictor of budget, cash, and service-level state fiscal stress. 
The short and long-term impacts of three common state responses to fiscal stress are also 
key findings of this research. In the short-term, none of these responses (tax increases, 
expenditure cuts or accessing the rainy day fund) had a statistically significant impact on 
fiscal stress. However, when assessing the impact of states responses to stress in one 
period of economic downturn compared to a subsequent period of economic downturn, 
long-term impacts were observed. In particular, impacts of state responses to stress  
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Table 7.1: Summary of Key Findings Related to Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Finding 
H1: States are strategic in their response to fiscal stress. Not Supported 
H2: Responses will differ based on the severity of fiscal stress. Partially 
Supported 
H2.1: Rainy day funds will be used in periods of lower fiscal stress. Not Supported 
H2.2: Incremental budget strategies will be used in periods of 
moderate fiscal stress. 
Partially 
Supported 
H2.3: Punctuated equilibrium strategies will be used in periods of high 
fiscal stress. 
Partially 
Supported 
H3: Institutional factors will affect state responses to fiscal stress. Supported 
H3.1: States with balanced budget rules will take more actions to 
address fiscal stress. 
Partially 
Supported 
H3.2: States with TELs will use more expenditure cuts and other non-
tax measures to address fiscal stress. 
Partially 
Supported 
H3.3: States with divided governments will take fewer actions to 
address fiscal stress. 
Not Supported 
H4: Institutional factors will affect states’ levels of fiscal stress. Supported 
H4.1: States with balanced budget rules will experience lower fiscal 
stress. 
Mostly 
supported 
      H4.2: TELs will affect state level of fiscal stress. Supported 
      H4.3: States with divided governments will experience higher fiscal  
      stress. 
Not Supported 
H5: States with structural deficits will engage different responses and 
experience higher fiscal stress. 
Mostly 
Supported 
       H5.1: States with structural deficits will be more likely to engage  
       punctuated equilibrium responses in periods of high fiscal stress. 
Supported 
       H5.2: States with structural deficits will experience higher fiscal  
       stress. 
Partially 
Supported  
H6: The short-term effect of state responses (e.g. tax increases,  
      expenditure cuts, rainy day fund use) on fiscal stress levels will be  
      minimal. 
Supported 
H7: The long-term effects of state responses (e.g. tax increases,  
       expenditure cuts, and rainy day fund use) on fiscal stress will  
       differ.  
Supported 
        H7.1: Tax increases and/or expenditure reductions will, in the long-  
        term, reduce fiscal stress levels.  
Mostly 
Supported 
        H7.2: Rainy day fund use will increase fiscal stress in the long-term. Partially 
Supported 
 
 
differed, depending on the type of fiscal stress considered. This resulted in different 
answers to the question, what is the most effective response to fiscal stress? A summary 
of these findings is presented in Table 7.1. 
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7.2 Implications 
These findings suggest that states have some control over their experience of 
fiscal stress. They may exert this control through their responses to fiscal stress, their 
decision to match revenues with expenditures, and either their adoption of balanced 
budget rules and TELs or their interpretation of these rules. However, state ability to 
control their experience of fiscal stress does not mean that they can expect immediate 
results. Results regarding the impact of longer-term responses indicate that the timing of 
state action matters. Working to reduce vulnerability to economic downturns before a 
downturn occurs is more likely to yield positive results than actions taken in the midst of 
recession and deepening fiscal stress.  This enhanced understanding of how institutional 
requirements and state actions influence the experience of fiscal stress may assist 
researchers when attempting to predict which states are more likely to end up in fiscal 
stress in subsequent recessions. In terms of what this research means to state policy and 
budget makers, the findings underscore the importance of preparing for the inevitable bad 
times during the good times. Budget restraint – both in terms of not haphazardly cutting 
taxes and increasing spending – is crucial to states performing better during the next 
economic downturn.  
7.3 Limitations and Future Research  
Despite the contributions of this study, there are some important limitations and 
multiple opportunities for further research. For example, this dataset only covers two 
episodes of national recession. Annually updating the data set using state CAFRs from 
2009 forward would provide the opportunity to expand the data set coverage and produce 
more robust results.  
Also, the GASB 34, which allows for the creation of the fiscal stress measures 
used in this analysis, was fully implemented in 2002. As additional years are added to 
this dataset, we may find that certain relationships between the explanatory variables and 
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fiscal stress change and either strengthen or weaken the findings here.  The manner in 
which the three response variables are modeled in this analysis does not allow for deeper 
investigation of across-the-board vs. targeted cuts or furloughs vs. layoffs and their 
affects on state experiences of fiscal stress.  Similarly, understanding the effect of an 
increase of personal income taxes as opposed to fees or sales taxes would deepen our 
understanding of how state tax choices in particular affect their fiscal stress levels. Also 
not reported here is the effect of the size of state responses on fiscal stress levels. The 
scope of this analysis did not include these types of investigations, but future research in 
this area may be fruitful.  
The difficulties in defining and measuring structural balance are similar in many 
ways to those related to understanding fiscal stress. This is an important concept, often 
discussed in empirical literature. As modeled in this analysis, structural balance appears 
to play a large role in state financial condition (level of fiscal stress experienced). 
However, a more robust measure of structural balance may yield more precise findings 
about its’ effect on fiscal stress. Future research that examines defining and measuring 
structural balance that supports reliable and valid comparison across states is warranted. 
 Finally, quantitative research such as this does not provide substantive focus on 
specific states, their cultures and traditions and context that would better explain any 
experience of fiscal stress and their responses to it. This research does not answer 
questions like, why did Alabama weather the current national recession better than 
Kentucky? or Why did Louisiana and Arizona experience different levels of fiscal stress, 
when both of these states have similar balanced budget rules? The current research 
provides a framework for better understanding patterns; case studies of the individual 
states can provide further texture to this framework. Essentially, this research provides 
the starting point for state analysts and scholars to evaluate the robustness or vulnerability 
of state institutional, political, and economic systems to fiscal stress. 
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7.4 Contributions to Theoretical and Empirical Research  
This study contributes to both theoretical literature and empirical research on 
fiscal stress. In this study, three theoretical frameworks – incrementalism, punctuated 
equilibrium, and cutback management theory – are compared in their ability to explain 
how states manage declining resources and fiscal stress. Most prior research comparing 
these theories was conducted at the local level (Pammer 1990; Bartle 1996; Jordan 2003; 
Levine et al 1981b; Lewis 1994; Rickards 1984). And, most research conducted at the 
state level does not review state responses in the 50 American states, rather must work 
uses a selection of case study states (Dougherty and Klase 2009).  In this analysis, the 
comparison of state actions includes all U.S. states and covers eight years, using a 
standardized measure of fiscal stress and a single data source for state responses. As a 
result of this comparison, results are able to answer whether one theoretical framework is 
better than others at explaining patterns of state responses to stress.  In fact, findings from 
this research indicate that no single theoretical framework of public budgeting explains 
how states respond to fiscal stress. Instead, it appears that states respond to particular and 
immediate needs, without engaging any specific strategy, similar to the findings of 
Pammer (1990) and Bartle (1996) conducted at the local level.  
To the existing empirical research on fiscal stress, this study makes several 
contributions. This paper adds to the literature by (1) clarifying the meaning of fiscal 
stress and developing a measure of fiscal stress that can be duplicated from publically 
available data, (2) using the State Coincident Index developed by the Philadelphia 
Federal Reserve to capture the effect of state economic conditions on responses to fiscal 
stress, and (3) assessing the longer-term impacts of responses to fiscal stress by using a 
panel dataset over eight years.  While there are multiple avenues for additional research 
on state fiscal stress, this analysis provides a basis for future research about government 
fiscal stress by providing a robust measure of the concept. 
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APPENDIX A 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS RESULTS 
State Year Budget Cash Long-Run Service-Level 
Alabama 2002 Moderate Low Low Low 
Alabama 2003 Low Low Low Low 
Alabama 2004 Low Low Low Low 
Alabama 2005 Low Low Low Low 
Alabama 2006 Low Low Low Low 
Alabama 2007 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Alabama 2008 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Alabama 2009 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Alaska 2002 High Low Low High 
Alaska 2003 Low Low Low High 
Alaska 2004 Low Low Low High 
Alaska 2005 Low Low Low High 
Alaska 2006 Low Moderate Low High 
Alaska 2007 Low Low Low High 
Alaska 2008 Low Low Low High 
Alaska 2009 High Low Low High 
Arizona 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Arizona 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Arizona 2004 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Arizona 2005 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Arizona 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Arizona 2007 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Arizona 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Arizona 2009 High High Moderate Low 
Arkansas 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2003 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2004 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2005 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2006 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2007 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2008 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Arkansas 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
California 2002 High High High Moderate 
California 2003 High High High Moderate 
California 2004 Moderate High High Moderate 
California 2005 Moderate High High High 
California 2006 Moderate High High High 
California 2007 Moderate High High High 
California 2008 Moderate High High High 
California 2009 High High High High 
Colorado 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
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State Year Budget Cash Long-Run Service-Level 
Colorado 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Colorado 2004 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Colorado 2005 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Colorado 2006 Low High Moderate Low 
Colorado 2007 Low High Moderate Low 
Colorado 2008 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Colorado 2009 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Connecticut 2002 High High High High 
Connecticut 2003 Moderate High High High 
Connecticut 2004 Moderate High High High 
Connecticut 2005 Moderate High High High 
Connecticut 2006 Moderate High High High 
Connecticut 2007 Moderate High High High 
Connecticut 2008 High High High High 
Connecticut 2009 High High High High 
Delaware 2002 Moderate High Moderate High 
Delaware 2003 Moderate High Moderate High 
Delaware 2004 Low High Moderate High 
Delaware 2005 Low High Moderate High 
Delaware 2006 Low High Moderate High 
Delaware 2007 Low High Moderate High 
Delaware 2008 Moderate High Moderate High 
Delaware 2009 High High High High 
Florida 2002 Low High Moderate Low 
Florida 2003 Low High Moderate Low 
Florida 2004 Low High Moderate Low 
Florida 2005 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Florida 2006 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Florida 2007 Low Moderate Moderate Low 
Florida 2008 Moderate Moderate High Low 
Florida 2009 Moderate Moderate High Low 
Georgia 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Georgia 2003 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Georgia 2004 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Georgia 2005 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Georgia 2006 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Georgia 2007 Low Moderate Moderate Low 
Georgia 2008 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Georgia 2009 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Hawaii 2002 Moderate Low High High 
Hawaii 2003 High Low High High 
Hawaii 2004 Moderate Low High High 
Hawaii 2005 Low Low High High 
Hawaii 2006 Moderate Low High High 
Hawaii 2007 Moderate Moderate High High 
Hawaii 2008 High Moderate High High 
Hawaii 2009 High High High High 
Idaho 2002 Moderate Low Low Moderate 
Idaho 2003 Moderate Low Low Low 
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State Year Budget Cash Long-Run Service-Level 
Idaho 2004 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Idaho 2005 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Idaho 2006 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Idaho 2007 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Idaho 2008 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Idaho 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Illinois 2002 High High High Moderate 
Illinois 2003 Moderate High High Moderate 
Illinois 2004 Moderate High High Moderate 
Illinois 2005 Moderate High High Moderate 
Illinois 2006 Moderate High High Moderate 
Illinois 2007 Moderate High High Moderate 
Illinois 2008 Moderate High High Moderate 
Illinois 2009 High High High Moderate 
Indiana 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Indiana 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Indiana 2004 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Indiana 2005 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Indiana 2006 Low High Low Moderate 
Indiana 2007 Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
Indiana 2008 Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
Indiana 2009 Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
Iowa 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2003 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2004 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2005 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2006 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2007 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2008 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Iowa 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2004 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2005 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2006 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2007 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kansas 2009 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2003 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2004 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2005 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2006 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2007 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Kentucky 2009 High High High Moderate 
Louisiana 2002 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Louisiana 2003 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Louisiana 2004 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
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Louisiana 2005 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
Louisiana 2006 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Louisiana 2007 Low Moderate Moderate High 
Louisiana 2008 Low Moderate Moderate High 
Louisiana 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Maine 2002 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Maine 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Maine 2004 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Maine 2005 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Maine 2006 Low High Moderate High 
Maine 2007 Low High Moderate High 
Maine 2008 Moderate High Moderate High 
Maine 2009 Moderate High Moderate High 
Maryland 2002 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Maryland 2003 Moderate High High Moderate 
Maryland 2004 Moderate High High Moderate 
Maryland 2005 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Maryland 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Maryland 2007 Moderate High High Moderate 
Maryland 2008 Moderate High High Moderate 
Maryland 2009 High High High Moderate 
Massachusetts 2002 High High High High 
Massachusetts 2003 Moderate High High High 
Massachusetts 2004 Low High High High 
Massachusetts 2005 High High High High 
Massachusetts 2006 Low High High High 
Massachusetts 2007 Moderate High High High 
Massachusetts 2008 Moderate High High High 
Massachusetts 2009 High High High High 
Michigan 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2004 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2005 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2006 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2007 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2008 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Michigan 2009 Moderate High High Low 
Minnesota 2002 Moderate High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2003 Moderate High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2004 Moderate High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2005 Low High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2006 Low High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2007 Low High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2008 Moderate High Moderate High 
Minnesota 2009 Moderate High Moderate High 
Mississippi 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Mississippi 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Mississippi 2004 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Mississippi 2005 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
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Mississippi 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Mississippi 2007 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Mississippi 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Mississippi 2009 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Missouri 2002 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Missouri 2003 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Missouri 2004 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Missouri 2005 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Missouri 2006 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Missouri 2007 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Missouri 2008 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Missouri 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Montana 2002 Low Low Low Low 
Montana 2003 Low Moderate Low Low 
Montana 2004 Low Low Low Moderate 
Montana 2005 Low Low Low Moderate 
Montana 2006 Low Low Low Moderate 
Montana 2007 Low Low Low Moderate 
Montana 2008 Low Low Low Moderate 
Montana 2009 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
Nebraska 2002 Moderate High Low Low 
Nebraska 2003 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Nebraska 2004 Low Moderate Low Low 
Nebraska 2005 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Nebraska 2006 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Nebraska 2007 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Nebraska 2008 Low Moderate Low Moderate 
Nebraska 2009 Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
Nevada 2002 Moderate Moderate High Low 
Nevada 2003 Moderate Moderate High Low 
Nevada 2004 Low Moderate High Low 
Nevada 2005 Low Moderate High Low 
Nevada 2006 Low Moderate Moderate Low 
Nevada 2007 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Nevada 2008 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low 
Nevada 2009 High Moderate High Low 
New Hampshire 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2004 Moderate High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2005 Low High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2006 Moderate High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2007 Low High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2008 Moderate High Moderate Low 
New Hampshire 2009 Moderate High Moderate Low 
New Jersey 2002 Moderate High High Moderate 
New Jersey 2003 Moderate Moderate High High 
New Jersey 2004 Moderate Moderate High High 
New Jersey 2005 High Moderate High High 
New Jersey 2006 Moderate Moderate High High 
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New Jersey 2007 Moderate High High High 
New Jersey 2008 Moderate High High High 
New Jersey 2009 High High High High 
New Mexico 2002 High High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2003 Moderate High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2004 Moderate High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2005 Moderate High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2006 Moderate High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2007 Low High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2008 Moderate High Moderate High 
New Mexico 2009 High High Moderate High 
New York 2003 Moderate High High High 
New York 2004 Moderate High High High 
New York 2005 Moderate High High High 
New York 2006 Low High High High 
New York 2007 Moderate High High High 
New York 2008 Moderate High High High 
New York 2009 High High High High 
North Carolina 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
North Carolina 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
North Carolina 2004 Moderate High Moderate Low 
North Carolina 2005 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
North Carolina 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
North Carolina 2007 Low High Moderate Moderate 
North Carolina 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
North Carolina 2009 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
North Dakota 2002 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
North Dakota 2003 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
North Dakota 2004 Low Moderate High Moderate 
North Dakota 2005 Low Moderate High Moderate 
North Dakota 2006 Low Moderate High High 
North Dakota 2007 Low Moderate Moderate High 
North Dakota 2008 Low Moderate Moderate High 
North Dakota 2009 Low Moderate Moderate High 
Ohio 2002 High Moderate High Moderate 
Ohio 2003 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Ohio 2004 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Ohio 2005 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Ohio 2006 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Ohio 2007 Low Moderate High Moderate 
Ohio 2008 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Ohio 2009 Moderate Moderate High Moderate 
Oklahoma 2002 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Oklahoma 2003 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Oklahoma 2004 Low High Low Low 
Oklahoma 2005 Low High Moderate Low 
Oklahoma 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Oklahoma 2007 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Oklahoma 2008 Low High Moderate Moderate 
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Oklahoma 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Oregon 2002 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Oregon 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Oregon 2004 High High High Moderate 
Oregon 2005 Moderate High High Moderate 
Oregon 2006 Low Moderate High Moderate 
Oregon 2007 Moderate High High Moderate 
Oregon 2008 Moderate High High Moderate 
Oregon 2009 High High High Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2002 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2004 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2005 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2007 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Pennsylvania 2009 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Rhode Island 2002 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2003 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2004 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2005 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2006 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2007 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2008 Moderate High High High 
Rhode Island 2009 Moderate High High High 
South Carolina 2002 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2004 Low High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2005 Low High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2007 Low High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
South Carolina 2009 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
South Dakota 2002 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
South Dakota 2003 Low Moderate Moderate Low 
South Dakota 2004 Low Low Moderate Low 
South Dakota 2005 Low Low Moderate Low 
South Dakota 2006 Low Low Moderate Low 
South Dakota 2007 Low Moderate Moderate Low 
South Dakota 2008 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
South Dakota 2009 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Tennessee 2002 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2003 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2004 Low Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2005 Low Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2006 Low Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2007 Low Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2008 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
Tennessee 2009 Moderate Moderate Low Low 
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Texas 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Texas 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Texas 2004 Low High Moderate Low 
Texas 2005 Low High Moderate Low 
Texas 2006 Low High Moderate Low 
Texas 2007 Low High Moderate Low 
Texas 2008 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Texas 2009 High High Moderate Low 
Utah 2002 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2003 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2004 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2005 Low Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2006 Low Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2007 Low Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2008 Low Low Moderate Low 
Utah 2009 Moderate Low Moderate Low 
Vermont 2002 Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Vermont 2003 Moderate High Moderate High 
Vermont 2004 Low High Moderate High 
Vermont 2005 Moderate High Moderate High 
Vermont 2006 Low High Moderate High 
Vermont 2007 Moderate High Moderate High 
Vermont 2008 Moderate High Moderate High 
Vermont 2009 Moderate High Moderate High 
Virginia 2002 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Virginia 2003 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Virginia 2004 Low High Moderate Low 
Virginia 2005 Low Moderate Moderate Low 
Virginia 2006 Low High Moderate Moderate 
Virginia 2007 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Virginia 2008 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Virginia 2009 Moderate High Moderate Low 
Washington 2002 Moderate High High High 
Washington 2003 Low High High High 
Washington 2004 Moderate High High High 
Washington 2005 Low High High High 
Washington 2006 Low Moderate High High 
Washington 2007 Low Moderate High High 
Washington 2008 Moderate Moderate High High 
Washington 2009 High Moderate High High 
West Virginia 2002 Moderate High High High 
West Virginia 2003 Moderate High High High 
West Virginia 2004 Low High High High 
West Virginia 2005 Low Moderate High High 
West Virginia 2006 Low Moderate High High 
West Virginia 2007 Low Moderate High High 
West Virginia 2008 Low Moderate Moderate High 
West Virginia 2009 Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Wisconsin 2002 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
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Wisconsin 2003 Moderate High Moderate Moderate 
Wisconsin 2004 Moderate High High Moderate 
Wisconsin 2005 Moderate High High Moderate 
Wisconsin 2006 Moderate High High Moderate 
Wisconsin 2007 Moderate High High Moderate 
Wisconsin 2008 Moderate High High Moderate 
Wisconsin 2009 Moderate High High Moderate 
Wyoming 2002 Low Moderate Moderate High 
Wyoming 2003 Low Moderate Moderate High 
Wyoming 2004 Low High Moderate High 
Wyoming 2005 Low High Moderate High 
Wyoming 2006 Low High Moderate High 
Wyoming 2007 Low High Moderate High 
Wyoming 2008 Low High Low High 
Wyoming 2009 High High Moderate High 
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Alabama 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alabama 2003 Low 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alabama 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alabama 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Alabama 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alabama 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alabama 2008 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alabama 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Alaska 2002 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 2003 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Alaska 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Alaska 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 2009 High 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Arizona 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Arizona 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Arizona 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Arizona 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
               
Arkansas 2002 Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Arkansas 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Arkansas 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Arkansas 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Arkansas 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 2008 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
California 2002 High 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
California 2003 High 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
California 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
California 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
California 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
California 2009 High 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
               
Colorado 2002 Moderate 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Colorado 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Colorado 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 2009 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
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Connecticut 2002 High 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Connecticut 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Connecticut 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Connecticut 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Connecticut 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut 2008 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Connecticut 2009 High 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
               
Delaware 2002 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 2003 Moderate 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Delaware 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
Delaware 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 2008 Moderate 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Delaware 2009 High 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
               
Florida 2002 Low 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2003 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 2009 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
               
Georgia 2002 Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Georgia 2004 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Georgia 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 2008 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
               
Hawaii 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 2003 High 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hawaii 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Hawaii 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 2008 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Idaho 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Idaho 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Idaho 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Idaho 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Idaho 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 2009 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
               
Illinois 2002 High 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Illinois 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Illinois 2004 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Illinois 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Illinois 2006 Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Illinois 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
               
Indiana 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Indiana 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Indiana 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 2005 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Indiana 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Indiana 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Indiana 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Iowa 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Iowa 2003 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Iowa 2004 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iowa 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Iowa 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Kansas 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kansas 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Kansas 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
               
Kentucky 2002 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 2003 Low 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 2004 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kentucky 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Kentucky 2008 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kentucky 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Louisiana 2002 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2006 Low 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Louisiana 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
               
Maine 2002 Moderate 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maine 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maine 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maine 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maine 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maine 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maine 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maine 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
               
Maryland 2002 Moderate 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maryland 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maryland 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maryland 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Maryland 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Maryland 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
               
Massachuse
tts 2002 High 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Massachuse
tts 2003 Moderate 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Massachuse
tts 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Massachuse
tts 2005 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Massachuse
tts 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachuse
tts 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachuse
tts 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachuse
tts 2009 High 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
               
Michigan 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Michigan 2003 Moderate 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Michigan 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Michigan 2005 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Michigan 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Michigan 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Michigan 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Michigan 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
               
Minnesota 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Minnesota 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Minnesota 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Minnesota 2005 Low 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minnesota 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Minnesota 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minnesota 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Minnesota 2009 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
               
Mississippi 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2003 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2008 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Missouri 2002 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Missouri 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
               
Montana 2002 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 2003 Low 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Montana 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Montana 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Montana 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 2009 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Nebraska 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Nebraska 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Nebraska 2004 Low 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Nebraska 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nebraska 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska 2009 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Nevada 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nevada 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Nevada 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nevada 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Nevada 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 2008 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 2009 High 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
               
New 
Hampshire 2002 Moderate 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New 
Hampshire 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Hampshire 2004 Moderate 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Hampshire 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Hampshire 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New 
Hampshire 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Hampshire 2008 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New 
Hampshire 2009 Moderate 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
New Jersey 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
New Jersey 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
New Jersey 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey 2005 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
               
New 
Mexico 2002 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Mexico 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Mexico 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New 
Mexico 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New 
Mexico 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Mexico 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Mexico 2008 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 2009 High 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Mexico 
               
New York 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
New York 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New York 2005 Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New York 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
New York 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New York 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New York 2009 High 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
               
North 
Carolina 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
North 
Carolina 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
North 
Carolina 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
North 
Carolina 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Carolina 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
North 
Carolina 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Carolina 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
North 
Carolina 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
               
North 
Dakota 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Dakota 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Dakota 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Dakota 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Dakota 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
North 
Dakota 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
North 
Dakota 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North 
Dakota 2009 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Ohio 2002 High 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Ohio 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ohio 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Ohio 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ohio 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 2008 Moderate 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Ohio 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
               
Oklahoma 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Oklahoma 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Oklahoma 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oklahoma 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oklahoma 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oklahoma 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 2009 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Oregon 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Oregon 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Oregon 2004 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oregon 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oregon 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oregon 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Oregon 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oregon 2009 High 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
               
Pennsylvan
ia 2002 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvan
ia 2003 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Pennsylvan
ia 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvan
ia 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvan
ia 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvan
ia 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvan
ia 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvan
ia 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Rhode 
Island 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Rhode 
Island 2003 Moderate 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Rhode 
Island 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rhode 
Island 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rhode 
Island 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Rhode 
Island 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhode 
Island 2008 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Rhode 
Island 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
               
South 
Carolina 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
South 
Carolina 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
South 
Carolina 2004 Low 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Carolina 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Carolina 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Carolina 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Carolina 2008 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Carolina 2009 Moderate 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
               
South 
Dakota 2002 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 2003 Low 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Dakota 
South 
Dakota 2004 Low 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
South 
Dakota 2005 Low 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Dakota 2006 Low 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Dakota 2007 Low 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
Dakota 2008 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
South 
Dakota 2009 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Tennessee 2002 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 2003 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tennessee 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tennessee 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Tennessee 2009 Moderate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
               
Texas 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 2003 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 2005 Low 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Texas 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Texas 2009 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Utah 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Utah 2003 Moderate 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Utah 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 2009 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
               
Vermont 2002 Moderate 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vermont 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vermont 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vermont 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Vermont 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 2009 Moderate 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Virginia 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 2003 Moderate 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Virginia 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Virginia 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Virginia 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 2007 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 2008 Moderate 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Virginia 2009 Moderate 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
               
Washington 2002 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 2003 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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Washington 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Washington 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Washington 2008 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 2009 High 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
               
West 
Virginia 2002 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West 
Virginia 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West 
Virginia 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
West 
Virginia 2005 Low 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
West 
Virginia 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
West 
Virginia 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
West 
Virginia 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West 
Virginia 2009 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
               
Wisconsin 2002 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Wisconsin 2003 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Wisconsin 2004 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wisconsin 2005 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 2006 Moderate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 2007 Moderate 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 2008 Moderate 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wisconsin 2009 Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
               
Wyoming 2002 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 2003 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 2004 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 2005 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 2006 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 2007 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wyoming 2008 Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 2009 High 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX C 
STRUCTURAL BALANCE 
The table below shows the Government Performance Project Scores for each state 
concerning its capacity to achieve structural balance. Thirty states have the same scores 
between 2005 and 2008. Twenty states have different scores. Of these twenty, eleven 
switched between mid-level and weakness or vice versa.  
 
 Structural Balance Score Different 
State 2005 2008  
Alabama Weakness Weakness No 
Alaska Weakness Mid-level Yes 
Arizona Mid-level Weakness Yes 
Arkansas Mid-level Mid-level No 
California Weakness Weakness No 
Colorado Weakness Mid-level Yes 
Connecticut Mid-level Mid-level No 
Delaware Strength Strength No 
Florida Mid-level Mid-level No 
Georgia Mid-level Strength Yes 
Hawaii Weakness Mid-level Yes 
Idaho Mid-level Strength Yes 
Illinois Mid-level Weakness Yes 
Indiana Weakness Strength Yes 
Iowa Mid-level Mid-level No 
Kansas Strength Mid-level Yes 
Kentucky Mid-level Mid-level No 
Louisiana Mid-level Mid-level No 
Maine Weakness Weakness No 
Maryland Mid-level Mid-level No 
Massachusetts Mid-level Weakness Yes 
Michigan Weakness Weakness No 
Minnesota Strength Mid-level Yes 
Mississippi Mid-level Mid-level No 
Missouri Mid-level Mid-level No 
Montana Weakness Mid-level Yes 
Nebraska Mid-level Strength Yes 
Nevada Mid-level Mid-level No 
New Hampshire Weakness Weakness No 
New Jersey Weakness Weakness No 
New Mexico Mid-level Mid-level No 
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 Structural Balance Score Different 
State 2005 2008  
New York Weakness Weakness No 
North Carolina Mid-level Mid-level No 
North Dakota Mid-level Strength Yes 
Ohio Mid-level Mid-level No 
Oklahoma Mid-level Mid-level No 
Oregon Weakness Mid-level Yes 
Pennsylvania Strength Strength No 
Rhode Island Mid-level Weakness Yes 
South Carolina Mid-level Mid-level No 
South Dakota Strength Strength No 
Tennessee Weakness Mid-level Yes 
Texas Mid-level Mid-level No 
Utah Strength Strength No 
Vermont Strength Mid-level Yes 
Virginia Strength Mid-level Yes 
Washington Mid-level Mid-level No 
West Virginia Mid-level Mid-level No 
Wisconsin Weakness Weakness No 
Wyoming Weakness Mid-level Yes 
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Regression Model with State Actions Modeled and Alternative Structural 
Balance Variable 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables (9) 
Budgeta 
(10) 
Cashb 
(11) 
Long-runc 
(12) 
Service-leveld 
Rainy Day Fund Use 
(Dummy) – 1 Year Lag  
0.029 
(0.037) 
-0.038 
(0.028) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
Expenditure Cuts 
(Dummy) – 1 Year Lag 
-0.004 
(0.040) 
-0.023 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.017) 
Tax Increases (Dummy) 
– 1 Year Lag 
0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
Governor signs balanced 
budget 
-0.028 
(0.096) 
0.882** 
(0.120) 
1.77** 
(0.214) 
1.57** 
(0.161) 
Governor submits 
balanced budget 
-0.695* 
(0.342) 
0.096 
(0.093) 
2.07** 
(0.295) 
1.05** 
(0.260) 
Legislature passes 
balanced budget 
0.130 
(0.266) 
-0.048 
(0.056) 
0.141** 
(0.036) 
-0.134 
(0.133) 
No Deficit Carryover 0.766* 
(0.317) 
0.844** 
(0.125) 
-0.012 
(0.163) 
0.756** 
(0.160) 
Spending Limit 0.046 
(0.129) 
-0.105 
(0.080) 
0.058 
(0.087) 
0.174^ 
(0.089) 
Revenue Limit 0.221 
(0.178) 
0.162^ 
(0.088) 
-1.67** 
(0.296) 
-0.487^ 
(0.260) 
Divided Government 0.074^ 
(0.038) 
-0.030 
(0.041) 
0.014 
(0.033) 
-0.014 
(0.020) 
Governor’s Political 
Party 
0.052 
(0.042) 
0.026 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.029) 
-0.027 
(0.023) 
Structural Balance with 
2005 and 2008 values 
0.104^ 
(0.059) 
-0.004 
(0.041) 
0.137 
(0.105) 
0.029 
(0.041) 
Economic Growth (%) –  
1 Year Lag 
0.038** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
Observations 380 388 380 380 
Adjusted R2 0.6574 0.7168 0.8912 0.9032 
^ Significant at the 90% confidence level.  *Significant at the 95% confidence level.  **Significant at 
the 99% confidence level. All regression models include control variables for year and states. 
a OLS regression. Tests for first-order serial correlation and heteroskedasticity do not show these 
problems. 
b OLS regression with robust standard errors. Tests show no serial correlation but heteroskedasticity is 
present. 
c Prais-Winsten OLS regression with robust standard errors.  
d Prais-Winsten OLS regression. 
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